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Abstract 
This thesis investigates the factors that have been influential in shaping Papua New 
Guinea’s (PNG) foreign policy in the period 2003–2015. It focuses on three case studies as the 
baseline for analysis: the enhanced cooperation program (ECP) between PNG and Australia in 
2003, the Julian Moti affair in 2006 and the case of West Papua in 2015. The period 2003–
2015 is significant because it encompasses several important developments that contributed to 
PNG’s shifting priorities, the most notable of which being the growing economy. PNG’s 
economic growth during this period gave the government a new sense of economic 
independence and confidence. The period showed a growing resistance to Australia’s influence 
in PNG. Leaders became more nationalistic and assertive. Deference to Australia was replaced 
with disputes and frequent opposition. PNG also developed a stronger sense of its place in the 
region and increasingly saw itself as a significant regional power with a role to play in shaping 
regional order. 
 
This research illuminates important areas of continuity and significant changes that 
have taken place in respect to PNG’s foreign policy over the period 2003–2015. An important 
area of continuity is the centrality of the PNG–Australia relationship. PNG has long aspired to 
conduct foreign policy that is independent from Australia’s influence, but this aspiration has 
been limited in part because PNG remained dependent on Australia. The period under review 
has not observed the emergence of a more coherent foreign policy that can minimise Australia’s 
influence in PNG. Political elites have evoked sentiments of nationalism and have deployed 
nationalist rhetoric—against perceived Australian dominance—to justify PNG’s independence 
and national sovereignty. However, the rhetoric was not translated into a coherent policy to 
downplay Australia’s influence. This was reflected in the ECP and Moti cases. Measured 
against key foreign policy concepts, the study did not convey a strong sense of institutional 
consolidation and coherence. Pervasive indigenous cultures played a significant role in foreign 
viii 
policy. The institutional context of foreign policy in PNG remains weak and more personalised 
in individual political leaders. The courts have acted to stabilise foreign policy engagement, 
but this is largely reactive. 
 
The case of West Papua reflected a subtle change in PNG’s foreign policy development. 
It provides an example of PNG’s departure from the traditionally reactive to the more strategic 
approach to foreign policy. The issue of human rights in West Papua has been a concern for 
PNG, but successive governments have refrained from condemning the human rights abuses 
and have often claimed that it was Indonesia’s domestic problem. In 2015, PNG departed from 
the non-interference policy and spoke openly against the human rights abuses in West Papua. 
This happened against a backdrop of regional positioning and strengthening. PNG deployed its 
nascent foreign policy tool—aid diplomacy—and consolidated its position in the region. It then 
pushed the issue of human rights through the sub-regional forum, the Melanesian Spearhead 
Group (MSG). This is a significant development in the evolution of PNG’s foreign policy, as 
it showed a concerted foreign policy. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background of Study 
On 29 June 1999, Papua New Guinea (PNG) Prime Minister William Skate and his 
Foreign Minister, Roy Yaki, flew to Taipei and made a secret diplomatic deal with Taiwan. 
The deal involved US$2.3 billion of aid, soft loans and investments in the timber and fishing 
industries in return for diplomatic recognition (Gaglioti & Phillips, 1999; Kerr, 2000; Monden, 
2003; Standish, 1999). The deal was a unilateral decision made by the prime minister (Bogari, 
2010, p. 141) and was signed on 5 July (Asia Times, 1999; Van Fossen, 2007, p. 17). The deal 
called for the abandonment of PNG’s longstanding ‘one China’ policy, which holds that there 
is only one state called China and that Taiwan is a part of China. As a policy, China demands 
that countries who seek diplomatic relations with China must break official relations with 
Taiwan and vice versa. Since 1976, the ‘one China’ policy has framed PNG foreign policy in 
the region. PNG’s commitment to the ‘one China’ policy has been reciprocated with close 
diplomatic relations and increased economic exchanges between both countries. PNG has also 
supported the policy at multilateral levels through the United Nations (UN) and the Asia–
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) agreements, while maintaining economic ties with 
Taiwan. China has been comfortable with this trilateral relationship, particularly with PNG’s 
economic relationship with Taiwan. China’s accommodative stance placed PNG in an 
advantageous position. In this case, PNG still benefitted from Taiwan, without establishing 
diplomatic relations or giving Taiwan diplomatic recognition. Prime Minister Skate’s decision 
to give diplomatic recognition to Taiwan was a significant shift from the status quo. His action 
caused a significant controversy in international relations. Both Australia and China protested 
vigorously against Skate’s formal link to Taiwan (Adcock, 1999; Atkinson, 2013; Harrison, 
1999). China viewed it as a ‘serious mistake’ and an ‘erroneous decision’ that constituted a 
‘serious infringement of China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity’ (Henderson, 2001, p. 
151). The Australian Government warned PNG against the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan, 
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alleging that it was not in the interests of Australia or PNG, as it could undermine regional 
stability1. 
 
Prime Minister Skate’s diplomatic recognition of Taiwan did not last. The National 
Parliament elected Sir Mekere Morauta as prime minister on 14 July 1999. A week after taking 
office, Morauta repudiated Skate’s recognition of Taiwan. He said that the standard procedures 
for opening diplomatic relations with other countries, which have applied since independence, 
were not correctly followed. He swiftly reversed the diplomatic recognition of Taiwan and 
reaffirmed the country’s commitment to the longstanding ‘one China’ policy, but also 
emphasised the continuing significance of trade ties with Taiwan (Hiambohn, 1999). 
Nonetheless, Skate’s decision to renege on the ‘one China’ policy in exchange for loans, 
investments and aid speaks to the fluid nature of PNG’s foreign policy. Why was Skate able to 
act unilaterally? What influenced his actions? The trilateral relationship between PNG, China 
and Taiwan had been, for the most part, cordial and it was not in PNG’s best interest to create 
an issue with the potential to destabilise this relationship. Whose interests was Skate 
representing? Moreover, how was he able to shift the direction of PNG’s foreign policy on such 
a sensitive issue so easily? These questions are essential to foreign policy analysis and highlight 
the distinctive nature of foreign policy in PNG, judged against Western standards. In truth, 
there is surprisingly little analysis of foreign policy in PNG. Although foreign policy is a 
significant policy area, its analysis is under-researched. 
                                               
1 China and Taiwan’s competition to gain recognition in the Pacific through ‘chequebook diplomacy’ has raised 
concerns about instability in the region (Young, 2007). Both countries have used untied loans and aid packages 
to win recognition at the expense of good governance reforms. This practice is said to undermine attempts to 
improve government transparency and accountability in the Pacific region (though it became less of a problem in 
recent years). 
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The study of PNG’s foreign policy has received little attention in scholarly and policy 
circles. Most of the early contributions to the literature on foreign policy in PNG are historical 
accounts of foreign affairs that are captured in the context of an emerging state (Ballard, 1981; 
Boyce, 1978; Griffin, 1974). There has been a slight increase in the number of scholarly articles 
and books on foreign policy since the 1990s, but most of the contributions lacked an analytical 
approach to the study of foreign policy. That is, they lacked theory development and empirical 
study regarding the processes and outcomes of foreign policy. Many of the contributions are 
focused on the core elements of foreign policy, such as security (Laki & May, 2009; May, 
1991, 1993, 2012), economy (Satish Chand, 2004; Satish. Chand & Yala, 2009; Mawuli, 1997), 
the approaches to foreign policy (Bogari, 2010; Monden, 2003), PNG’s relations with its 
neighbours, particularly Australia (Hayward-Jones, 2012; Hunt, 2017; Moraitis, 2010), 
Indonesia (Blaskett, 1989; May, 1986a, 1991; Weatherbee, 1982) or both (MacQueen, 1989a), 
articles that are not specifically focused on a particular issue but had relevance to immigration 
(Hayward-Jones, 2017; Warbrooke, 2014), national sovereignty (Hawksley, 2005; Rolfe, 
2001), foreign aid (Hawksley, 2005; Hayward-Jones, 2015a) and regional diplomacy (Nelson, 
2007). These contributions focus on specific elements of foreign policy. 
 
De Gedare (1994), and Wolfers and Dihm’s (2009) works on foreign policy analysis in 
PNG are the most significant and comprehensive contributions to the subject. De Gedare 
investigated PNG–Australia relations between 1980 and 1990 and assessed PNG’s 
independence and change vis-a-vis foreign policy during the study period (De Gedare, 1994). 
His study did not cover the period after 1990. PNG has experienced dramatic changes in its 
foreign policy environment, domestically and externally, since the 1990s. The changes 
signified that PNG had more options in terms of foreign policy. For example, the peaceful rise 
of China as an economic and military power in the 1990s (Ikenberry, 2008; Kang, 2010; 
Kristof, 1993) created geopolitical opportunities for PNG. PNG no longer needed to identify 
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itself with traditional hegemons like Australia and New Zealand (NZ), as it had more choices 
of which external power it could engage with. 
 
Wolfers and Dihm (2009) looked at the challenges to making and implementing foreign 
policies in PNG after independence. They outlined the two different policy frameworks that 
guided PNG’s foreign policy since independence: ‘universalism’ (1975–1985) and ‘active and 
selective engagement’ (1985–2002). Universalism expressed PNG’s determination to break 
away from its historical place in the Western orbit and to search elsewhere for support in the 
pursuit of its development and security objectives (Turner, 1990, pp. 148–151). Similarly, the 
active and selective engagement approach to foreign policy was aimed to diversify and seek 
new opportunities. It was premised on a basic approach that included the consolidation and 
extension of existing relations, the conduct of independent and constructive neighbourly 
cooperation and further diversification of PNG’s relations. According to Wolfers and Dihm 
(2009, p. 301), the basic approach to foreign policy was not applicable in its original form circa 
1997. They suggested that shifts were occurring in PNG foreign policy, but they fell short in 
identifying or analysing the dynamics that were driving these changes. Simply put, little is 
known about the factors that drive foreign policy and the approach to foreign policymaking. 
 
There is a distinctive gap in the academic literature on contemporary foreign policy. 
This study reduces the gap. It focuses on foreign policy in PNG and the factors that drive it in 
the twenty-first century. Accordingly, there is an overarching research question guiding this 
research: what factors have been influential in shaping PNG’s foreign policy in the twenty-first 
century? This question has three interrelated parts: foreign policy, foreign policymaking and 
the foreign policy environment. PNG’s foreign policy (the policy itself, or the outcome of 
decisions and actions) in the twenty-first century can be determined by looking at the actors 
and institutions that are involved in foreign policymaking and the factors in the environment 
that influence foreign policy decision-making. The study is important for scholarly purposes 
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because it contributes to the literature of foreign policy in PNG over a period of significant 
change in PNG’s domestic and international environment. It contributes knowledge of foreign 
policy and its making in the contemporary period. The study is equally important for foreign 
policy practitioners. PNG’s future depends on how well policymakers understand and manage 
their connections with the rest of the region and with the rest of the world. The study is 
significant not only in terms of foreign policy, but it will have relevance to broader debates on 
the changing nature of the state, political economy, regionalism and governance. More broadly, 
the study contributes to the broad scholarship on foreign policy and its making in the 
developing world. 
 
1.2 Methodology 
1.2.1 Case study approach 
In this research, I will use the case study approach propounded by Yin (1984, 1998, 
2003, 2009), Stake (1995, 2000), Denzin (1989) and Merriam (1988) within a ‘critical policy 
analysis’ approach (Fischer, 2007, 2016; Jessop & Sum, 2016; Stevens, 2003; Taylor, 1997) to 
answer the research question. A case study is ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomena within its real life context’ (Yin, 2003, pp. 13–14). It is a research 
method involving a close, in-depth and detailed examination of a subject of study and its related 
contextual conditions. The subject of study, or the ‘case’, is a phenomenon specific to time and 
space. The research question in this study, which begins with ‘what’, is more exploratory (Yin, 
1984, p. 17). The case study approach is relevant because it allows investigating foreign policy 
in its totality. It allows looking back in history to record the details of policy actors, institutions, 
processes, factors influencing foreign policy and other useful information on which analysis of 
foreign policy can be made. Simply put, case studies allow one to investigate and retain the 
holistic and meaningful characteristics of real life events in international relations. They 
provide some understanding of ‘who does what with whom, where, when, over what and in 
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what immediate context’ (Andriole, Hopple, McCauley & Wilkenfeld, 1978, p. 7) in foreign 
affairs. 
 
I relied on a number of sources to build the cases for analysis in this study. I sourced 
information from conversations with academics and foreign policy practitioners, ministerial 
statements on public record, bilateral agreements, policy statements obtained from secondary 
sources, a report from a Defence Force Board of Inquiry (DFBI) in PNG and the print and 
online media. I triangulated information from the press and political statements with published 
books, journal articles, Hansard, country profiles, reports and organisational publications and 
reviews. I used the ‘triangulation protocol’ (Denzin, 1989) to ensure that the case study 
research was based on a disciplined approach and not simply on a matter of intuition, good 
intention and common sense. 
 
1.2.2 Critical policy analysis 
The critical policy analysis approach devotes special attention to interpretive, 
argumentative and discursive approaches to policy analysis. It is focused on evaluating actions 
in terms of the larger systems of meaning of which they are a part, including the context of the 
situation, the institutional context and the wider societal context (Fischer, 2016, p. 96). Critical 
policy analysis includes ‘discourse analysis’, or the analysis of language and its interpretation 
(Durnova, 2014; Fairclough, 1993; Paul, 2009), and the analysis of policy documents (Taylor, 
1997) and political actions. The critical policy analysis is fitting for this study, as the analysis 
of foreign policy from the case studies in PNG is drawn from political statements, policy 
documents, events, relationships, processes and the broader social, political, economic and 
cultural milieu in which the decision-maker is embedded. From the critical perspective, I 
viewed foreign policy as an outcome of social and historical conditions. In this sense, reviewing 
the historical evolution of foreign policy enabled me to capture how social and economic 
conditions impact decisions made by policy-makers. I looked at the policy outcomes, 
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interrogated the policy processes, revealed policy constructions, and examined players 
involved in the policy development, interpretation, and implementation processes throughout 
the study. In addition, I looked at the underlying values of the policy to understand how those 
values relate to policy mechanisms such as structures, contents, and features. 
 
1.2.3 Choice of case studies 
This study will answer the research question by focusing on three case studies as the 
baseline for analysis: the enhanced cooperation program (ECP) between PNG and Australia in 
2003–2006, the Julian Moti affair in 2006 and the case of West Papua in 2015. These three 
cases were chosen primarily because each of the cases—all prominent domestic issues—
engage with a significant foreign policy event that elucidates critical issues and illuminates the 
different key aspects of foreign policy. Moreover, foreign policymaking and its outcome 
(foreign policy) are central to the research question. The ECP and Moti cases provide a window 
to foreign policymaking. That is, the cases shed light on the interaction of policymakers 
(politicians and bureaucrats) and institutions in deciding or making foreign policy. The West 
Papua case illuminates the changing nature of PNG’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century. 
The three case studies, together, reveal the factors shaping PNG’s contemporary foreign policy 
and its making in the twenty-first century. 
 
1.2.4 Time frame 
The period 2003–2015 is a significant period to study because it encompasses many 
important developments that contributed to PNG’s shifting priorities. The domestic 
environment saw considerable changes. The discovery of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in the 
PNG highlands at the turn of the twenty-first century improved PNG’s economy, which in turn 
gave a sense of independence. The improved economy instilled a growing sense of economic 
independence and self-confidence in the government (Post-Courier, 14 May 2014, p. 5). 
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Leaders were becoming more nationalistic and assertive in international relations (Post-
Courier, 11 December 2014, p. 3) and deference to Australia was replaced with disputes and 
frequent opposition (ABC News, 2005; Associated Press, 2013; Davidson & Doherty, 2017; 
Kisselpar, 2016). PNG’s domestic politics created pressures on foreign policy. Further, PNG 
developed a stronger sense of its place in the region and increasingly saw itself as a significant 
regional power with a role to play in shaping regional order, following Fiji’s suspension from 
the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2009. In the region, Australia has advanced its engagement 
to secure its strategy and enhance its security interests, as shown in the establishment of the 
offshore detention centres in PNG and Nauru (Bem, Field, Maclellan, Meyer & Morris, 2007; 
Kneebone, 2006). In addition, Australia recast its aid programs in the region to strengthen 
security and demanded good governance and inclusive development (AusAID, 2003, 2010). 
Concurrently, the Pacific region has observed the entry of more active external participants, 
which is reflected in the growing engagement of China and Indonesia (D'Arcy, Matbob & 
Crowl, 2014; Henderson & Reilly, 2003). The period was quite turbulent for PNG in terms of 
foreign policy, as it responded to these regional challenges. The challenges and changes 
signified that PNG had more options in terms of foreign policy. The exclusive focus on 2003–
2015 does not mean that the immediate post-independence era will be neglected; the period 
following independence is relevant because it sets the foundation for understanding 
fundamental changes in the contemporary period. Answering the research question, with a 
focus on 2003–2015, will shed light on the evolving nature of foreign policy and its making in 
PNG in the twenty-first century. 
 
1.3 Structure of The Thesis 
This thesis is divided into three main parts, with part one presenting a conceptual 
framework for this study. It begins by defining what foreign policy is to introduce the 
fundamental concepts of foreign policy analysis in the context of a developing country. A 
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framework is developed from the concept of foreign policy, based on the experiences of 
developing countries, to help understand foreign policy and its making in PNG. It is essential 
to have a sense of the foundation to understand key changes in the contemporary period. 
Therefore, Chapter 3 provides the historical baseline for foreign policy analysis in PNG. It 
covers PNG’s foreign policy from the pre-independence period up to 2002 and provides a basis 
for the first case study that begins in 2003. 
 
Part two is composed of the three case studies, which illuminate different aspects of the 
changing dynamics of PNG’s foreign policy. As a bilateral aid program between the PNG and 
Australian governments, the ECP represented an ambitious institutional strengthening program 
that focused on PNG’s key government departments and agencies (law and justice, treasury, 
finance, planning, transport, civil aviation and border and immigration), as well as reflected 
Australia’s security interests in the region. In mid-2003, Australia proposed to take a more 
direct role in helping PNG address some of the core challenges affecting its development. Both 
countries committed to improving governance and law and order in PNG, with this 
commitment being captured in the ECP agreement. The ECP proved controversial in PNG 
because it proposed a deep form of intervention, including the deployment of Australian 
officials into the PNG Government system. The ECP is about foreign aid and its influence on 
national sovereignty. It is important because it indicates the first time that PNG showed 
significant resistance to the Australian aid program. It sheds light on PNG’s interests and 
provides a window to evolving foreign policy. At the same time, it shows how foreign policy 
is made in PNG. 
 
The Moti affair in 2006 involved PNG’s refusal to extradite Moti to Australia, where 
he faced criminal charges. Instead of accommodating Australia’s request for extradition, the 
PNG Government secretly flew Moti to the Solomon Islands. Moti’s arrest in PNG was 
controversial, but his dramatic escape was even more controversial and became a subject of a 
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judicial inquiry. The Moti affair touches on the issue of national sovereignty, the rule of law 
and bilateral relations with Australia. It emerged against the backdrop of Australia’s 
intervention approach in PNG and the region at large, which was often resented as overbearing 
and neo-colonialist in nature. In defence of national sovereignty, Michael Somare and his 
supporters refused Australia’s extradition request and gave safe passage to Moti. In the process, 
they violated domestic laws as well as international treaties and conventions. The Moti incident 
happened at a time when relations between PNG and Australia were at their lowest, following 
the collapse of the ECP. Further, it happened after an incident at the Brisbane airport, where 
Somare was unceremoniously told to remove his shoes during a routine security search. The 
Moti affair touches on the issue of sovereignty and it is significant to understanding the 
development of PNG’s foreign policy. It suggests shifts in how political elites understood the 
national interest and further illuminates how policy actors and institutions interact to produce 
foreign policy outcomes. 
 
On 5 February 2015, Prime Minister O’Neill made a statement about West Papua that 
indicated a departure from its non-interference policy in Indonesia; he indicated that the issue 
of human rights violations in West Papua was no longer a domestic matter for Indonesia. It 
was the first time that an incumbent PNG prime minister spoke directly about the rights of 
West Papuans in a public forum. O’Neill acknowledged the atrocities that were committed 
against the Melanesian people and vowed to lead discussions in the region to stop the human 
rights violations that were perpetrated against them. The case of West Papua is an outlier in the 
sense that it provides one of the first instances of a substantive PNG foreign policy that is 
supported by a degree of policy coherence. It showed a connection between domestic and 
regional politics and, more importantly, a concerted foreign policy. The West Papua case spoke 
of greater participation in regional politics. 
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The concluding chapter constitutes part three of this thesis. The chapter touches on 
PNG’s foreign policy environment, from the post-independence era up to the period under 
review, to give a sense of the changing environment. The chapter draws heavily on the case 
studies to consider the salient factors that shape PNG’s priorities (foreign policy) and how PNG 
tried to achieve its priorities during the study period (foreign policymaking). The chapter 
revisits the research question and identifies the factors that influenced foreign policy during 
the study period. In doing so, it not only reflects on the research question, but it highlights the 
continuities, changes and challenges of foreign policy. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptual Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
Many of the common concepts of foreign policy that are relevant to developed countries 
do not always fit into the developing country’s settings. Western scholars treat Western ideas 
and institutions as universal and assume that their concepts are superior to the political concepts 
and institutional arrangements in other parts of the world. The experiences of developing 
countries can be forced into the conceptual categories of conventional Western theorising about 
foreign policy, but the explanations that result are at least wanting in richness, if not also in 
interpretive validity (Puchala, 1998, p. 149). Therefore, the purpose of this chapter is to develop 
an analytical framework from which foreign policy in the developing country context can be 
analysed. This is because PNG’s foreign policy is being made in a developing country context 
and it is necessary to understand the fundamental concepts in this context. 
 
The chapter begins by defining foreign policy in an idealised or developed country 
context to identify the key concepts that are central to foreign policy, with the challenges of 
foreign policy covered next to illuminate the nature of the concept. The key concepts of foreign 
policy are used against the experiences of developed and developing countries. The aim is to 
introduce ‘frames of references’ (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987, p. 5), or a set of entities that provide 
guidelines for interpretation and explanation, that will help one understand the factors shaping 
PNG’s foreign policy and its making when applied to the case studies. Drawing on foreign 
policy literature, I have developed a framework that will be used to reflect on the research 
question at the end of the chapter. 
 
2.2 What Is Foreign Policy? 
Foreign policy is the strategy or approach chosen by the state to safeguard its national 
interests and achieve its goals in international relations. Hill (2003a, p. 3) succinctly defines 
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foreign policy as ‘the sum of official external relations conducted by an independent actor 
(usually a state) in international relations’. Webber and Smith (2002, p. 2) defined foreign 
policy in the following terms: 
 
Foreign policy is composed of the goals sought, values set, decisions 
made and actions taken by states, and national governments acting on 
their behalf, in the context of the external relations of national societies. 
It constitutes an attempt to design, manage and control the foreign 
relations of national societies. 
 
Clarke and White (1989, p. 5) argue that ‘foreign policy, like domestic policy, is 
formulated within the state, but unlike domestic policy is directed and must be implemented in 
the environment external to that state’. Gibson (1944, p. 9) provides a classical definition of 
foreign policy that has good currency in the contemporary period. He describes foreign policy 
as: 
 
A well-rounded, comprehensive plan, based on knowledge and 
experience, for conducting the business of government with the rest of 
the world. It is aimed at promoting and protecting the interests of the 
nation. This calls for the clear understanding of what those interests are 
and how far we can hope to go with the means at our disposal. Anything 
less than this falls short of being a national foreign policy. 
 
The descriptions of foreign policy provided by various authors do not vary widely. 
Several themes that emerge from their descriptions are common. First, they agree that foreign 
policy is a governmental activity that is designed to be implemented outside the territorial 
boundaries of a state. Second, foreign policy is ‘aimed at promoting and protecting the interests 
of the nation’ (Gibson, 1944, p. 9). The interest of the nation, or the national interest, is an 
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intrinsic part of foreign policy and it forms the basis for state actions in the international arena; 
that is, national interest drives foreign policy. Third, the state is responsible for foreign policy, 
as it is the main actor in international relations. This view is widely shared by realists (Dunleavy 
& O'Leary, 1987; Hill, 2003a; Martin, 1992; Morgenthau, 1973; Pierson, 1996; Waltz, 1979; 
Wohlforth, 2008) who believed that no higher authority could legitimately pursue the national 
interest apart from the state. This monopoly is identified with sovereignty. No authority can 
exercise sovereignty over a designated territory other than the state. Fourth, the notion that 
foreign policy is composed of goals, values, decisions and actions (Smith & Webber, 2002, p. 
2), or a comprehensive plan (Gibson, 1944, p. 9), implies a rational appraisal of external risks 
and opportunities and states mobilising a response. Finally, ‘means at our disposal’ (Gibson, 
1944, p. 9) indicate some form of power. These themes are central to foreign policy, but how 
do they fit in the context of the developing countries? 
 
2.3 Challenges of Foreign Policy 
In this section, I try to extract the challenges of foreign policy in a developing country 
context. I do this by first highlighting the difficulty of describing foreign policy in terms of a 
well-rounded and comprehensive plan (Gibson, 1944, p. 9). I then identify some of the themes 
central to foreign policy that do not fit well in the developing countries, particularly the concept 
of state and state sovereignty. Finally, I consider the concept of power, the concept of national 
interest and the formalised and institutionalised policy settings in the developed countries and 
compare them with the developing countries. The purpose of contrasting the key concepts of 
foreign policy between the developed and developing countries is to bring PNG into the 
contextual foreground. 
 
As observed in the last section, foreign policy, in an idealised sense, is a strategy or 
approach chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests in the international arena. 
However, foreign policy is by its very nature elusive, disorderly and reactive. First, it is elusive 
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because a number of factors have combined to blur the distinction between domestic and 
foreign policies (Rosenau, 1992, 1997). For instance, the idea of foreign policy can encompass 
a broad range of domestic policy issues that have external dimension, including trade, security, 
defence, economics and aid (Aarstad, Drieskens, Jørgensen, Laatikainen & Tonra, 2015; 
Brown, Halle, Peña Moreno & Winkler, 2007). Second, foreign policy is what individuals 
representing the state do or do not do in their interactions with individuals, groups and officials 
in international relations (Rosenau, 1976, pp. 16–17). In essence, foreign policy is but a series 
of decisions taken by official decision-makers (Brecher, Steinberg & Stein, 1969; Bruck & 
Snyder, 1962). It can involve little more than expressing a view in international forums such 
as the UN (Wolfers & Dihm, 2009, p. 301). Foreign policy does not need to be a predetermined 
course of action or strategy; it can be an impromptu statement or expression of a particular 
view, reflecting the reactive nature of foreign policy. Finally, foreign policy is a slippery 
concept (Hill, 2003b). To some extent, decision-makers decide what foreign policy is by 
choosing what they do. The discretion of the decision-makers reflects the disorderly nature of 
foreign policy. All in all, the strategy inferred by foreign policy is often obscured. In essence, 
foreign policy does not necessarily follow a strategy. 
 
The concept of statehood—which in the literature has been equated with Western, 
democratic and constitutional political institutions, an effective government, inviolate 
geographical boundaries and a monopoly over the use of force within those boundaries 
(Jackson & Rosberg, 1982, pp. 2–4; Weber, 1978, pp. 54–56)—does not fit easily into most 
non-Western settings. The modern state of the liberal West, which took centuries to develop 
into its current form, was difficult to achieve for many societies around the world. Many states 
that were created in the decolonisation process struggled to qualify for statehood by the 
criterion of international law in use by the 1930s: ‘the existence of effective government, with 
centralised administrative and legislative organs’ (Brownlie & Crawford, 2012, p. 129). Many 
states were rushed to independence on a timetable dictated by the administrators, without 
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properly designed institutions for government. As a result, many post-independence states 
could not create legitimate and effective political and administrative institutions, or 
participatory processes to ensure the active and open participation of civil society in the 
formulation of the state’s government and policies. Many institutions could not deliver political 
goods, namely security, health, education, economic opportunity, good governance, law and 
order and fundamental infrastructure requirements (Ballard, 1981; Boyce, 1978; Migdal, 1988; 
Potter, 2004). 
 
The idea of statehood is closely associated with sovereignty, a concept that is defined 
in many ways by different analysts. Sovereignty is most commonly identified with the 
Westphalian concept, understood as the recognised right of domestic political authorities to be 
the only arbiters of legitimate behaviour within the territorial boundaries of their state, free 
from external interference (Krasner, 1999, p. 4). The Westphalian concept stresses the 
exclusion of external authority in a state’s domestic affairs. The authority of the state, however, 
has never worked perfectly and its principles have frequently been violated for several reasons 
that vary from one state to another. For example, following the end of the Cold War, a number 
of states stretching from the Balkans through the Caucasus, Middle East, Central Asia and 
South Asia were unable or unwilling to fulfil their sovereign responsibility of providing 
security and the appropriate standard of political goods and services for their citizens, which 
forced the international community to intervene in some of these crises (Ayoob, 2002; Etzioni, 
2007). This intervention has eroded the state’s sovereignty, as the state’s political authority is 
shifted from state to non-state actors or institutions (Thomson, 1995, p. 214). In practice, the 
state’s capacity to exercise independent choices, implied by sovereignty, can be curtailed. 
 
The traditional notion of the state as being the fundamental unit of international society 
is flawed, as new actors have become involved. The increased linkages between a variety of 
state, sub-state and non-state actors have eroded the primacy of the state in foreign policy. 
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Never have so many different non-state actors competed for the authority and influence that 
once belonged to states alone. Non-government organisations (NGOs), intergovernmental 
organisations, social movements, civil society in its many combinations (and definitions), 
policy networks, issue networks and communities of experts of every calling and credential 
have now populated the world of foreign policy. They align (and realign) in fluid alliances of 
interest and opportunity through the mass and electronic media and affect governments in 
endlessly new and startling ways (Naím & Smith, 2000). Moreover, as the world economy is 
transformed by new modes of production and trade (and as transnational corporations and 
institutions come to exercise more influence and power), the capacity of national policymakers 
to frame their agendas diminishes (Lewis & McGrew, 1992). Fundamentally, the integration 
of the global economy has undermined traditional state sovereignty. For developing states, this 
means that it is even harder to exercise sovereignty, as more non-state actors compete for 
authority. 
 
Power is a fundamental feature of politics and international relations. It is central to the 
pursuance of national interest. Power has multiple connotations in the way it is used (Clarke, 
1979; Dahl, 1957; Lukes, 2005; MacDonald, 1976; McLachlan, 1981), but it connotes 
influence in international relations. It works through behavioural relations or interactions 
(Barnett & Duvall, 2005) and social relations, and through dependence and interdependence 
(Baldwin, 1980; Barkin, 2013; Keohane & Nye, 1987). Power is conceived as an attribute that 
is possessed by the state and it is something that can be used intentionally as a resource to either 
shape the actions of others, or condition their behaviour and actions (Barnett & Duvall, 2005, 
p. 45). A state’s power is often characterised by tangible (military strength, economic strength, 
size of population and territory) and intangible (culture, ideology and competence in 
diplomacy) resources (Keohane & Nye, 1998; Nye, 1990; Waltz, 1979). Waltz (1979, p. 131) 
asserted that a state’s power status depends on how it scored on all the following items: size of 
population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political 
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stability and competence in diplomacy. Measured against some of these elements, a realist 
analysis, for example, would reveal that developing countries are deficient in power and are, 
therefore, inconsequential in world politics (Puchala, 1998, p. 149). Nonetheless, in 
contemporary international relations, power is more complex because it is interrelated (Barkin, 
2013; Keohane & Nye, 1987) and often achieved through shared institutions. Developed 
countries, including those regarded as powerful, often find themselves dependent on 
developing countries for resources, or in situations that warrant cooperation from developing 
countries. For example, the post–Cold War era has witnessed a proliferation of terrorist 
activities around the world. Terrorism has militated against the state’s power to act alone, 
thereby forcing states—even those considered powerful—to cooperate to address the issue. 
 
The idea of state interest in foreign policy has been most clearly enunciated through the 
concept of the national interest (Gibson, 1944, p. 9). The concepts of national interest enable 
policymakers to understand the goals and objectives that are to be pursued by a state’s foreign 
policy. Otherwise phrased, a state’s national interest is pursued through foreign policies using 
self-interested strategies that are oriented towards some goals or objectives. These strategies 
are designed by the government through high-level decision-making processes (DeRouen & 
Mintz, 2010; Hudson, 2007; Jensen, 1982). The concept of national interest, however, is 
contentious, shrouded with ambiguity and often defying any adequate or globally accepted 
definition. Several scholars have written on national interest (Beard & Smith, 1934; Frankel, 
1970; Morgenthau, 1952; Nuechterlein, 1976, 1991; Weldes, 1996), but there is no consensus 
on an accepted definition of the subject. In its most basic form, national interest often includes 
four aspects: defence interests, which protect the nation–state and its citizens against the threat 
of physical violence directed from another state; economic interests, which enhance the nation–
state’s economy; world order interests, which attempt to maintain the international, political 
and economic system in which nation–states may feel secure; and ideological interests, which 
involve the protection and furtherance of a set of values that a nation–state’s people share and 
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believe to be universally good (Nuechterlein, 1976, p. 248). These basic features show that 
national interest does not include only material interests, but ideological interests as well. 
However, in practice, the idea of national interest is subjective. Formulation of national interest 
by the government can be the outcome of a contested and subjective process (Alden & Aran, 
2012) in which multiple sources of influences—such as interest groups (distinguished by their 
sources of support and the nature of their interest) and public opinion (a broad term that 
encompasses the mass and attentive public, various interest and lobby groups)—seek to define 
national interest in favourable terms. National interest objectives can also be the object of 
intense external lobbying, as stakeholders external to government, such as the private sector, 
organised migrant communities, international government organisations and other NGOs, 
intervene to secure their interests. 
 
2.4 Foreign Policymaking: Developed and Developing Countries 
Developed and developing countries vary widely in their ‘structure’, which is defined 
as: 
• the formal institutions of rule—laws, rules and regulations—that govern economic, 
political or social life  
• the informal institutions that shape behaviour, loosely understood as culture, and 
might include prevailing ideologies, religious beliefs or discourses at the ideational 
level of culture 
• the formal and informal institutional arrangements and distributions of power that 
constitute them 
• the socio-economic and social structure prevailing in the domestic environment 
• the geographical features, such as whether a country is primarily tropical or 
temperate, landlocked or insular, mountainous or desert and large or small 
•  the resources endowments (Leftwich, 2010, p. 96). 
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These structures strongly influence both the strategic policy choices and the 
institutional arrangements that a leadership may make. The structural configurations vary from 
one country to another and they always represent both constraints and opportunities for 
‘agents’, which are described as individuals, groups, organisations and coalitions that pursue 
particular interests (Leftwich, 2007, p. 7; 2010, p. 96). Foreign policy is shaped by the dynamic 
interplay—causal relations running in both directions—between structural factors, institutions 
and agents. Figure 2.1 is a diagram representing the three factors that shape foreign policy. 
 
Figure 2.1. Framework for understanding factors shaping foreign policy. 
Source: (Leftwich, 2007). 
 
In developed states, foreign policy is usually institutionalised in the form of formalised 
and prescriptive state institutions (Allison & Zelikow, 1999; Gaskarth, 2013; Gyngell & 
Wesley, 2003), although still with a high degree of discretion. Responsibility for foreign 
policymaking is usually shared by distinct governmental agencies, with foreign affairs (the 
department or ministry) having a dominating but not necessarily dominant role. The cabinet 
plays a significant role in foreign policy. However, I use parliamentary committees as an 
example for illustrating the formalised and institutionalised settings that are found in many 
developed states. The government frequently uses committees to deliberate on issues that are 
vital to its interests and the use of committees enhances transparency within the policy process. 
Institutions 
Structural 
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Committees provide a robust ‘check and balance’ system: they separate politics from the 
administration, they prevent or minimise vested interests and they limit political interference 
in specific areas of interests that are under committee review (Firth, 2011; Gaskarth, 2013; 
Gyngell & Wesley, 2003). Each core interest area of foreign policy is separated and managed 
by a separate committee, though it is coordinated at the centre. For example, this can be found 
in Australia: the National Security Committee of Cabinet concentrates on the security aspect 
of foreign policy (Australian Government, 2013); the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade considers and reports matters relating to foreign affairs, defence, 
trade and human rights; the Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
deals with legislation and matters referred to it for inquiry; and the Joint Standing Committee 
on Treaties reviews and reports all treaty actions proposed by the government before any action 
that binds Australia to the terms of the treaty is taken (Firth, 2011, pp. 88–92). As mentioned, 
the cabinet plays a more significant role in foreign policy than parliamentary committees, but 
the example illustrates the shared responsibility for foreign policymaking. The arrangement 
allows the state’s policy actors to identify interests and goals, recognise the courses of action 
to attain the goals, pool resources, consider the costs associated with each action and select the 
course of action that will result in the highest expected utility (Oppenheim, 2002; Snidal, 2012). 
The underlying assumption is that the state is unified, rational and seeking to both determine 
the national interest in a systematic way and then implement a credible foreign policy. The 
critical point is that foreign policy is driven in a rational sense and is completed by consolidated 
bureaucratic institutions. 
 
In an ideal policy environment, foreign policy often occurs across different interrelated 
levels. According to Gyngell and Westley (2003), foreign policy occurs across strategic, 
contextual, organisational and operational levels (see Figure 2.2). Foreign policymaking at the 
strategic level speaks both to the regional and global politics and to the specific policy 
outcomes required by the interplay of events and societal values. Strategic foreign policy 
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involves specific choices, interpretations and definitions of national interests, national values, 
national roles and the international context. It is authoritative, generalised and abstract. 
 
Figure 2.2. The different levels of foreign policymaking. 
Source: Gyngell and Wesley (2003). 
 
The context or circumstances that internationally and domestically form the setting for 
foreign policy profoundly influence foreign policy choices. Contextual calculations determine 
what is at risk for the state and its social values, as well as the type of actions that can be taken. 
At this level of policymaking, the costs, benefits, opportunities and constraints of the policy, 
its relationship to other policy issues and its relevance to the wider strategic policy goals are 
analysed. Three sets of criteria are used to make foreign policy judgements: the social values 
and the areas of responsibility that are affected (governmental); how they resonate with the 
political philosophy or ideology of the political party or the government in power (political); 
and the relative power of the states that are involved in an issue (international). Each of the 
criteria is important to foreign policy decisions and sometimes difficult choices and trade-offs 
are made at this level (Gyngell & Wesley, 2003, p. 29). 
 
Policymaking at the organisational level involves both the process of guiding a policy 
response through existing institutional or governmental structures and the process of 
Strategic level
Contextual level
Organisational level
Operational level
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marshalling and apportioning resources to policy issues. The extent to which an issue is 
managed at the organisational level depends largely on the seriousness of the issue at hand; an 
issue of the highest priority will attract substantial resources. Policymaking at the operational 
level refers to the implementation of foreign policy through diplomatic, bureaucratic, media or 
other channels. The operational level is divided into geographical and functional specialisations 
that directly monitor the policy space. Although operational policies are enacted by leaders and 
ministers, the bulk of the operational policies at this level is carried out by bureaucrats and 
diplomats. 
 
Each level (strategic, contextual, organisational and operational) plays a connected and 
crucial role in producing the actual foreign policy initiative or response. Further, each level 
features different sets of activities and is separated by different levels of authority and 
responsibility. The differing authority and responsibility at each level is determined by the 
separation of powers between the different actors (political executives and the civil servants) 
and the hierarchical structure of the policymaking institution (Gyngell & Wesley, 2003, pp. 
17–57). When combined, the different levels, with each set of activities, provide the dynamic 
nature of the foreign policy process. In this foreign policy environment, there is less scope for 
discretion. Leaders must navigate their way through a web of institutional roadblocks and 
political opposition that generates constraints and incentives in the conduct of foreign 
policymaking. 
 
The discussion on foreign policy thus far has largely been focused on an idealised state. 
I now relate the themes that are discussed above to the context of developing countries. I start 
by looking at the concept of state. As mentioned, many postcolonial states were not properly 
built to accommodate the demands of a modern state. Many states were rushed to independence 
without properly designed institutions for government. As a result, the formal institutions of 
government are generally weak (Alence, 2004; Boyce, 1978; Clapham, 1977), in the sense that 
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the rules and regulations guiding the operations and administration of the political institutions 
are widely circumvented or ignored in practice (Helmke & Levitsky, 2004; O'Donnell, 1994). 
In Melanesia, most analyses of the state suggest that pre-existing social forms pervade the state 
at almost every level (Dinnen, 2001; Gordon & Meggitt, 1985; Morgan, 2005). Culture plays 
an influential role in people’s social, political and economic lives. For example, politics at all 
levels is organised along traditional structural lines (Ketan, 2007). Intensely local forms of 
social control are stronger than the order—or disorder—imposed by the state. The introduced 
state did not alter the fundamentally established political practice or the ‘Melanesian political 
culture’ (Morgan, 2005, p. 3; Standish, 2013, p. 8). Political culture may be loosely defined as 
the sets of actions and values that define and guide political behaviour (Chilton, 1988), or more 
pointedly, as a distinctive predisposition that drives political behaviour (Diamond, 1994; 
Formisano, 2001). The patterns of these predispositions vary from society to society. In 
Melanesia, the political culture has been influenced by the combination of modern state and 
traditional cultural institutions that are primarily associated with leadership and loyalty to the 
clan (Ketan, 2000, 2007; May, 1997; Standish, 2013). The influence of the ‘Melanesian 
political culture’ on the introduced system of government has, in turn, weakened the formal 
institutions of government and has posed significant challenges for policymaking and 
implementation in a myriad of ways. 
 
Culture has also influenced the foreign policies of the Pacific Island states. The ‘Pacific 
way’, which denoted a collective political identity for virtually all the island states of the Pacific 
region in the postcolonial period, has set the benchmark for regional cooperation. The Pacific 
way claimed unique Pacific characteristics based on broadly shared social and political values 
that revolve around notions of tolerance and consensus (Lawson, 2013, p. 19), solidarity and 
reciprocity, the fostering and maintenance of kinship networks and relationships, attachment 
to land and sea, respect and care for others, the upholding of human dignity, respect for kinship 
and consultation and shared leadership (Huffer, 2006, p. 50). These values became the guiding 
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principles for Pacific regionalism and set the foundation for the PIF. The Melanesian countries 
complemented the Pacific way with a ‘Melanesian way’ (Narokobi, 1983) to represent the 
Melanesian culture and way of doing things. The Melanesian way is vaguely defined, but it 
had connotations of kastom (custom) and wantok (Lawson, 2013; Lindstrom, 2008) and was 
firmly grounded in culture (Huffer, 2006; Keesing, 1989; Moore, 2008). They have contributed 
to an ideology of ‘Melanesian-ism’ that has, in turn, underpinned the assertion of a specific 
regional identity. The Melanesian identity emerged largely as a Melanesian enterprise; it has 
been mediated by certain anti-colonial dynamics in which the ‘Melanesian self’ has been 
asserted in opposition to a ‘European other’ (Lawson, 2013, p. 18). Melanesians identified 
themselves differently from non-Melanesians. The construction of the Melanesian identity 
paved the way for the formation of the sub-regional group, the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
(MSG). 
 
In many developing countries, the distribution of power and authority within the 
government is often personalised and concentrated in the hands of a few leaders. Foreign policy 
is a monopolised or highly exclusive affair (Lampreia & Seabra da Cruz Jnr, 2005) and political 
leaders often insulate foreign policy from domestic influences. Prime ministers and presidents 
often take a personalised approach to foreign policymaking, in that they exclude opposition, 
prevent civil society participation, are less accountable to Parliament and the people, 
circumvent the bureaucracy’s involvement and subsequently exclude senior public officials 
from the policymaking process (Alemazung, 2010; Barker & Sandbrook, 1986; Clapham, 
1977; East & Robertson, 2005; Singh, 2000). To differing degrees, the formal institutions that 
are responsible for foreign policy are nominal in developing states; they exist, but they are not 
actively involved in the decision-making process. The role of foreign affairs ministries in many 
developing countries is subordinated to policy implementation and foreign relations 
management (Crouch, 1996; Singh, 2000, 2005). Parliaments have insignificant influence. In 
some countries, the role of Parliament is reduced to nothing but a rubberstamp for the 
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executive’s policies (Boyce, 1978; Clapham, 1977; Singh, 2000, 2005). Indeed, Melanesian 
parliaments often rubberstamped the executive’s programs (Morgan, 2005, p. 6). At its core, 
the formal state institutions responsible for foreign affairs do not participate in foreign policy 
development. Subsequently, the political process described by Gyngell and Westley (2003) in 
developed countries is almost non-existent in developing countries. 
 
Under this foreign policy environment, it is difficult to identify a coherent or shared 
idea of national interest. In developing countries that have authoritarian regimes, the national 
interest is becoming personalised—but nevertheless, there can be competing perspectives 
among the ruling elite who contend for translation into what might be called ‘national interests’ 
(De Gedare, 1994, p. 44). The national interest is more often aligned with leaders’ interests. In 
developing countries that have democratic regimes, the idea of national interest is often 
ambiguous and loosely defined by the governments in power. They often manipulate foreign 
policy in the direction that corresponds to their particular interest, which may not coincide with 
the ‘national interest’ (Alden & Aran, 2012, p. 33). Therefore, it is not difficult for the 
government or political elites to pursue personal and parochial interests rather than what may 
be deemed as the interest of the state. In Melanesian societies, clans or tribe loyalties are 
generally stronger than loyalty to the state (Reilly, 2004). As such, what may be deemed as the 
national interest is subordinated to tribal and clan interests. 
 
There is a disconnect between policy and practice in many developing countries. The 
government’s ability to systemically determine the national interest, and subsequently foreign 
policy, at the organisational and operational levels is often challenged by capacity and 
governance issues. The foreign affairs mechanism usually contains a small political elite who 
are based on personalised leadership, a small bureaucracy that is particularly weak at the lower 
levels and inadequate specialisation in both geographical and functional divisions of foreign 
affairs administration (Boyce, 1978, p. 5). The foreign affairs mechanism is sometimes 
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incapacitated by inadequate resources. In the Pacific and Melanesian states, many 
representatives have limited formal education (John Henderson, 2003; Morgan, 2005). 
Disarmed by their inability to tackle government legislation on technical matters, members of 
parliaments have often allowed much of government legislation to pass as tabled (Morgan, 
2005, p. 8). In the context of foreign policy, limited formal education signifies that Melanesian 
members of parliament possess limited skills and knowledge in mastering the art of diplomacy 
and in articulating foreign policy objectives. Under these circumstances, it is difficult for the 
state to drive foreign policy in a rational sense. Further, the politics in many developing 
countries is characterised by extreme fluidity and uncertainty (Levitsky, 2003). For example, 
governments in Melanesia are replaced frequently by way of no-confidence, or by shifting 
alliance with political parties without serving their full term (Fraenkel, 2014; Henderson, 2003; 
May, 2003c). The frequent and unexpected changes in government and foreign ministries 
generates an environment of uncertainty. Under such conditions of uncertainty, foreign policy 
formulation becomes a daunting task. The interest of the state and the latitude of actions 
deemed appropriate in specific issue areas of foreign policy are often limited to managing risks 
and installing short-term measures to reduce risk and uncertainty. For the most part, foreign 
policy tends to be more reactive. Foreign policy pronounced at the strategic level is often 
reactive to external pressures, threats and opportunities—albeit erratically and 
unsystematically. 
 
Many developing countries lack power in international relations (Puchala, 1998) and, 
as such, they are unable to independently carry out their foreign policy objectives. They cannot 
effectively make and enforce policy on their own; they can do so only in cooperation with other 
countries. They may have the material resources, but they often do not have the skills and 
capital to translate these material resources into desired outcomes. As such, many postcolonial 
states depend on benevolent powers for economic development (Amarshi, Good & Mortimer, 
1979; Cardoso & Faletto, 1979; Denham & Lombardi, 1996). The dependent relationship is 
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vital in developing countries. In some cases, independence was made possible by continuing 
dependence on external sources for financial aid, technical skills and military support (Ballard, 
1981; Boyce, 1978; Clapham, 1977; Pardesi, 1976). In turn, many states are unable to exert 
substantial influence over the fundamental decisions that affect their national economy, as 
international structures and processes shape them directly or indirectly. The growing spread 
and depth of international cooperation, increasing domestic acceptance and application of 
international law, aid dependency and the conditions attached to loans from international 
financial institutions often impinge on decision-making. This phenomenon subsequently 
erodes the sovereignty of the state. 
 
Many governments did not sever the relationship with their former colonial 
administrations after independence. They maintained strong economic links with their former 
colonisers because of the trade partnership that had developed through the colonial period 
(Ballard, 1981; Clapham, 1977). The historical connections between the colonial 
administration and the emerging state often strengthened dependent relationships and, 
moreover, generated ‘patron–client relationships’ (Carney, 1989; Eisenstadt & Roniger, 1980) 
that are usually characterised by the exchange of economic and political resources (support, 
loyalty, votes and protection), as well as a certain degree of reciprocity. The most important 
aspect of patron–client relationships is compliance. The patron expects compliance from the 
client in matters that are crucial to patronal interests (Kassimeris, 2009). As mentioned, 
dependent relationships were important for many developing countries. With little influence in 
world politics and international relations, most developing countries are compelled to use 
diplomacy as a primary bilateral activity for building coalitions and partnerships with 
individual states to expand economic opportunities and security interests. Further, they form 
coalitions and regional groupings to compensate for the power deficiency. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
The key lessons from the literature are that foreign policy in developing countries is 
challenged by weak formal institutions and that there is a limited capacity of the political and 
bureaucratic elites to articulate foreign policy objectives. In this weak foreign policy 
environment, foreign policy is unstable and non-strategic. Developing countries lack the power 
to independently pursue foreign policy objectives. As such, they depend on benevolent powers 
for development support and, further, form coalitions to pursue their interests in the 
international arena. Foreign policy in developing countries is more personalised. In the absence 
of strong formal institutions, the interest that drives foreign policy is loosely defined by the 
government in power. These key points are significant when considering PNG’s foreign policy 
in the postcolonial period, which will be considered in more detail in Chapter 3. 
 
The key points raised in this chapter are also significant when considering the factors 
that have been influential in shaping PNG’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century, which 
are raised as the primary research question in Chapter 1. In subsequent chapters, I will use the 
points raised in this chapter and reflect on the research question. I will consider: the 
environment in which foreign policy is made, or the environment in which policy actors are 
embedded; the agents or the actors involved in foreign policymaking, including state 
(politicians and bureaucrats), sub-state and non-state actors and their influence on the policy 
process; the institutions (formal and informal) that shape the actions of the agents; and PNG’s 
relationship with Australia, as well as the wider Asia–Pacific region. I will also consider 
foreign policies in the period 2003–2015 to determine the evolving nature of PNG’s foreign 
policy. 
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Chapter 3: Foreign Policy and Its Making: Pre-Independence, 2002 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a historical view of PNG’s foreign policy and its making from 
the pre-independence era and from independence in 1975 up to 2002. This period is important 
because it offers the historical appreciation of foreign policy prior to the first case study, which 
starts in 2003. Further, the pre-independence period is critical to this study because it sets the 
foundation for the evolution of postcolonial foreign policy. It illuminates the key principles 
and factors that shape it and provides the baseline for foreign policy analysis in PNG. I focus 
on the key themes raised in Chapter 2 as a baseline from which to gauge the development of 
foreign policy in the subsequent chapters, particularly how foreign policy is changing after 
2002. 
 
The chapter is divided into six main parts. The first part looks at the concept of state in 
the PNG context and the second part covers the period from the pre-independence era up to 
1975; it touches on the foundation of PNG’s foreign policy. The Australian legacy was central 
to almost all aspects of PNG’s international relations. In the years leading up to independence, 
PNG sought to move away from the Australian orbit. The third part looks at the period between 
1975 and 1981, with a specific focus on PNG’s first foreign policy doctrine—universalism. 
Universalism suggested a departure from the Australian orbit, but it had limitations. PNG did 
not implement foreign policy independently, partly because it heavily relied on Australia for 
aid and other developmental support. The second foreign policy doctrine—active and selective 
engagement—is covered next and looks at the period between 1981 and 2002. The evolving 
nature of active and selective engagement constitutes the fifth part. This part focuses on the 
factors that influence PNG’s foreign policy, including changes in the external environment, 
PNG’s relations with its neighbours—particularly Australia, Indonesia and the Pacific Island 
countries—and PNG’s domestic environment. The final part focuses on the foreign affairs 
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mechanism and foreign policymaking. This part aims to highlight the challenges that foreign 
policymaking faces in the post-independence era up to 2002 and the chapter ends with a short 
conclusion. 
 
3.2 PNG: The State 
The colonisation and occupation of PNG has been well documented by many writers 
(Gash, Hookey, Lacey & Whittaker, 1975; Joyce, 1971; Legge, 1956). The island of New 
Guinea was colonised by different empires at different times in its colonial past. The Dutch 
initially laid claim to the western part of the island in 1660, as Dutch New Guinea, and the 
Germans took possession of the north-eastern quarter in 1884 and named it German New 
Guinea. 
 
Figure 3.1. Map of New Guinea in the colonial era 
Source: CartoGIS, the Australian National University. 
 
The south-east quarter of the island of New Guinea, known as the Territory of Papua, 
became a British protectorate in 1884 and it was formally annexed as British New Guinea in 
1888. It was devolved to Australian jurisdiction (exercised jointly by Queensland, New South 
Wales and Victoria) in 1902 as British interest in the island waned. From 1902 to 1905, the 
newly formed Government of the Commonwealth of Australia relieved the three states of joint 
control and assumed responsibility until 1906, when the Commonwealth took over full control 
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of the territory and changed its name to Papua. In 1949, the two territories of Territory of Papua 
and Trust Territory of New Guinea (formerly German New Guinea) were amalgamated to form 
the Australian-administered Territory of Papua and New Guinea, under the terms of the United 
Nations Trusteeship Agreement of 1946 (Griffin, 1974; Legge, 1956). The combined territories 
were given self-governing authority on 1 December 1973 and Australia granted them full 
independence under the name of Papua New Guinea on 16 September 1975. 
 
Figure 3.2. Map of the Territory of Papua and New Guinea 
Source: CartoGIS, the Australian National University. 
 
Figure 3.3. Political map of Papua New Guinea 
Source: CartoGIS, the Australian National University. 
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Prior to colonisation, people were organised into many thousands of independent 
political groupings, with some created by individual ‘big men’ and others led by powerful 
chiefs (Berndt & Lawrence, 1971; Sahlins, 1963; Strathern, 1971). Village societies were, and 
still are to a large extent, self-contained communal authorities that coexisted in alternating 
patterns of war and peace with their neighbours. The traditional political organisation did not 
exist beyond the level of a tribal community. In 1884, the concept of state, which identified 
with democratic and constitutional political institutions, was imposed on the traditional PNG 
societies with disregard for their cultures, structures and boundaries. The imposition of the 
colonial state superimposed an overarching institutional framework that was foreign to the 
local communities. The introduced state did not transform the indigenous culture; it gradually 
developed with traditional Melanesian forms of government to produce syncretic political 
modes that exhibit elements of both Western and indigenous forms (Allen & Hasnain, 2010; 
Ketan, 2000; May, 1982, 2004; McLeod, 2008; Morgan, 2005). Many people found it difficult 
to distinguish between the state and their respective traditional styles. Political elites have often 
combined traditional and modern values and organisational forms of government to suit their 
own development (May, 1997, pp. 24–25). But in setting the ‘rules of the game’ (Helmke & 
Levitsky, 2006; Leftwich, 2010) and applying them, political elites often undermine the power 
of the political institutions. They often used the ‘Melanesian way’ (Jacobsen, 1995; Narokobi, 
1980), to justify the use of traditional values in governance. The term ‘Melanesian way’ is 
vaguely defined, but it has connotations of kastom (custom) and wantok (Lawson, 2013; 
Lindstrom, 2008) and its use provides ‘a capacity for compromise’ (May, 2004, p. 47) in 
politics and governance. 
 
Culture plays an influential role in PNG’s social, political and economic life. PNG’s 
political history has been shaped by its traditional culture of competition and reciprocity. Terms 
like ‘big man’ and wantok are used to describe the patronage and informal networks that are 
often more influential than formal institutions and rules (Scott, 2005, p. 51). The cultural 
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obligation to reciprocate under the wantok system creates tension between the pressure for the 
institutionalisation that would consolidate and strengthen the power and position of formal 
institutions and the pressure for the maintenance of a personalised basis of politics, which is 
largely played by ‘big men’ who derive their power and authority from their closest supporters. 
This power, regarded as ‘personal power’ (Sahlins, 1963, p. 289), is often more influential than 
legal and rational authority. 
 
PNG was still a ‘collection of stateless societies’ (Wainwright & White, 2004, p. 22) at 
their independence in 1975, comprised of hundreds of semi-autonomous tribal and linguistic 
groups. It has more than 7000 different cultural groups and approximately 852 different 
languages, which makes it one of the most culturally diverse countries in the world. By 
ethnolinguistic standards, it is the most fragmented society in the modern era (Reilly, 2008, pp. 
12–13). The cultural diversity posed significant problems for national unity and has been a 
great concern for the early government. The threat to national unity was exacerbated by the 
separatist movements that were proliferating in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Some of these 
movements were established from a background of cult activity, others were established to 
oppose particular government policies and few pressed for more regional autonomy. Many 
leaders in the separatist movements were ambivalent about national unity (Denoon, 2005, p. 
86; May, 2004, pp. 48–106). Since the 1970s, political elites and the local intellectuals have 
undertaken efforts to produce images and ideals of nationhood in the hope of consolidating 
national unity (Ballard, 1981; Foster, 1995; Griffin, 1974; May, 2004). The newly established 
government of Sir Michael Somare pushed for national unity through its ‘political education’ 
programs to infuse the idea of unity in the minds of people (Ballard, 1981, p. 64; May, 2004, 
pp. 118–121). The effectiveness of this program, however, was difficult to assess. Despite a 
variety of attempts to cultivate or invoke a sense of shared national culture and identity, the 
highly localised loyalties to wantok and ethnolinguistic groups prevailed. The weak sense of 
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nationhood complicated the process of state building and made it difficult to articulate the 
national interest. 
 
At their independence, the new state faced an enormous task of creating a sense of 
shared nationhood. Sentiments of nationalism were limited to a few people (Ballard, 1981, p. 
10). The weak sense of nationalism made it difficult to cohere a strong or unitary national state, 
which complicated the prospects for pursuing strategic foreign policies. It suggested that 
foreign policy was not driven by nationalistic tendencies as seen in many parts of the 
developing world, particularly Africa (Duara, 2003; Hodgkin, 1956; Pardesi, 1976). In PNG, 
nationalism was generated by an elite group who were educated in the Western education 
system and who were introduced during the colonial period. They were able to mobilise the 
support for nationalist movements that led to independence. The path to independence lacked 
what Geertz (1973) described as the ‘consciousness of massive, univocal, irresistible 
movement, the stirring to action of an entire people, that the attack upon colonialism almost 
everywhere induced’ (Geertz, 1975, p. 236). Simply put, independence was not triggered by 
united and mass movements against colonialism. Pokawin (1982, p. 57) argued that: 
 
Independence for PNG on 16 September 1975 was not a result of 
national consensus. The majority of Papua New Guineans were either 
not concerned, against, or not committed. It was the doing of a small 
group of people led by the Pangu Party and its sympathisers in the 
House of Assembly. Many people were not sure of what independence 
would bring for them and the country. 
 
The Western-educated elites that experienced the brunt of the colonial policies 
engineered the self-determination process in PNG. They optimistically borrowed Western 
ideas and ideals and presented them as ‘national goals’ in the preamble of the PNG constitution 
(Kari, 2005). These goals were said to have captured the ‘common interest’ of society, which 
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subsequently formed the overarching ideological interests that drove domestic and foreign 
policy. 
 
PNG exhibits many signs of a weak state, including the limited capacity of the public 
sector to deliver services, the weak law enforcement capacity and a poorly developed sense of 
national identity. Its political institutions seem to be growing increasingly vulnerable to 
undemocratic pressures that range from long adjustments of parliaments to increasingly 
trouble-prone national elections (May, 2003c, pp. 154–155). The country’s development is 
challenged by dysfunctional service delivery mechanisms, deteriorating infrastructure, poorly 
functioning systems of government, law and order challenges and corruption. The state’s 
weakness in providing adequate government services is, in part, a function of economic decline 
that could be corrected through sustained growth. However, periods of high economic growth 
have not been associated with good governance (Chand, 2002; Levantis & Gupta, 1999; 
Mawuli, 1997). Clans increasingly play the role of interests groups (Reilly, 2004, p. 51). The 
effect of small ethnic groups acting to secure their own interests undermines the broader 
interests of society. During his survey of policymaking in 1981, Ballard wrote that ‘state 
penetration of society was limited’ in most new states (Ballard, 1981, p. 3). More than four 
decades after their independence, this is still true of many parts of PNG. State institutions and 
agencies are left vulnerable to manipulation by ‘big men’ and other personal and local interests. 
 
3.3 Pre-Independence, 1975 
The decolonisation of PNG contrasted in many respects to other parts of the former 
imperial world (Carter & O'Meara, 1985; Fischer & Morris-Jones, 2012) because PNG was 
given self-government before its independence. This gave decolonisation in the Pacific a 
‘special character’ (MacDonald, 1986, p. 115). Decolonisation in PNG was peaceful, smooth 
and progressive and Canberra relied on a variety of committees to facilitate the decolonisation 
process. The first, the Gunther Select Committee, recommended a House of Assembly in its 
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interim report in 1962. The first House of Assembly in 1964 had 38 Papua New Guineans and 
26 expatriates. Most of the indigenous Papua New Guineans were illiterate and few members 
had any idea of the structure of government, or how an assembly might affect it. The second 
House of Assembly was elected in 1968 and was full of Papua New Guineans, but it was still 
an Australian legislature. The second committee, the Guise Select Committee, focused more 
on further constitutional progress, but within strict limits that were dictated by Canberra. The 
final committee, the Arek Select Committee, embraced precedents from previous committees 
and the Australian connection. They synthesised the views of Papua New Guineans, reconciled 
them with Australian policy for the devolution and subsequent delegation of powers and 
subsequently proposed a program of development towards self-government. The committee’s 
report, presented to the Assembly in March 1971, recommended preparations for self-
determination in 1972–1976. Its proposal concerning the structure of parliament and the 
electorates formed the blueprint for self-government in 1973 and subsequent independence in 
1975 (Denoon, 2005, pp. 35–69). 
 
Australian colonial rule was paternalistic (Hegarty, 1979, p. 188). In contrast to some 
African countries where colonialism did little to develop indigenously rooted institutions that 
could tackle the development demands of modern states (Bräutigam & Knack, 2004, p. 255), 
the Australian colonial administration prepared PNG to handle its government institutions, 
albeit hastily, before handing over the power and responsibility for policymaking. Australia 
helped PNG build its political institutions and administrative and public service structures, and 
helped educate and train its human resources before transferring powers and relinquishing 
control of its former colony (Ballard, 1981; Boyce, 1978). It provided technical and advisory 
support before and after independence. In the years leading up to its independence, expatriates 
largely serviced PNG’s foreign offices. As Downs (1980, p. 552) noted: 
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Until the transfer of power, Australia represented Papua New Guinea 
not only at the United Nations, but also in all other places. Australia 
entered into all international agreements and trade arrangements on 
behalf of both Papua and New Guinea. For example, Australia became 
a signatory to the International Coffee Agreement of 1962 as an 
exporter of coffee although no coffee was produced by Australia for 
overseas markets. During the period of Australian trusteeship, over two 
hundred treaties to which Australia had become a party were applied to 
Papua New Guinea. The most important were those associated with the 
United Nations Organisations such as World Health (WHO), 
UNESCO, International Telecommunications Union (ITU), ECAFE, 
the Colombo Plan, the South Pacific Commission and South Pacific 
Forum. 
 
More specifically, Australia determined the direction of PNG’s foreign policy during 
the pre-independence era. During the self-governing era (1971–1975), Australia became 
increasingly less of an administrator. It invested and maintained close educational, 
communications and cultural links, as well as personal and political ties, with PNG. The 
Australian legacy was, therefore, central to almost every aspect of PNG’s foreign relations. 
That legacy also affected how PNG saw and interacted with other communities and countries 
in the region and around the world (Kooyman & Moore, 1998, p. 208; Wolfers & Dihm, 2009, 
p. 304). For example, PNG followed the same alliance and distanced itself from communist 
countries as part of Australia’s anti-communism efforts. Further, PNG maintained the bilateral 
and multilateral agreements it entered and adopted the foreign policy precedents set by the 
colonial administration. At its independence, PNG had little influence to plot a course different 
to that pursued by Australia. Independent PNG did not depart significantly from the trade and 
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security links that were established by the colonial administration. Instead, it maintained and 
strengthened its relations with Australia. 
 
PNG began the post-independence era with a small and mostly agriculture-based 
economy. Its domestic revenues were sourced from the personal income taxes of the large 
expatriate population, a few larger companies and trade duties (Fallon, 1992, p. 10). Even more 
so, PNG had a limited domestic production base, a poor revenue-raising ability and relied on 
Australia for economic development, particularly in aid, trade and investment. PNG’s 
relationship with Australia was generally ‘dependent’ (Amarshi et al., 1979; Fitzpatrick, 1980; 
Sawyerr, 1982) in many aspects. It also relied on Australia for technical advice, as the newly 
independent nation lacked experienced national staff in almost all departments, including 
foreign affairs. The limited knowledge of national politicians on how to conduct bilateral and 
multi-relations in foreign affairs made the dependent relationship much deeper than it appeared. 
The nature of this dependent relationship subsequently strengthened Australia’s influence in 
PNG, even after independence. PNG’s unusually high dependence on Australia adds to 
sensitivities about independence and sovereignty, which has been a source of frustration, 
particularly among PNG’s elite. Australia has never been sure about how its aid to PNG should 
be spent most effectively and has deliberated between allowing PNG control and exerting 
control over it (AusAID, 2003). This has not prevented disagreements and frustrations, usually 
over the content of the aid program. There are many reasons for this, such as how the aid 
allocated to PNG has often been mismanaged by PNG’s small elite, genuine pride and 
nationalism and real disagreement about how aid could be most effective (which is further 
discussed in Chapter 4). As a dominant partner, Australia has played a leading role in 
improving the effectiveness of its aid in PNG, which often leads to charges of neo-colonialism. 
 
Australia’s interest in New Guinea developed in the middle of the nineteenth century. 
The motives underlying Australia’s interest in New Guinea varied. Some authors argue that 
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New Guinea offered opportunities for profitable investment (Joyce, 1971, p. 8; Legge, 1956, 
p. 13), while others contend that Papua provided a potential source of cheap labour that could 
support the Queensland sugar plantations (Irvine, 2004; Moore, 1974). Australia’s prominent 
interest in New Guinea, however, related more to its security. PNG featured prominently in all 
assessments of Australia’s defence needs (Downs, 1980; Gash et al., 1975; Hunt, 2017; Joyce, 
1971; Legge, 1956). Historically, Australia has long been concerned with the prospect that 
New Guinea may fall under the control of another foreign power. Australians were aware of 
the fact they inhabit a sparsely populated continent that is situated near to the thickly populated 
countries of eastern and south-eastern Asia and very far from Britain, on whose naval strength 
they relied for their defence. Vague fears of an attack were aroused by the European expansion 
in the Pacific. New Guinea was essential to Australia for strategic reasons, as it would provide 
a bulwark against any attack. Therefore, Australia felt that it was imperative that the islands to 
the north should be in British or Australian hands (Hunt, 2017; Legge, 1956). For this reason, 
Australia created the Pacific Island Regiment (PIR), currently the Papua New Guinea Defence 
Force (PNGDF), during the Second World War as part of the Australian Army Northern 
Command (Hunt, 2017; Laki & May, 2009). It was constructed to defend Australia’s northern 
borders. The fears of military invasion against Australia subsided in the aftermath of the Second 
World War. Nonetheless, Australia’s defence and strategic interest have remained an integral 
component of the PNG–Australia relationship in the postcolonial era. Besides the fear of a 
military invasion, Australia did not want communism on its doorstep. Since the 1960s, 
Australia and its ally, the United States (US), supported Indonesian rule over West Papua to 
appease the Indonesian Government and to stop it from sliding towards communism (Bohane, 
Elmslie & Thompson, 2003; May, 1979; Ondawame, 2010; Penders, 2002). The residue of 
Australian fears of possible Indonesian expansionism during the Sukarno era (Wolfers & Dihm, 
2009, p. 305) prompted Australia to expand the PIR into the PNGDF. This expansion in the 
1960s was in direct response to the perceived expansionist threats from Indonesia (Laki & May, 
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2009, p. 262). Australia’s security and strategic concerns has also influenced PNG’s relations 
with Asian countries. Under the terms of the United Nations Trusteeship Agreement of 1946, 
Australia was responsible for PNG’s external relations. Australia restricted the early PNG 
Government from pursuing relations with other countries that posed threats to Australia’s 
strategic interest. For instance, Japan’s formal relations with PNG were sanctioned by Australia 
(Griffin, 1974, p. 152). The influence of this minimalist policy affected the postcolonial state’s 
relations with the outside world, notably with Japan and communist China. Indeed, heavy 
dependence on Australia limited postcolonial PNG’s options to develop independent foreign 
policies. 
 
The limitation vis-a-vis foreign investments from Southeast Asian countries became 
one of the determining factors in PNG’s first foreign policy. It wanted to befriend many 
countries and organisations, including those sanctioned by Australia. PNG felt that it was 
necessary to open its relations to any country and region that could influence its economic 
interests, without subscribing to the ideological and geopolitical alliances that were prevalent 
at that time (Foreign Affairs Review, 1981, p. 23). It is worth noting that PNG emerged as a 
nation in the Cold War era, which was a time when there was great political and military tension 
between powers in the Western Bloc (the United States, its NATO allies and others) and the 
Eastern Bloc (the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Pact). There were growing concerns 
by policymakers in PNG about the country’s foreign policy, with key issues including PNG’s 
relations with Australia and Indonesia. Concerns about the establishment of independent 
trading links and an independent identity for PNG after Australia departed were also raised by 
the early policymakers. These concerns formed the basis of universalism—PNG’s first foreign 
policy. 
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3.4 Universalism (1975–1981) 
During the self-governing era (1971–1975), seminars, discussions and debates were 
held between politicians, scholars and advisers about the future of PNG’s foreign policy 
(Griffin, 1974; Kooyman & Moore, 1998). In 1974, the first minister to assume full 
responsibility for PNG’s trade and foreign relations, Sir Maori Kiki, outlined the principles of 
the policy that subsequently became the government’s post-independence foreign policy, 
which came to be known as universalism, or ‘friends to all and enemies to none’ (Bogari, 2010; 
Firth, Griffin & Hank, 1979; King, 1985; Wolfers & Dihm, 2009). Successive statements of 
that policy highlighted three main issues: that the PNG Government should establish friendly 
relations with as many countries as possible and be hostile to none, that PNG should be 
identified as a South Pacific nation and that it should be regarded as a bridge or link between 
Southeast Asia and the South Pacific (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982c; Griffin, 1974; Wolfers 
& Dihm, 2009). From this perspective, the approach was presented as a logical approach to 
establishing relations with the world and concurrently mitigating dependence on Australia. 
Simply put, it was a self-interest foreign policy that was aimed to weaken Australia’s influence 
by building a broad range of relations. 
 
The doctrine of universalism is common in new and emerging states, the main reason 
for which being that many of the newly independent states lack the resources for development. 
Therefore, they rely on the developed economies for expertise, trade and capital for economic 
development. This requisite for economic development signifies extending relations to any 
countries and organisations that can support their economic interests, without considering their 
political ideologies, alliances and geographical location. For instance, Brazil’s early 
postcolonial foreign policy was deeply rooted in autonomy and universalism (Correia, Favaron, 
Ramanzini Júnior & Vigevani, 2008; Saraiva, 2010), where universalism was meant to express 
the idea of receptiveness towards all countries regardless of their geographical location and 
economic policy (Saraiva, 2010, p. 152). In PNG, universalism was anchored in a spirit of 
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neutrality and aimed to extend its external relations beyond those prescribed by the colonial 
administration (Bogari, 2010; Wolfers & Dihm, 2009). Nevertheless, universalism did not deny 
the special place of Australia because of the prominence of aid, trade and commerce, security, 
history, cultural affinity, education and skilled and technical workforce recruitment factors. 
Although PNG has formed its world views and forged relations independent of Australia’s 
influence, it still relied on Australia for economic and developmental support. Therefore, 
universalism was, in many respects, an aspirational foreign policy doctrine with limited 
practical consequences. 
 
Universalism extended PNG’s relations beyond Oceania. The realpolitik of 
universalism emphasised economic development and, to a lesser extent, security. PNG 
prioritised trade, aid and investment. These priorities also determined where diplomatic 
missions should be located. Foreign missions were opened and cordial relationships were 
forged with new states, with this friendly reception extended to foreign investors and 
prospective aid donors (Boyce, 1978, pp. 41–54). PNG continued to form coalitions and 
alliances with countries and international organisations that could support its interests. Its 
political independence in 1975 represented a dilution of relations with Australia— not 
necessarily in the absolute, but certainly in relative terms, as PNG extended its relations beyond 
Oceania (Wolfers & Dihm, 2009, p. 304). Independence signified that PNG had formally recast 
its political and administrative ties with Australia and had assumed sole responsibility for its 
domestic and external affairs. 
 
Despite its independence, PNG depended on Australia for aid and developmental 
support to progress its nascent economy. Although PNG expanded to the wider world, Australia 
remained the dominant external partner in its foreign relations. At independence, there was a 
wide gap between development and the resources that were available for development, 
particularly financial and human resources. Australia assisted PNG in this regard and its aid to 
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PNG was critical for development. It represented 41.4 per cent of PNG’s budget at 
independence (Commonwealth of Australia, 1975, p. 4) and it was given in the form of lump 
sum budgetary support. The budget support alleviated the resource constraints that the early 
government faced and was used as an incentive to accelerate economic development. In 
addition, Australian officials supported PNG to arrange the budget and monitor expenditures. 
It was not practical for an inexperienced bureaucracy to expend large amounts of aid, let alone 
the institutional capacity to handle budget expenditure and monitoring in the early years after 
independence. Some of the guidance was provided by Australian advisers who constituted the 
vestigial portion of the colonial administration that serviced the Department of Foreign 
Relations and Trade (DFAT) (Ballard, 1981). Along these lines, Australia cemented its 
influence in the newly independent state. 
 
Universalism was useful for PNG in the formative years of its independent period. PNG 
did not discriminate against the Eastern and Western Blocs, but it allied with members of both 
blocs who respected its independence. In the Asian region, PNG expanded their relations to 
any country, including communist regimes that could support its economic interests. For 
example, PNG extended relations to the communist government of the People’s Republic of 
China and subscribed to the ‘one China’ policy—and was given observer status to the 
Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) a year after independence (Bogari, 2010; 
Wolfers & Dihm, 2009). In the Pacific region, PNG concentrated its limited diplomatic 
resources on regional links and made commitments to regional cooperation as a priority 
concern (Kiki, 1976; Somare, 1974). It became a member of the PIF, formerly South Pacific 
Forum, at independence. A common sense of identity and purpose in the region was important 
for PNG and the small island states. It was a newly independent state with limited resources, a 
weak economy, a lack of proper infrastructures and a weak power base. Therefore, collective 
diplomacy was important for the island countries, including PNG. The PIF consolidated PNG’s 
network and identity. 
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Despite widening its network and establishing new relationships, universalism did not 
provide a clear direction for how PNG could develop its national interests, particularly in 
setting priorities or making choices. The lack of ability to independently set priorities was, in 
part, limited by its dependence on Australia. For instance, ASEAN was important to PNG’s 
economic and social interests (Byrnes, 1981), but the political and security issues that have 
occupied ASEAN nations (e.g., the role of China and USSR in Southeast Asia, Vietnam, 
Kampuchea and the Indochinese refugees) demanded, in Canberra’s view, a strong assertion 
of the Australian presence in the region (MacQueen, 1989a, p. 540; Weatherbee, 1982, p. 338). 
Accordingly, PNG’s freedom to pursue a more independent position in the ASEAN was tied 
by its need to accommodate Australia’s strategic concerns. As Mortimer (1979, p. 227) noted: 
 
Having a guaranteed budget support [from Australia], Papua New 
Guinea does not have to go begging to investors and importers of raw 
materials, but can hold out for the best available terms. In this respect 
she is in a decidedly more advantageous position than most Third 
World countries, and hence it is not in her interest to promote political 
relations with them [ASEAN and other countries] which might harm 
her special relationship with Australia. 
 
PNG benefitted in its relationship with Australia in terms of aid, but the relationship 
was constraining in terms of PNG’s wider engagement in ASEAN. It was seeking special 
membership status within ASEAN and Indonesia had agreed to argue for PNG’s position to 
change from observer status to a position from which a PNG delegation could receive briefings 
on ASEAN policy decisions (Canberra Times, 17 December 1980; Rodgers, 1980). However, 
PNG’s ASEAN link and economic interests would harm Australia’s strategic interest. 
Therefore, it was not in PNG’s interest to promote political relations with countries and 
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regional organisations that pose threats to Australia’s strategic interest (Mortimer, 1979, p. 
227). The subtle pressure to respect Australia’s strategic interest is implied by the patron–client 
relationships discussed in Chapter 2. Maintaining the Australian connection was critical for 
PNG’s development, but subscribing to Australia’s security and strategic concerns were 
untenable. It meant that PNG would sacrifice some of its self-interests. This predicament, in 
part, propelled policymakers to reconsider universalism. 
 
PNG’s security concerns were also an issue with the government. Since PNG’s 
independence, Australia carefully avoided entering into any binding defence commitments to 
PNG. In February 1977, a statement of understanding was issued by the then prime ministers, 
Malcolm Fraser and Michael Somare, who accepted the need for continuing consultations on 
matters of mutual concern to the two defence forces: 
 
The two Prime Ministers affirmed that both their governments attached 
high importance to continuing the close co-cooperation between their 
two countries in defence matters. They acknowledged their 
Governments’ desire to contribute to the strengthening of peace and 
stability in their common region. They declared that it was their 
Government’s intention to consult, at the request of either, about 
matters affecting their common security interests and about other 
aspects of their defence relationship (Australian Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, 1977). 
 
The joint statement, however, did not include any suggestion of the commitment of 
Australia’s security assets in the event of a crisis (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
1977, pp. 90–91). However, there was an implicit guarantee of support, as there was a strong 
link between the Australian military and the PNGDF. A crisis, if there was going to be one, 
could involve Indonesia. The militant group Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), 
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Movement, has been using the PNG side of the border as a sanctuary and base for attacks 
against the Indonesian army since Indonesia acquired control of the western half of the island 
of New Guinea from the Dutch in 1962 (which is further discussed in Chapter 6). On this basis, 
it was often perceived that a military conflict between PNG and Indonesia could develop along 
their shared border (Henningham, 1995; MacQueen, 1989a; May, 1986a; Nyamekye & 
Premdas, 1979a, 1979b). Successive PNG governments were unable to secure a greater degree 
of commitment on security matters from Australia, a concern that was sharpest in periods of 
tension on the border. The border problem was a potentially dangerous threat to regional 
stability (MacQueen, 1989a), but Canberra’s ambivalence towards the issue has often led to 
feelings of discontent among PNG policymakers. 
 
PNG wanted a peaceful and lasting relationship with Indonesia. Its policymakers 
desired relations with Indonesia to go beyond the border concerns (Weatherbee, 1982, p. 342). 
Somare viewed the ‘importance of business-like relations with Jakarta’ (MacQueen, 1989a, p. 
534) and, throughout 1978 and 1979, his government stiffened its own internal policing of the 
border, exiled OPM leaders, repatriated some illegal border crossers and maintained tighter 
control over the political activities of permissive residents (May, 1986a; Weatherbee, 1982). 
The Somare government recognised the importance of maintaining a stable relationship with 
Jakarta (MacQueen, 1989a, p. 541; Weatherbee, 1982, p. 342) not only as a basis for the speedy 
resolution of any future border problems, but also as a ‘bridge’ to Southeast Asia (Byrnes, 
1981). However, the bridge between Southeast Asia and the South Pacific has often been 
weakened by the sporadic hostile exchanges between Jakarta and Port Moresby over the 
activities of the OPM and Indonesia’s military responses. In June 1979, PNG was invited to 
the twelfth ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting. The PNG delegation, led by the deputy prime 
minister and minister for foreign affairs and trade, were guests of the Indonesian Government. 
Attendance at the meeting by invitation of the Indonesia government was special for PNG; it 
was a gesture of support for PNG’s ambition for special membership status in ASEAN. 
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In the Pacific region, universalism posed two basic challenges for PNG. First, it 
strengthened PNG’s relations in the region, though PNG’s involvement in Pacific affairs often 
raised suspicions about acquiring leadership of the islands from Fiji (Fry, 1982; MacQueen, 
1991; Weatherbee, 1982). In 1980, PNG intervened in Vanuatu to quell a rebellion against the 
newly elected government (which is discussed in detail in the later part of this chapter). Fiji, a 
supporter and participant in UN peacekeeping, viewed PNG’s unilateral intervention with 
suspicion. It suspected PNG of seeking a distinct leadership role in the region and of taking 
over its historical leadership of the islands (Weatherbee, 1982, p. 337). PNG has not contested 
the leadership status because it was already a leader, given its abundant natural resources, 
landmass and population when compared to other Pacific Island countries. PNG was more 
concerned about helping the Melanesian government and maintaining regional stability than 
vying for regional leadership, but its intervention in Vanuatu elicited mixed reactions 
(MacQueen, 1988, p. 235). It was apparent that there were differences of opinion and interest 
within the Pacific community. Second, universalism strengthened PNG’s identification and 
solidarity with other Pacific Island countries, though it did little to strengthen PNG’s economic 
position and broader foreign policy influence. The Pacific region was less powerful, as far as 
economic influence is concerned. Stronger relations would not improve PNG’s economic 
interest. PNG assumed the status of ‘major power’ among the Pacific Island countries right 
from independence, given its size and resources (MacQueen, 1991, p. 168). As such, it can 
push its economic interests independently from other Pacific Island states. Beyond its size and 
resources, PNG is centrally located between two regions: Asia and the South Pacific. This 
geographical location gives it more advantage than the island nation–states. PNG can push its 
economic interests in Asia alone. 
 
Given the above concerns—freedom to make more independent choices, Australia’s 
defence commitments to PNG, friendly relations with Indonesia and PNG’s economic interests 
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in the Pacific—PNG realised that it cannot be ‘friends to all’ in foreign relations. Sometimes, 
PNG needed to be selective to attain its economic and diplomatic interests and, for the first 
time, its foreign policy was brought into the domestic debate. In 1979, the Somare government 
commissioned a review of universalism (Foreign Affairs Review, 1980). Universalism 
underwent a comprehensive review that involved consultants, a committee of departmental 
heads, heads of PNG’s diplomatic missions and consular posts around the world (who flew 
into Port Moresby for the purpose) and a variety of senior officials from other government 
agencies. The review was undertaken in response to challenges in the environment. The Somare 
government felt that PNG needed a more pragmatic foreign policy that could be used to pursue 
its national interest, given the challenges, threats and opportunities in the external environment. 
The ‘friends to all and enemies to none’ approach was untenable. In March 1980, the Somare 
government fell during a no-confidence motion and was replaced by a coalition government 
led by Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan. Chan embraced the review, which culminated in the 
drafting of a white paper that was tabled in Parliament in 1981. 
 
Between the time universalism was approved for review and the time the white paper 
was produced, a significant event in the Pacific took place. The event that came to be known 
as the ‘coconut war’ (Shears, 1980) gave potency to the review. The coconut war was a brief 
and unconventional clash between PNG soldiers and rebels in Espiritu Santo, Vanuatu in 
August 1980. Shears (1980) covered the incident in his book, The Coconut War: The Crisis on 
Espiritu Santo, in detail. On 30 July 1980, the Anglo-French condominium of the New 
Hebrides gained independence as Vanuatu. However, on 28 May 1980, two months before 
independence, a brief insurrection created widespread panic among the island people. The 
secessionist movement was led by Jimmy Stevens, a Ni-Vanuatu nationalist and politician who 
took over government properties and referred to himself as the prime minister. The insurrection 
was supported by French officials and colonists, as well as by an American libertarian 
organisation known as the Phoenix Foundation. Their objective was to frustrate the 
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independence process, in part to discourage the prospect of independence in New Hebrides. 
French and British authorities were notified of the uprising. On 8 June 1980, Father Walter 
Lini, the prime minister-elect of New Hebrides, called on the British and French Governments, 
who had been running the New Hebrides for decades, to take military action and quell the 
rebellion. Both governments deployed troops: the British Government deployed 120 men from 
the 42 Royal Marine Commando and the French deployed 55 combat police from the Garde 
mobile from Noumea to Port Vila. The Marines, however, took no action to stop militant 
activities and the combat police withdrew within 24 hours after it arrived. It became apparent 
that neither the British nor French would take effective action against the secessionists. Father 
Lini had to look elsewhere. He turned to the PNG Government of Sir Julius Chan for help. On 
7 August 1980, PNG deployed 300 troops, two patrol boats and four aircraft to Vanuatu and 
codenamed the military operation Kumul Force. The rebellion abruptly ended when the 
PNGDF troops shot and killed Jimmy Steven’s son. The troops disarmed and arrested Jimmy 
Stevens and his followers, recovered government properties, including vehicles that were 
seized during the coup, and restored normalcy on the island. The PNG effort was all the more 
praiseworthy in light of the ineffectual British and French attitude to the rebellion (Australian 
Government, 1980; Foreign Affairs Review, 1982e; Shears, 1980). PNG’s successful 
intervention in the coconut war became a turning point in PNG’s regional politics and 
international relations. 
 
The experience had a considerable effect on the subsequent relationship between PNG 
and Vanuatu, one that was based on ethnic solidarity. This solidarity was given greater potency 
by the fact that PNG acted at the behest of the Vanuatu government, given the South Pacific 
Forum’s disagreement with the use of PNG troops. The Solomon Islands lacked resources to 
materially contribute to the undertaking, but strongly supported PNG’s initiative. The coconut 
war became a pivotal point in regional politics and PNG’s evolving foreign policy. It sharpened 
the idea of a sub-regional group within the regional group. Therefore, the seeds of the sub-
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regional bloc, the MSG, were sown (MacQueen, 1989b, p. 34). The coconut war also shaped 
how PNG viewed the colonial powers and their responses to problems in the region, 
particularly Australia’s commitment to regional security. PNG was disappointed with the lack 
of response from those Forum members who had the capacity and capability to assist, 
particularly Fiji, Australia and NZ. Although Australia indirectly approved and supported with 
their approval of using seconded military personnel in the PNGDF and their Royal Australian 
Air Force aircraft, the indecision and delay in Canberra before final decisions were made did 
not impress Port Moresby (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982e, p. 51). For example, when PNG 
sent its army to Vanuatu, it discovered that reliance on Australian resources (such as equipment 
and Australian personnel attached to PNGDF) was controlled in Canberra. The coconut war 
challenged Australia’s defence commitments to PNG and underscored the differing 
perspectives in the region. Fiji, a supporter and participant in UN peacekeeping, viewed PNG’s 
action in Vanuatu as an attempt to assume leadership of the islands (Weatherbee, 1982, p. 337). 
The experiences of the coconut war, particularly Australia’s defence commitments and the 
South Pacific Forum’s dissent from PNG’s efforts, gave fresh impetus to the review. 
 
3.5 Active and Selective Engagement (1981–2002) 
On 9 November 1981, the foreign policy white paper was tabled in parliament (May, 
1986a, p. 105). It was the first review of PNG’s foreign policy since its independence. The 
foreign policy white paper recommended that PNG should adopt a basic approach to its foreign 
policy. This involved a three-pronged diplomatic strategy, which emphasised consolidation and 
extension of existing relations, independent and constructive cooperation with neighbouring 
countries and further diversification and development of relations with other countries (Bogari, 
2010; Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a; Wolfers & Dihm, 2009). Based on the basic approach, 
it was suggested that PNG adopt an active and selective engagement foreign policy. This policy 
involved: identifying issues, opportunities and problems that are central to PNG’s national 
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interests; selecting those issues and actors, including governments, international organisations, 
multinational corporations and others, who can support the country’s national interests; 
analysing the relative advantages and disadvantages and taking the appropriate action or 
inaction; and engaging actively with the issues and selected actors to secure and enhance the 
country’s national interests (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1980, pp. 6–7). Active and 
selective engagement focused on consolidating existing relations. It was concurrently open to 
exploring new opportunities and other arrangements with prospects for further socio-economic 
and security benefits. 
 
In articulating the concept of active and selective engagement, the authors placed 
PNG’s relations with Australia, Indonesia and the Solomon Islands in a framework of wider 
common interests to be promoted in an independent, constructive and neighbourly cooperation. 
These three countries share a common border with PNG. The white paper acknowledged their 
importance and simultaneously urged that the conduct of relations between each country should 
differ because of the differences between the three countries themselves, as well as the 
differences in the ways in which PNG’s relations with their governments have previously 
developed (Department of Foreign Affairs, 1980, pp. 39–41). The overall objective was to 
conduct independent and constructive neighbourly cooperation with the governments of each 
country, appropriately and by different means. 
 
Policymakers in PNG perceived in the white paper that its relations with Australia have 
‘become relatively, but not absolutely, less important to Papua New Guinea’ (Foreign Affairs 
Review, 1982d, p. 39). The relative but modest decline in the importance of relations with 
Australia occurred because PNG diversified almost every aspect of its foreign relations—not 
only the formal aspects of diplomacy, but also the economic and other aspects. PNG diversified 
its trading partners towards Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia, including Japan and Germany. 
Japan became an important export destination, although Australia retained its status as the 
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major origin of PNG’s imports. These developments led to the diversification of PNG’s 
relations with Australia, the main exceptions of which including, by mutual agreement, aid and 
development support (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982d). PNG still depended on Australia for 
aid, trade, investments in merchandise and mining sectors and for trained public servants. The 
foreign policy white paper did not stress much the security aspect of PNG–Australia relations. 
As discussed earlier, Australia avoided entering into any binding defence commitments with 
PNG and, moreover, it was perceived that Australia would come to PNG’s assistance, should 
there be an external aggressor (Laki & May, 2009, pp. 261–262; May, 1993, p. 35). However, 
the white paper raised security issues vis-a-vis PNG–Indonesia relations. 
 
The white paper stressed the importance of PNG–Indonesia relations (Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 1980, pp. 42–48). Cooperation between PNG and Indonesia in the fields of 
education, defence, police and cultural exchanges based on mutual understanding and trust has 
been captured under a Technical Cooperation Agreement between the two countries, which 
was signed on 5 June 1979 (and expired in 1984). One of the more arresting of these premises 
in the white paper related to security. It was asserted that ‘no foreign government threatens 
military aggression towards Papua New Guinea now or in the readily foreseeable future’ 
(Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 46). This clause underscored the unlikeliness of a military 
conflict with Indonesia. It was further asserted that ‘there is no foreign armed force on whose 
assistance we can rely’ and, even more pointedly, ‘no foreign government has offered to 
guarantee the independence and security of Papua New Guinea. Nor, despite expressions of 
concern by senior Australian officials, is one likely to do so’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982b, 
pp. 46–47). This assertion was a direct response to the residual Australian defence commitment 
along the PNG–Indonesia border and the Vanuatu experience that questioned Australia’s 
military assistance to PNG. 
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PNG appreciated the asymmetries of power in its relations with Indonesia and it 
acknowledged that the PNGDF’s capacity to defend against an armed attack was comparatively 
modest (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 46). This acknowledgement led the PNG 
Government to an accommodative posture, which was described as ‘increasing commitment to 
co-operation’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 41) and ‘consistent with both countries’ 
national interest’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 43). The guidelines for this policy 
proposal were slightly defensive. Regarding the threats from Indonesia, the white paper stated 
that ‘there is no evidence to suggest that a substantial or influential body of opinion in Indonesia 
has aggressive intentions towards Papua New Guinea’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 41). 
The events and conditions in Irian Jaya (specifically referring to the oppression of the 
Melanesian people living in West Papua) were matters of Indonesia’s internal affairs, but they 
pointed out that domestic critics of policy ‘have failed to distinguish between ethnic sentiment 
and national interest’ (Foreign Affairs Review, 1982a, p. 42). The overtures of friendship 
demonstrated PNG’s intention to resolve the border problems and its intention to mend the 
broken link to the wider ASEAN community. 
 
The foreign policy white paper not only emphasised PNG’s economic and security 
interests, but it also stressed the importance of international cooperation in addressing issues 
that had a substantial capacity to affect PNG’s wider and shared interests. The issues included 
arms control, human rights, refugees, racism and national self-determination (Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 1980, pp. 108–116). The white paper was tabled in parliament on 21 
November 1981 and the Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Noel Levi, delivered an 
interim statement that detailed the changing emphasis of PNG’s foreign policy. In support of 
the white paper, Mr Levi said: 
 
Relations have, in fact, developed in a rather selective way—
sometimes because the Papua New Guinea government has wanted 
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them to do so, but often because the government of other countries or 
other circumstances have caused them to do so. We recognise that 
national interests—ours as well as those of other countries—and not 
friendship, have often been the reasons (Foreign Affairs Review, 1980, 
p. 10). 
 
The main argument put forward was the differences in how relations with various 
countries have developed. The supporting statement introduced PNG’s active and selective 
engagement foreign policy. It denotes picking one’s friends more carefully. This policy stance 
reflected PNG’s intention to rebalance its reliance on the postcolonial relationship with 
Canberra and replace it with one that formed a part of wider regional and global foreign policy. 
The conviction that drove the policy was that PNG’s foreign policy should promote self-
defined real interest (Weatherbee, 1982, p. 335). Active and selective engagement laid the 
foundations for the diversification of socio-economic, military and aid relations in many ways. 
It demonstrated PNG’s ambitions to replace its Australian relations with ones with the rest of 
the world. 
 
3.6 The Evolving Nature of Foreign Policy 
The active and selective engagement approach to foreign policy was formally endorsed, 
accepted and followed by successive governments—but it also proved flexible. Since 1985, 
different prime ministers and their foreign affairs ministers adopted their own foreign policy 
initiatives under the rubric of active and selective engagement. Prime Minister Paias Wingti 
(1985–1988) pursued a more proactive approach to foreign policy when he moved away from 
what he perceived was a reactive posture to international developments (Bogari, 2010, p. 39). 
He aimed for a fundamental reorientation of PNG’s foreign policy. Shortly after coming to 
power in late 1985, the Wingti government announced its intentions to establish a more stable 
and formal relationship with Indonesia. In October 1986, the foreign ministers of the two 
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countries signed the Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation as a commitment 
to avoid, reduce and contain disputes or conflicts between the two countries, as well as to settle 
any differences that might arise between their borders by peaceful means (Treaty of Mutual 
Respect, Friendship and Cooperation, 1986). The treaty was regarded by President Suharto as 
‘another milestone in the history of both countries’, while PNG’s prime minister and the foreign 
secretary said it would give direction for the future and inspire confidence in PNG and its 
regional neighbours (May, 1991, p. 165). The move towards the pact was initiated by PNG as 
a ‘sweetener’ (MacQueen, 1989a, p. 535), or a gesture of goodwill, to ease the tensions along 
the border during 1984–1985 when a series of border violations (which are discussed further 
in Chapter 6) generated protests in PNG (May, 2004, pp. 300–301). Nonetheless, the pact was 
significant, as it provided an example of a foreign policy that was initiated by PNG and, 
moreover, it showed PNG’s determination to maintain its friendly relations with Indonesia. 
 
In 1986, PNG helped form the MSG at an informal level and the group represented an 
important practical manifestation of ‘Melanesian-ism’ in regional politics (Lawson, 2013, p. 
19). PNG considers MSG as an important sub-regional organisation through which it could 
advance its interests. During the MSG’s inaugural meeting in 1986, Sir Michael Somare said: 
 
The establishment of the MSG sets the legal foundation for the 
governance of our Melanesian people, which will be the basis for our 
existence. This shows that our Melanesian spirit, brotherhood and 
solidarity is united and we ask for the non-interference in our affairs by 
regional powers as we face the challenges ahead (Somare cited in 
Pacific Institute of Public Policy, 2008, p. 2). 
 
MSG is the strongest sub-regional political and economic alliance in the Pacific and 
was founded to harness a spirit of solidarity between the independent nations. The group was 
established to advance free trade and economic goals between member countries, which 
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included PNG, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, New Caledonia and Fiji (though Fiji did not join 
the MSG until 1996). Over time, the interests of the organisation evolved to include political 
goals and it served as a ‘voice for the liberty of all Melanesians against the tentacles of Western 
colonisation’ (Koanapo, 2008). Beneath the smooth surface of economic diplomacy, one can 
still sense undercurrents of what Gregory Fry describes as ‘regional nationalism’, or the 
promotion of a regional cultural identity that often opposes neo-colonialism (Fry, 1981, p. 468). 
Sentiments of regional nationalism have often been directed towards Canberra, as Australia’s 
activism in the region has often been resented as neo-colonial and overbearing. 
 
Apart from making overtures of friendship to Indonesia, Prime Minister Wingti also 
moved to consolidate its relations with Australia. On 9 December 1987, Prime Minister Wingti 
signed the Joint Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Australia and Papua 
New Guinea (JDP) with his Australian counterpart, Robert Hawke. The JDP was significant 
for three basic reasons. First, it sought to shift the focus of the PNG–Australia relationship from 
aid to trade. The declaration was a turning point in the bilateral relationship, as it shifted it from 
the postcolonial phase of giving aid and advice to a more mature phase in which the relationship 
is based on reciprocity and recognition of mutual benefits between independent states. The 
most prominent feature of JDP was the mutual aim to move aid away from the centre of the 
bilateral relationship (AusAID, 2003). The promotion of trade rather than aid was inherent in 
the joint declaration. Following the JDP, other trade agreements, including the Agreement 
between the Governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (1990) and the Agreement on Trade and Commercial Relations 
between the Governments of Australia and the Government of Papua New Guinea (1991), were 
signed between the two countries. These agreements focused on enhancing trade and 
commercial relations. Second, the declaration formalised Australia’s commitment to PNG’s 
security needs. In contrast to the joint statement between PNG and Australia in 1977, in which 
the two countries affirmed that their governments ‘attached high importance to continuing the 
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close cooperation between their two countries in defence matters’ (Australian Department of 
Prime Minister and Cabinet 1977), the JDP was reworded: 
 
In the event of external armed attack threatening the national 
sovereignty of either country, such consultation would be conducted 
for the purpose of each Government deciding what measures should be 
taken, jointly or separately, in relation to that attack (DFAT, 1992). 
 
The changed wording was superficial, in that PNG lacked the capacity to contain 
external military attacks. However, Prime Minister Wingti said it was an improvement on the 
1977 undertaking and PNG’s defence secretary considered the undertakings that were reflected 
in the JDP as an effective guarantee of Australian commitment (May, 1993, p. 36). The 
underlying factor was that PNG faced no real external threat. The perceived threat that it faced 
from Indonesia had subsided since the signing of the Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and 
Cooperation between the two countries. Nevertheless, PNG wanted a formal security guarantee 
from Australia in the event of uncertainty and threats. Finally, the pact was significant because 
it was initiated by PNG. The significance of this is the emergence of a new crop of political 
leaders in PNG’s foreign policy environment. Unlike its predecessors in the 1970s, who lacked 
basic understanding of politics and international relations, the new crop of political leaders is 
versed in the subject and has sought to plot PNG’s directions in foreign affairs. In his welcome 
speech in Canberra, Hawke complimented Wingti for initiating the wide-ranging document 
between PNG and Australia. Hawke approved the members of Wingti’s generation, who sought 
to redefine PNG’s place in the world and its key foreign relationships (Australian Department 
of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 1987). PNG’s ambitions to shift the basis of its relations with 
Australia from aid to trade, however, faced significant challenges: the lack of a coherent trade 
policy (UNCTAD, 2006, p. 2); a deteriorating infrastructure, including transport and 
communications (Gibson & Rozelle, 2002); and an insufficient private sector capability, 
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including poor access to finance and supply chains (DFAT, 2014b). As a result, PNG’s 
ambition to reduce aid was futile. For example, three years after the JDP in 1990, the net 
bilateral aid flow from Australia stood at US$262 million and averaged US$221 million by 
2002 (World Bank, 2017b), which is shown in Figure 4.1. Almost a decade after the JDP, PNG 
still received aid and continued to rely on Australian aid at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. 
 
Prime Minister Rabbie Namaliu (1988–1992) focused more on the ‘economic aspects 
of active and selective engagement’ and opened new diplomatic missions and honorary 
consulates in the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, France, Germany, the US (Houston and Los 
Angeles) and Canada (Bogari, 2010, p. 140). PNG signed economic agreements, such as the 
Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement and the Investment Promotion and Protection 
Agreements, with the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Germany 
and Israel. When Wingti returned as prime minister in 1992, he ‘looked north’. In 1994, Wingti 
announced the look north policy, a strategic policy proposal that was aimed to reduce national 
dependence on Australia. Wingti said: 
 
That is where our future is in terms of trade, in terms of investment. So 
when I decided to take that position, I took it on a bigger scale, looking 
at the future of this country in the region. We belong to this region, and 
we have to live with Indonesia, we have to live with China, we have to 
live with the Asian countries—and Australia and New Zealand are now 
doing the same—so we made the right decision (Wingti, cited in 
Vatsikopoulos, 1995, p. 29). 
 
Wingti’s ambitions to diversify PNG’s foreign relations and to find alternative outlets 
for its economic opportunities corresponded with the growing influence of Asia in the Pacific. 
China was emerging as a great political, economic and military power. Similarly, India was 
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emerging as a potential superpower. Other countries in Asia, including the Four Asian Tigers 
(South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan) and the high performing economies 
(Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand) (World Bank, 1993), were also developing economically 
quickly and were reaching the level of other great powers around the globe. These changes 
generated new opportunities for PNG. 
 
The government’s look north policy renewed and consolidated PNG’s existing 
relationship with China. However, the policy was not adequately communicated to the 
bureaucracy at the ‘organisational level’ (Gyngell & Wesley, 2003, pp. 25–28). Otherwise said, 
the policy was suggested at the political level, but was not developed by the bureaucratic 
mechanism. As a result, the essence of this policy proposal was not adequately translated into 
practical policy. For example, the policy focused on Asia, but it was difficult to determine who 
was authorised to make decisions with whom, for what purposes, on what issues, how these 
decisions would translate into tangible outcomes and whether these decisions were aligned with 
the country’s interests. In effect, there was never a clearly enunciated statement for what the 
look north policy was. Since its pronouncement in 1994, the look north policy has been 
communicated in different ways, for different reasons and at different times. This is partly 
because the policy was not documented. Subsequently, successive governments and ministers 
have engaged with both traditional and non-traditional partners and individuals from Asia. The 
foreign policy implication was that PNG lost its opportunities in the ‘Asian century’, a term 
associated with the dominant role that Asia could play in the twenty-first century because of 
its growing economic clout (Mahbubani, 2008; White, 2011). The idea of Asian century gained 
influence among PNG leaders, following the rapid growth of China and India since the 1980s 
that has propelled them to the top ranks of the world’s biggest economies. PNG did not 
maximise its opportunities in the Asian century. For example, a paper presented by the PNG 
foreign affairs ministry at the UN trade and development conference in 2006 highlighted this 
issue: 
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The lack of a vision and coherent trade policy has resulted in the 
development of ad hoc and often conflicting rules, regulations and 
practices affecting trade, and in an even greater disconnect between 
trade policy framework and other key economic (tariff, investment, 
industrial), sectoral (manufacturing, agriculture, forestry, fisheries, 
minerals) and social policy issues (UNCTAD, 2006, p. 2). 
 
The paper made specific reference to the look north policy. PNG was positioning itself 
to build on Asian interest in its resources, but a lack of a coherent trade policy has contributed 
to what has been described as the ‘lost decade of the 1990s’ (Prasad & Snell, 2004, p. 269; 
Ritchie, 2014, p. 300)—a period that was characterised by severe economic crisis and the 
failure to achieve sustainable economic development (Faal, 2006; Mawuli, 1997; UNCTAD, 
2006). As mentioned, the government’s ambition to improve its economic relations at the 
strategic level was not translated into clear policy objectives that could guide government 
actions. As a result, PNG did not take full advantage of the Asian century. However, it does 
not mean that PNG did not benefit from the policy. The look north policy strengthened PNG’s 
existing relations with the wider Asian countries, in that it gave greater leeway to Asian 
businesses and state-owned enterprises to exploit PNG’s resources. In turn, it generated 
economic opportunities for PNG, most notably the increased aid and investment from China. 
However, these benefits did not emerge because of articulate or planned policy. Nonetheless, 
‘look north’ nestled in the broader active and selective engagement approach to foreign policy. 
 
The professed reason for the look north policy in 1994 was to diversify international 
relations for trade and investment opportunities, but Wingti’s real reason was his frustration 
with the aid relationship between PNG and Australia (Crocombe, 2007, p. 211). Australia has 
consistently been PNG’s largest development partner. Since independence, the PNG–Australia 
relationship has largely been one between an aid donor and an aid recipient. The most important 
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element of the aid relationship was the direct support for the PNG Government budget. From 
1975 to the mid-late 1980s, Australian aid to PNG was given largely in the form of lump sum 
budgetary support because PNG had a limited domestic production base and a poor revenue-
raising ability. Australian aid to PNG inadvertently strengthened PNG’s dependence on 
Australia. In terms of domestic politics, the continued dependence on Australia has been both 
an increasing affront to national pride and a source of considerable economic vulnerability, as 
witnessed in the aftermath of a significant cut in aid in 1986. Australia suddenly announced 
that it would reduce aid to PNG without prior consultation. May (2004, p.25) succinctly 
described this incident: 
 
In July 1985 the two countries negotiated a new five-year agreement to 
cover the period to 1991. Under this agreement Papua New Guinea was 
to receive a total of $A1400 million with annual grants declining by 3 
per cent per annum and a further 2 per cent per annum being shifted 
from general budgetary assistance to programme aid. In August 1986, 
however, in presenting the 1986/1987 budget the Australian 
government announced that aid to Papua New Guinea would be cut by 
some $A10 million in the current financial year. Less than four weeks 
later, foreign minister Hayden, while visiting Port Moresby, gave 
notice that Australian aid to Papua New Guinea may be further cut; a 
figure of $A45 million per annum was mentioned. 
 
Australia’s short notice to drastically reduce aid placed PNG in a vulnerable position 
and the decision was not received well in the government of Paias Wingti. In what historical 
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institutionalists call ‘critical juncture’2, the sudden decision to reduce aid to PNG would 
redefine its bilateral relations with Australia. Indeed, Australia’s sudden decision to renege on 
its aid commitment to PNG created bilateral tensions. Wingti had to look elsewhere. He 
realised that the country could not rely entirely on Australia for continued aid and economic 
support. Subsequently, he adopted two approaches to handle Australia: look to Asia to diversify 
PNG’s economic relationship and change the basis of the PNG–Australia economic 
relationship from aid to trade. 
 
Prime Minister Wingti’s decision to ‘look north’ was partly influenced by a populist 
reaction to Australia’s influence in PNG. The programmed aid managed by Australia, ‘in which 
the donor retains considerable control over where and how aid money is spent’ (Corbett, 2017, 
p. 71), was perceived as a form of neo-colonialism. It was often criticised as enhancing the 
patron–client relationship (Connell, 1997, p. 308) discussed in Chapter 2. Many Papua New 
Guineans viewed Australia’s substantial development assistance as ‘boomerang aid’ that 
benefitted Australians more than it did PNG (Dinnen & McLeod, 2008; May, 2012; Shek, 
2005). Australia’s decision to reduce aid in 1986 was the breaking point in the aid relationship 
between the two countries. It triggered the shift in the direction of foreign policy by compelling 
PNG to ‘look north’ and putting Australia on notice. At its core, the look north policy was 
primarily a reactive foreign policy posture; it was more aspirational and rhetorical than 
determinative. 
 
                                               
2 A critical juncture constitutes a situation that is different from the normal historical development of the 
institutional setting of interest (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007, p. 348). It is how particular elements of political order 
that were established at earlier moments in time set or frame future choices and interests. Paul Pierson argues that 
‘junctures are “critical” because they place institutional arrangements on paths or trajectories, which are then very 
difficult to alter’ (Pierson, 2004, p. 135). Otherwise said, antecedent conditions set a specific trajectory of 
institutional development and consolidation that is difficult to reverse. The choice an agent makes during the 
critical juncture triggers a path-dependent process that constrains future choices. 
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The announcement of the look north policy aimed to entertain populist nationalism and 
populist reaction to Australia’s ‘overbearing and neo-colonialist’ attitude (MacQueen, 1989a, 
p. 536). Pushing back on Australia played well to the domestic audience. The policy was an 
ambitious, yet assertive foreign policy aimed more at opening the country to its imposing 
northern Asian neighbours than at endeavouring to emulate their success. PNG was not the first 
or only country in the Pacific to ‘look north’. Fiji and the Solomon Islands had also done so 
when their relations with Australia became strained. Fiji looked to Asian countries to boost 
diplomatic ties and promote trade and investment soon after it was admonished for the 1987 
coup. Soon afterwards, the Solomon Islands announced their plans to relate more to Asia after 
an Australian official document alleged corruption in the government (Crocombe, 2007, p. 
211). The idea of ‘look north’ was not foreign to PNG’s international relations. PNG has been 
engaging with Asia since its independence in 1975, when it was accorded observer status in 
ASEAN in 1976. Trade relations and foreign exchanges existed with China, Japan and the 
ASEAN countries well before the pronouncement of the look north policy. PNG strongly 
affirmed its commitment to ‘look north’ because its relations with Australia were strained over 
the budget cut issue. 
 
Prime Minister Julius Chan (1994–1997) focused on the Pacific region. His ‘work the 
Pacific’ foreign policy aimed to strengthen regional cooperation and integration (May, 2012, 
p. 48). The policy provided a framework for effective and enhanced engagement with the 
Pacific Island countries. Under this policy framework, PNG undertook a public relations and 
confidence-building exercise to gain the confidence of the PIF’s member countries and the 
MSG. Part of this strategy involved annually offering additional spaces and scholarships to 
Pacific Island students in PNG’s tertiary institutions (Bogari, 2010, p. 140). It was the first time 
that PNG offered to assist the Pacific Island states, apart from the coconut war that occurred at 
the behest of the Vanuatu government in 1980. PNG’s approach in the region fostered 
ambivalent feelings among its traditional and core diplomatic partners. ‘Work the Pacific’ and 
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‘look north’ sent mixed signals in the region. As a result, the foreign minister in the Chan 
government, Kilroy Genia, adopted a strategy of ‘reinforcing our core relationships’ in 1996 
(Bogari, 2010, p. 141). This strategy was an assurance to the traditional partners that, no matter 
what new policy fad, PNG would always maintain its relations with its traditional partners. The 
policy had no significance, as PNG’s relations with its traditional partner, Australia, was 
consolidated in the JDP. Nonetheless, the government wanted to leave behind a policy imprint 
that could be remembered after it vacated office. 
 
PNG’s domestic environment was changing in ways that impacted foreign policy. The 
country’s economic performance improved in the second half of the 1980s. The primary 
impetus for growth during this period was provided by the production of the country’s second 
major gold and copper mine at Ok Tedi, with the first mine being the Bougainville mine that 
was officially halted in May 1989, following an armed conflict. Growth in the non-mining 
economy increased modestly (World Bank, 1990a). In the 1990s, the PNG economy entered a 
new era of significant mineral-driven growth, with new mining and petroleum projects coming 
on stream. Between 1991 and 1994, PNG experienced its best with gross domestic product 
(GDP) growth averaging around 11.9 per cent and the highest growth rate recording 18.2 per 
cent in 1993 (see Figure 3.4). The growth was attributed to the mineral boom and increased 
activity in the agriculture, forestry and fishery sectors (Bank of Papua New Guinea, 1998; 
World Bank, 2017b). The gross national income (GNI) per capita showed a corresponding 
increase3 from US$790 in 1991 to US$1090 in 1994 (see Figure 3.5), which grew at an average 
annual rate of 8.05 per cent. 
                                               
3 GNI per capita is the gross national income, which is converted to US dollars (using the World Bank Atlas 
method) and is divided by the mid-year population. GNI, calculated in national currency, is usually converted to 
US dollars at official exchange rates for comparisons across economies. To smooth fluctuations in prices and 
exchange rates, a special Atlas method of conversion is used by the World Bank. This applies a conversion factor 
that averages the exchange rate for a given year and the two preceding years, which is adjusted for differences in 
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Figure 3.4. Papua New Guinea’s GDP growth (annual percent), 1975–2002. 
Source: World Bank (2017b). 
 
Figure 3.5. Papua New Guinea’s GNI per capita, atlas method (current US$), 1980–2002. 
Source: World Bank (2017b). 
 
PNG’s mineral resources, oil deposits, timber and abundant tuna stocks make it an 
attractive investment opportunity for Japan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and China. With 
the increased exploitation of mineral and forestry resources, issues relating to the sustainability 
of development and climate change have acquired greater importance in PNG. PNG signed the 
                                               
rates of inflation between PNG and the advanced economies (France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom and 
the US) (World Bank, 2017b). 
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in June 1992, as part of its 
commitment to international cooperation in combating climate change, and the Agreement 
Establishing the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme in June 1993, as part of its 
commitment to regional support for sustainable development. 
 
The exploitation of natural resources strengthened the economy. However, despite the 
strong economic growth in the early 1990s, the revenues from this commodity-based economy 
have not translated into strong economic development and improvements to living standards. 
Poverty—persistent and nationwide—was not reduced. For example, a household survey 
conducted in 1996 and 2009 in PNG revealed that poverty did not decline between these years. 
It found that ‘poverty increased between each survey, but of a different nature each time’ and 
noted the ‘increase in the prevalence of poverty’ over the study period (Gibson, 2013, p. 35). 
Essentially, the economic growth has not reduced poverty levels. The country was blighted by 
endemic corruption and the government’s poor economic management. 
 
In the mid-1990s, the economy performed poorly as a result of a ravaging drought 
(1997–1998), the East Asian financial crisis and the consequent slump in international prices 
for mineral exports and commodity prices, the falling value of the kina, the prolonged closure 
of the vast Bougainville mine, endemic corruption and the irresponsible macro-economic 
management (Gaglioti & Phillips, 1999; Theodore. Levantis & Yala, 1998; Mawuli, 1997). 
The structural shifts tested PNG’s behaviour in international relations. The government of 
William Skate that came into power on 22 July 1997 emerged when the economy was 
experiencing a negative growth of 3.9 per cent (see Figure 3.3). Skate was compelled to seek 
financial aid offshore. He announced a ‘constructive partnership in Asia/Pacific’ at the 53rd 
session of the UN General Assembly prior to its announcement in PNG (Bogari, 2010, p. 141). 
Behind this cosmetic strategy, he made a unilateral decision to give diplomatic recognition to 
Taiwan in return for US$2.3 billion of aid, soft loans and investment in the timber and fishing 
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industries (which was discussed in Chapter 1). Skate essentially sacrificed a significant foreign 
policy commitment, the ‘one China’ policy, to gain a short-term financial benefit. 
 
The shifts impacted other areas as well, particularly national unity and civil society’s 
influence on foreign policy decision-making. Following the economic crisis in the mid-1990s, 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) seized the opportunity to impose 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) in PNG. The government of William Skate (1997–
1999) displayed strong opposition to almost every condition that the IMF and World Bank 
imposed on PNG for releasing financial assistance. Skate sought to avert stringent austerity 
programs that were suggested by the IMF and World Bank. However, his successor, Sir Mekere 
Morauta, was more accommodating to the demands of international financiers. The release of 
World Bank loans was premised on the privatisation of the state bank—the Papua New Guinea 
Banking Corporation—and other state-owned enterprises, including the Electricity 
Commission, Telikom PNG, Air Niugini and Post PNG. The Morauta government (1999–
2002) succeeded in divesting the country of some of the portfolio of wholly or partly publicly-
owned enterprises. However, the trade union opposition and anti–land mobilisation movement 
that was comprised of university students and NGOs opposed the privatisation of the Papua 
New Guinea Banking Corporation. Frustrations against the IMF and World Bank in PNG 
erupted in June 2001. A large demonstration was staged against a land mobilisation plan of the 
Morauta government, which was suspected to have been driven by the IMF and World Bank. 
The demonstration ended with three students dead and a demonstrator shot by members of the 
Special Services Division police. In 2002, the new government of Sir Michael Somare 
suspended the controversial privatisation policy (Curtin, 2009; Kavanamur, 2002; May, 
2003a). Somare believed that the privatisation was conducted too hastily. He said there was no 
reason for privatisation to continue if it was not in the economic and social interests of PNG. 
However, for the international community—including Australia, which had backed Somare’s 
predecessor—the decision was the first indicator of a focus change under the new 
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administration (McLeod, 2002). Somare’s decision to stop the privatisation policy was 
significant in PNG’s evolving foreign policy, in that it was primarily influenced by populist 
and nationalist sensibilities that were built on resistance to the external actors that interfere or 
attempt to interfere in PNG’s domestic affairs. It posited national unity—which has not been 
prominent after independence—against external influence. 
 
3.7 The Foreign Affairs Mechanism and Foreign Policymaking 
In the last sections, I examined PNG’s foreign policy in the post-independence era up 
to 2002 and the factors that have been influential in shaping it. In this section, I focus on the 
PNG foreign affairs mechanism and foreign policymaking. This is important because it sets the 
foundation for the analysis of foreign policymaking in the twenty-first century. As mentioned 
earlier in this chapter, the Australian colonial administration prepared PNG’s foreign affairs 
mechanism well before self-government and independence. Boyce (1978) has described PNG’s 
early foreign policymaking apparatus in detail. In 1971, the colonial administration established 
a PNG foreign office within the Department of the Administrator whose task, among others, 
was to assist in organising diplomatic training and to help establish an adequate foreign service. 
As early as 1972, several indigenous Papua New Guineans were recruited and trained to 
become diplomats and, at independence, a total of 30 Papua New Guineans were prepared for 
diplomatic duties. The institutions created by the colonial administration before independence 
were reasonably modest, but effective. The institution that took charge of foreign affairs was 
the DFAT. This institution was a small department with two divisions, but it combined many 
functions. One division was political and the other was created to oversee foreign affairs 
matters that related to trade policy, trade operations, international economic affairs, political 
and social affairs (e.g., diplomatic relations, international organisations and migrations) and 
customs. The Minister for Foreign Relations and Trade confined his or her responsibilities to 
matters of trade and industry and the Chief Minister (Prime Minister) took charge of all foreign 
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affairs. The Chief Minister retained a direct interest in foreign policy matters and issues (Boyce, 
1978, pp. 41–54). The period after independence did not observe drastic changes in the 
institutional arrangement. Although the institutional structures that were constructed during the 
early years were consistent with PNG’s development, centralisation and coordination of policy 
were the early government’s strengths. 
 
There was a scarcity of experienced local diplomats and foreign affairs officials who 
were readily available to occupy foreign offices or attend important meetings. In this 
bureaucratic vacuum, Australian expatriates continued to service the DFAT. They participated 
in international conferences that required technical or professional specialisation. A small 
number of nationals who were educated up to university levels were pushed into high offices 
with minimal experiences in government systems and world issues. The rest of the locals who 
were attached to the offices were relegated to subordinate roles. Treaty drafting and 
international legal matters were done by expatriates, either on secondment or informally 
through the University of Papua New Guinea. This arrangement indicated that Australians 
attached to the various divisions in the DFAT still influenced foreign policy choices. The 
foreign affairs department’s composition gradually changed to include many nationals in the 
early 1980s. With a few exceptions, most of the senior administrative positions were occupied 
by people who were often intelligent and devoted, but who never had the opportunity to acquire 
the knowledge and experience needed to properly fill the positions (Boyce, 1978, pp. 41–54). 
Essentially, the foreign affairs area was inevitably an area in which PNG officials and political 
leaders had little experience of responsibility. 
 
PNG’s traditional, social and political structures were of limited value for 
administrative purposes in the transition period (1964–1975) As such, policymaking was 
vested with the decision-makers in Canberra, who encouraged the adoption of Australian 
precedents and style of administration. Canberra framed the legislation on significant issues, 
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including transfer of power, public service control and localisation, lands policy and economic 
policy. Most of these government functions were transferred to the government during the self-
governing era (1973–1975), except foreign affairs and defence. Australia retained control over 
foreign affairs and defence and only relinquished control to the PNG Government at 
independence (Ballard, 1981; Boyce, 1978; Wolfers & Dihm, 2009). That is, foreign policy 
was one of the last areas of policy transfer. Dependence on Australian bureaucratic leadership 
and support was particularly significant for PNG’s nascent foreign policy, as it had a 
bureaucracy that lacked skills and experience in foreign relations. 
 
PNG’s capacity to implement foreign policy in the 1980s has been complicated by its 
limited administrative capacity. From the mid-1980s, the dynamics that created weak 
governance took a much stronger hold (Pieper, 2004). The political scene has been 
characterised by frequent changes of government, shifts in alliances, cabinet reshuffles, votes 
of no-confidence and a general sense of instability—a situation that is mirrored in the public 
service, where departmental heads and government officials are frequently changed (Laki & 
May, 2009; Standish, 1999, 2013). The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFA) did 
not experience as many Secretary changes as some other government agencies. Nonetheless, it 
saw frequent changes of ministers, repeated organisational restructuring and significant 
cutbacks in staffing. These changes, together with political appointments at the level of 
diplomatic mission or consular post, combined to weaken institutional capacity (Wolfers & 
Dihm, 2009, p. 306). The politicisation of appointments was a departure from the early years 
of the post-independence period, where foreign affairs officials were trained for diplomatic 
roles and were elevated to the post (Boyce, 1978). The public service’s ability to support the 
National Executive Council (NEC) has eroded over time, mainly due to the erosion of the 
independence, professionalism and capacity of the wider public service and to the politics 
usurping and devaluing the fundamental role of public administration. In the context of foreign 
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policy, institutional decline inferred that sound policy advice was not fed into the foreign policy 
decision-making process. 
 
In practice, during 1975–2002, foreign policymaking and implementation in PNG has 
not been neatly tied to any institution. While foreign policy ‘making’ has been entrusted to the 
NEC, its management and administration has been devolved to the Department of National 
Planning and Monitoring, the DFA, immigration and customs, the Attorney General and other 
line departments and agencies whose functional responsibilities encroached on foreign affairs. 
Foreign policy coordination between institutions of government has been weak. Certain 
institutions and relationships at the critical centre of foreign relations, including significant 
elements of defence cooperation, have been conducted with little or no provision for the foreign 
office’s participation. There has been a growing number of international meetings in which 
senior public servants or government agency representatives gather to exchange information 
or to develop cooperative arrangements with counterparts from other countries and the officials 
of the organisations to which they belong (Wolfers & Dihm, 2009, p. 300). These gatherings 
have been conducted with minimal consultation with the foreign affairs ministry. It signified 
that foreign policy has often been conducted in a fragmented manner. 
 
Foreign policy development depended on the consultation and coordination of foreign 
policy issues between the political leaders and the bureaucrats, as well as between the 
institutions of government responsible for managing foreign policy (Gyngell & Wesley, 2003). 
However, in PNG, state ministers often made statements and commitments on issues with 
foreign policy implications without consulting the foreign affairs ministry (Bogari, 2010, p. 
144). The lack of coordination between institutions whose functional responsibilities encroach 
on foreign policy and the lack of consultation between political leaders has been a formidable 
challenge to foreign policy development. Moreover, there has been a disconnect between 
foreign policy statements and foreign policy development, which is best reflected in the case 
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of the look north policy that was discussed earlier. The look north policy was suggested at the 
political level, but it was not developed by the bureaucratic mechanism. This points to the 
foreign policy mechanism’s weakness, particularly the bureaucracy to support the 
government’s foreign policy priorities. 
 
Foreign policymaking in PNG has been influenced by personalities, personal views and 
strengths of its leaders. The viewpoints of key political actors often featured prominently in 
foreign policy. For instance, Michael Somare’s political image is associated with the broader 
idea of Pacific unity. He opposed PNG’s intervention in Vanuatu in 1980 (MacQueen, 1989b; 
Standish, 1985) and mounted a fierce attack on the idea of the MSG at the end of 1987, claiming 
that it was anti-Australian and anti-NZ4 (MacQueen, 1989b, p. 36). Julius Chan is politically 
and economically conservative and has been a vocal supporter of greater regional cooperation. 
He explored new relationships, particularly with Asia and the Pacific (Bogari, 2010, p. 140; 
MacQueen, 1989b, p. 36). Paias Wingti, one of PNG’s new generation of leaders who served 
their political apprenticeship wholly in the post-independence period, displayed a greater 
commitment to reorienting PNG’s foreign policy than the ostensibly more conservative Somare 
when he replaced him in November 1985 (MacQueen, 1989a, p. 533; 1989b, p. 37). Influenced 
by a new crop of advisers and academics, elites such as Wingti began to accept new challenges 
in foreign policy as a sign of national maturity and, therefore, departed from the status quo. He 
brought some distinct changes to PNG’s foreign policy. Wingti redefined the PNG–Australia 
economic relationship from aid to trade and reoriented the direction of PNG’s foreign policy 
to the ‘north’ when he was prime minister from 1985 to 1988 and from 1992 to 1994. Skate 
called his predecessors ‘gutless’ and moved to give diplomatic recognition to Taiwan (Pacific 
                                               
4 This was a superficial position on MSG that stemmed from differences with the Wingti government (MacQueen, 
1989b). Somare has always been an ardent supporter of regionalism (Pacific Institute of Public Policy, 2008). 
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Islands Report, 1999) under his ‘constructive partnership in Asia and the Pacific’ approach. 
His approach to international relations was often associated with populist resistance to external 
influence, which often insinuated that he was the ‘people’s choice’ against neo-colonialism 
(Pacific Islands Report, 1999; Standish, 1999). The foreign policy implication is that these 
leaders drive foreign policy with minimal influence from the NEC. This aspect of foreign 
policymaking underlines the personalised nature of foreign policy and points to a weak foreign 
policy mechanism. That is, in the absence of strong political institutions to guide the actions 
and behaviours of key policy actors, the prime ministers heavily influenced foreign policy. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
PNG was a traditional society at its independence. Many local people have found it 
difficult to understand the new institutions of modern government that were introduced by the 
colonial administrators. Many people were strongly affiliated to their wantok and their ethnic 
and regional groupings than to the nation–state. Allegiance to ethnic and regional groupings 
has often challenged the political system of government. Moreover, it undermines the 
principles of bureaucracy, which in turn contribute to state weakness. In the context of foreign 
policy, this phenomenon posed significant challenges for national unity and subsequently made 
it difficult to articulate a compelling understanding of the national interest and the strategic 
sense of foreign policy. 
 
In many respects, PNG’s foreign policy over the period 1975 to 2002 is largely a 
historical account of the relationship between PNG and Australia. During the self-governing 
era, the governing authority sought to move away from Australia’s orbit. At their 
independence, PNG adopted universalism, a foreign policy doctrine that points to a tentative 
attempt to articulate independent foreign policies. This suggested a departure from the 
Australian orbit. However, PNG’s capacity to implement independent foreign policies was 
constrained by inadequate resources, including an inexperienced bureaucracy and political 
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leadership. As a developing state, it largely depended on foreign aid and investment to develop 
its nascent economy—with much of the aid and development assistance coming from Australia, 
its former colonial administrator. Australia helped PNG by providing aid, development 
support, a skilled workforce and technical assistance. Subsequently, Australia cemented its 
influence in the newly independent state. It helped PNG develop its economy and inadvertently 
strengthened PNG’s dependent culture. 
 
From the 1980s, PNG began to slowly challenge its reliance on Australia. In 1981, it 
adopted a doctrine of active and selective engagement as its foreign policy framework in 
response to changes in the external environment. This foreign policy doctrine did not depart 
significantly from universalism. It still maintained ties with its traditional partners and 
concurrently provided the foundation for the diversification of PNG’s socio-economic, military 
and aid relations. Under this foreign policy doctrine, PNG lifted the level of its diplomacy in 
the Pacific Islands. PNG also formalised its relations with its two closest neighbours, Indonesia 
and Australia. It signed the Treaty of Mutual Respect, Friendship and Cooperation with 
Indonesia in 1986 and the Joint Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations with Australia in 
1987. The JDP redefined PNG’s relationship with Australia, committed Australia more to 
PNG’s security needs and emphasised more on trade than aid. However, PNG did not depart 
significantly vis-a-vis its aid relations with Australia. It still had the same need for development 
assistance that it had during the early years of independence. 
 
PNG’s postcolonial foreign policy has evolved, as reflected in the shifting foreign 
policy doctrine. Minimising its primary dependence on Australia has been the primary driver 
of PNG’s evolving foreign policy. PNG sought to broaden its options and limit Australia’s 
constraints. Indeed, it widened its foreign relations, but its successive governments have not 
minimised Australia’s influence. PNG still depended on Australian aid at the beginning of the 
twenty-first to support its programs and policies. To put it differently, PNG’s foreign policy 
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underwent a gradual change, but it did not depart significantly from the early days of the 
Somare government’s accession. PNG still depended on Australia, which has often been an 
affront to national pride. Various governments have adopted foreign policy initiatives in 
support of active and selective engagement, but the capacity to implement foreign policy has 
often been hampered by poor administration and governance issues. Such issues include weak 
foreign policy coordination and a lack of consultation between the formal institutions of 
government whose functional responsibilities encroached on foreign affairs, which implied that 
foreign policy had been conducted in a fragmented manner. Overall, PNG’s foreign policy 
development has been constrained by a weak foreign policy mechanism. 
 
The environment to which foreign policy must respond has been changing. Since the 
2000s, the foreign policy environment has become more fluid. The Pacific region has observed 
the entry of more active external participants, including China and Indonesia. These new 
changes signified that PNG has more options in terms of foreign policy. Concurrently, the 
domestic environment has been changing. PNG’s economic development, driven largely by the 
extractive industries, gave it a new sense of economic independence and confidence. PNG has 
also developed a stronger sense of its place in the region and has increasingly considered itself 
an important regional power with a role to play in shaping regional order. These factors have 
been interacting to unsettle the postcolonial status quo. However, does it result in the 
emergence of a more coherent foreign policy? Using three case studies—the Enhanced 
Cooperation Program (EXP) between PNG and Australia in 2003, the Julian Moti affair in 
2006 and the case of West Papua in 2015—as the baseline for analysis, this study examines in 
greater detail the changing nature of foreign policy and whether trends in this period have 
continued in the period under review (2003–2015). 
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Chapter 4: The Enhanced Cooperation Program 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the ECP and focuses on the period between 2003 and 2009. The 
ECP was a bilateral aid program between the PNG and Australian governments. It represented 
an ambitious institutional strengthening program that reflected Australia’s interests in security 
and good governance in PNG. In mid-2003, Australia proposed to take a more robust role in 
helping PNG address some of the core challenges affecting its development, which reflects 
frustration at the waste and ineffectiveness of its aid to the country. Both countries committed 
to managing the problems of governance and law and order in PNG. The commitment was 
captured in the Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation between Papua New Guinea and 
Australia, or the ECP, in 2004. The ECP proved controversial in PNG, as it proposed a deep 
form of intervention that included the deployment of Australian police and officials into the 
PNG Government system as in-line workers rather than as advisers. The ECP case is 
compelling as a case study for many reasons in terms of the changing nature of foreign policy 
in PNG. It centres on PNG’s most important bilateral relationship—that of Australia. The 
politics of ECP suggest shifts of PNG’s approach to the relationship, which has been 
characterised as one of dependency for most of the post-independence period. Analysis of ECP, 
therefore, has the potential to illuminate new dynamics that impact PNG’s foreign policy. A 
fundamental question arising from the ECP case is whether it marked a critical juncture in the 
relationship between PNG and Australia, which sheds light on PNG’s changing interests and 
provides a window to evolving foreign policy in PNG. 
 
This chapter is composed of three main parts. The first looks at the historical context 
of the aid relationship between PNG and Australia to provide context behind the ECP. The aim 
is to highlight the dominance of Australia’s overseas development assistance (ODA) to PNG. 
The ECP was a direct government-to-government initiative that evolved from existing bilateral 
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programs. The program is covered in more detail in the second part, which outlines the rationale 
behind the program and its approach. It covers the challenges and politics of the program and 
the salient factors that shape it. More importantly, it provides an appreciation for why the 
Australian Government conceptualised the ECP and intervened in PNG. The last part is an 
analysis of the ECP’s foreign policy implications. It summarises the key implications of the 
program vis-a-vis foreign policy and relates the case to the changing nature of foreign policy. 
 
4.2 The PNG–Australia Relationship 
As noted in Chapter 3, PNG and Australia have a particularly close and special 
relationship that stems from colonial and historical ties. Both countries maintained close levels 
of contact and friendship that are befitting of close neighbours who are bound together by 
geographical proximity and historical and security ties. Based on the historical relationship 
with PNG and its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations, Australia assured 
PNG in 1975 that it would have first call on Australia’s aid program after independence. During 
his address at the PNG independence celebrations in Port Moresby on 16 September 1975, the 
then Australian Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, said: 
 
The Australian Government has stressed that a united and independent 
Papua New Guinea will continue to have first call on Australia’s 
expanding aid program. I reaffirm that pledge in the strongest possible 
terms; reaffirm it with the full support of the Australian Government, 
the full support of the Australian political parties, the full support of 
the Australian people. I give a categorical and unequivocal assurance 
to the Government and people of Papua New Guinea that this nation 
will continue to have first call on our expanding aid program (Whitlam, 
1975). 
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The bilateral relationship with Australia has been the most important relationship for 
PNG. The aid program is a central and practical part of Australia’s engagement with PNG and 
forms a critical part of the bilateral relationship. Australian aid has played a significant role in 
PNG’s development; historically, it has supported both the stability and the legitimacy of 
national government. Since self-government in 1972 and subsequent independence in 1975, 
Australia worked closely with PNG to develop the newly established nation–state and provided 
advice and skilled bureaucrats to support the new state. It heavily supported PNG’s budget; at 
independence, Australian aid provided 41.4 per cent of PNG’s budget (Commonwealth of 
Australia, 1975, p. 4). Of the net ODA that was received in PNG from 1975 to 2003, Australia 
remains by far the largest contributor, as shown in Figure 4.1. The graphs only show figures 
from 1975 to 2003. Recent figures are not shown in this and other graphs in this chapter because 
the ECP was introduced in 2003. Nevertheless, Australia’s ODA to PNG surpassed that of any 
other foreign donors, both bilateral and multilateral. 
 
Figure 4.1. Bilateral aid to PNG (current US$), 1975–2003. 
Source: World Bank (2017b). 
 
$0
$50
$100
$150
$200
$250
$300
$350
$400
$450
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
M
ill
io
n 
U
S$
Net bilateral aid flows from Australia Total net bilateral aid flows
80 
Australia’s bilateral aid program to PNG has consistently been Australia’s largest 
bilateral aid program, with an estimated annual average of over A$300 million. In 2002–2003, 
the estimated total aid flow to PNG rested at A$351.4 million (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2002, p. 13). This figure represented 15 per cent of Australian foreign aid in the 2003 budget 
appropriation (Chand, 2004, p. 9). The average annual allocation is by far the most significant 
allocation to a single country in the region. It dwarfs aid to Indonesia, which is the second 
largest recipient of Australian aid, and the Pacific Islands as a region (see Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2. Australian ODA in the region (current US$), 1975–2003. 
Source: World Bank (2017b). 
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at independence, as shown in Figure 4.3 (World Bank, 2017b). The decline in aid, however, 
was not an indication of economic independence, as PNG remained aid-dependent in the early 
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(Dollery, Fleming & Heinecke, 2008, p. 54) and implied that PNG faces similar dependency 
challenges with a significant number of other developing countries. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. PNG’s net ODA received (as percent of GNI), 1975–2003. 
Source: World Bank (2017b). 
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Since the 1980s, the aid’s effectiveness became an increasing concern for Australian 
policymakers. Subsequently, several reviews of the Australian aid program have been 
undertaken, including the Jackson Review (Jackson, 1984) and Simons Review (Simons, 
1997). In 1984, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs commissioned the Jackson Review, 
which led to a stronger focus on partnerships with recipient countries through a country 
program approach. Initially, Australia’s aid program was administered by several government 
departments, which reflected the ad hoc nature of the program. The program approach was 
different. Instead of selecting individual projects, country programs considered the 
development priorities of recipient governments as well as Australia’s interests, which included 
humanitarian assistance, support for Australia’s strategic interest and the promotion of 
Australia’s commercial position (Jackson, 1984). Otherwise said, in the country program 
approach, Australian aid was programmed on the basis of country and regional strategies in 
consultation with partner governments. Both the Australian and recipient governments were 
involved in the planning and implementation of the recipient country’s programs. On 24 May 
1989, the Australian and PNG governments signed the Treaty on Development Cooperation. 
Under this treaty, both governments agreed that ‘budget support assistance shall be provided 
by the Government of Australia to the Government of Papua New Guinea at a progressively 
diminishing rate’ in support of ‘a progressive increase in jointly programmed aid, 
supplementary aid and other forms of assistance’ (Treaty on Development Co-Operation 
between the Government of Australia and the Government of Papua New Guinea, 1989). In 
support of PNG’s budget, untied aid would be reduced with a subsequent increase in program 
aid. This adjustment was the first time both countries agreed that Australia would provide a 
jointly programmed aid to PNG that was consistent with both governments’ policies, priorities 
and practices. The adjustment to the mode of aid delivery, which PNG accepted, was an 
Australian initiative that was aimed to improve the effectiveness of aid. The process 
commenced in 1992–1993 and was completed by around 2000. 
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In 1996, the Australian minister of foreign affairs commissioned the Simons Review 
(Simons, 1997). The Review, under the new Howard government, argued that the basic 
arrangement of the aid program was sound, but that it had suffered from the lack of a clear 
objective that left it open to being pulled in different directions. Its major findings were that 
the three-pronged approach of the Jackson Review—to allow poverty reduction, foreign policy 
and commercial interests to inform all aid decisions—had been a misstep. The review 
recommended a substantial change in the approach and direction of aid. It further stated that, 
at times, the effectiveness of aid suffered as a result of the commercial orientation of the types 
of activities that were undertaken (Simons, 1997, pp. 1, 3). This rationale led to the adoption 
of a single and clear objective for the aid program: to advance Australia’s national interest by 
assisting developing countries to reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development (Tomar, 
1997). The Simons Review strengthened the partnership approach that was emphasised in the 
Jackson Review, in which Australia worked together with recipient countries and supported 
projects and programs that were mutually beneficial. Cooperative relationships and effective 
partnerships with developing countries formed the core of Australia’s aid program. 
 
On 7 October 1999, the Australian and PNG governments signed the revised Treaty on 
Development Cooperation (1999). The revised treaty was partly influenced by the Simons 
Report, which raised concerns about the corruption and mismanagement of Australian aid 
(Simons, 1997, pp. 14–15). Article 4(2) of the Treaty reads: 
 
In order to improve the impact and effectiveness of the development 
co-operation program the Parties agree that aid should promote: 
priority development outcomes as detailed in the MTDS [Medium 
Term Development Strategy] and any other priorities determined by 
the Government of Papua New Guinea from time to time; high levels 
of accountability and transparency; the commitment and participation 
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of both Governments and the Papua New Guinea community; and 
innovative and efficient aid delivery. 
 
The revised treaty demanded greater accountability and transparency, while 
maintaining that aid would be jointly programmed (Article 4). In addition, Article 8(1) of the 
revised treaty stated that: 
 
The Governments of Australia and Papua New Guinea recognise the 
importance of performance benchmarks for the development co-
operation program. The Parties agree that performance against agreed 
targets, including benchmarks, shall influence the level and allocation 
of funding of the development co-operation program. 
 
An essential element of the revised Treaty was the introduction of generic and sector-
specific performance targets and benchmarks. The sectors included health, education, rural 
development and governance, which prompted two issues that cut across the development 
process: the promotion of gender equality and the maximisation of environmental 
sustainability. Performance in each of the sectors against the determined benchmarks would be 
reviewed and assessed annually, with the outcome of the analysis being used to determine the 
type and volume of future Australian aid. It was the first time for such an approach in the 
Australian aid program. It demonstrated Australia’s gradual approach to maximise the benefits 
of its aid disbursement. Essentially, Australia found a way to exercise greater control, given 
the worrying trends in PNG. 
 
Australian aid has been important in supporting key social sectors in PNG, such as 
education, health and infrastructure development. Over the period 1975–2002, between 10 and 
30 per cent of Australian aid went to core government sectors, including health, education, 
governance and infrastructure (see Figure 4.4). Governance, however, remains the biggest 
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challenge: corruption is endemic among the political elite and the bureaucracy; elections are 
held in a timely manner, but they are neither free, nor fair; the political participation of women 
is low; the parliamentary opposition is weak; and the country suffers from an inefficient civil 
service, serious law and order problems, and poor discipline in the army and police (Reilly, 
2002; Rynkiewich & Seib, 2000; Standish, 1999; Sullivan, 2004). As a result, Australia focused 
more on improving governance in PNG. The formal targeting of governance as a key sector for 
Australian assistance in PNG commenced in 1997. Since then, Australian efforts have 
intensified to support public sector administration and economic management, to help develop 
an effective judicial and law enforcement system and to strengthen systems for the protection 
of individual rights and freedoms (AusAID, 2003). 
 
Figure 4.4. Sectoral composition of Australian-programmed assistance to PNG, 1975–2002. 
Source: AusAID, 2003. 
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strengthen law and justice institutions (9 per cent) and other governances (15 per cent) (see 
Table 4.1) that included supporting effective economic management, an environment that 
encourages the private sector, building the capacity of PNG agencies to deliver essential 
services, and strengthening civil participation and representation (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2002, p. 14). 
 
Table 4.1 Breakdown of Bilateral Aid to PNG by Sector 
2001–2002       2002–2003 
Sector A$ 
(million) 
Allocation 
(%) 
 Sector A$ 
(million) 
Allocation 
(%) 
Governance 96 28  Other 
Governance 
52.71 15 
Education 82.3 24  Education 70.28 20 
Transport and 
Infrastructure 
82.3 24  Transport and 
Infrastructure 
77.31 22 
Health 54.86 16  Health 66.77 19 
Renewable 
Resources 
13.72 4  Renewable 
Resources 
10.54 3 
Other 13.72 4  Other 17.57 5 
    Justice 31.63 9 
    Public Sector 
Management 
24.60 7 
 
Source: Commonwealth of Australia (2001, 2002). 
 
Since 1997, there has been an increasing focus on good governance because it was 
considered important for strengthening PNG’s ability to effectively use aid resources to 
improve development outcomes. Australia’s increased focus on good governance was 
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consistent with the global interest in good governance. Prompted by concerns over the 
effectiveness of aid, the World Bank and donor countries have endorsed good governance as a 
core element of their development strategy (Kaufmann, 2009; B. MacDonald, 1998; Santiso, 
2001). The framework that guides principles of aid effectiveness is captured under the Paris 
Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which looks at the responsibility of developed and 
developing countries for delivering and managing aid in terms of ownership, alignment, 
harmonisation, managing for results and mutual accountability (Development Assistance 
Committee, 2008). Australia has signed undertakings so that its aid program will be aligned 
with the Paris Declaration principles in many regions and countries, including PNG, and has 
continuously focused on improving the effectiveness of its aid programs in the country. 
 
At the turn of the twenty-first century, Australian aid has been targeting the quality of 
governance in PNG, particularly with respect to the management of public expenditure, 
encouragement of broad-based sustainability growth and the addressing of the underlying 
causes of conflict and instability. Efforts to improve the impact of Australian aid were reflected 
in Australia’s push to develop the Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation between 
Australia and Papua New Guinea in 2004. It was an Australian initiative to develop an 
engagement architecture that frames dialogue with PNG on development and security issues 
and it provided a base for program efforts to strengthen the governance and capacity of state 
institutions. The agreement flagged a strong collective effort to strengthen public service 
agencies in the PNG Government. The signing of the Joint Agreement was accompanied by a 
range of new programs that represented a concerted effort on Australia’s part to address 
fundamental development problems in PNG. The Joint Agreement was heavily influenced by 
the ‘new interventionism’ paradigm of the time that prevailed in Australia’s near 
neighbourhood (Dinnen, 2004; Doyle, 2001; Glennon, 1999), which proposed a robust form of 
state building and using interventionist modalities such as embedded technical support. A key 
program that was developed under the Joint Agreement was the ECP, which was best 
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understood as a form of transnational ‘forward defence’ in which the neighbouring country 
becomes a ‘frontline’ for protecting Australia’s security and strategic interests (Chan, 
Goodman & O’Connor, 2006, p. 83). It was the largest single aid program to PNG since 
independence. At the time the ECP was first accepted in 2003, the Australian Government 
agreed to fund PNG with approximately $1.1 billion over five years until 30 June 2008 
(Parliament of Australia, 2005). This package included $805 million of new funding to the 
existing annual aid of $330 million under the bilateral aid program to PNG. 
 
4.3 The Enhanced Cooperation Program 
The ECP was driven by Australia’s strategic and security concerns, specifically the idea 
that state fragility posed significant security risks by reducing the ability of states to manage 
and contain possible risks that might emanate from their domestic territory (Barbara, 2008; 
Chan et al., 2006). The program’s idea emerged against a backdrop of three broad and 
overlapping influences: state fragility and concerns about the security implications of fragile 
states, which were made more significant, given the war on terror; an increasing focus on good 
governance; and growing frustration at the limited impact of significant aid spending, which 
resulted in a focus on cooperative intervention. It subsequently gave rise to a more robust 
Australian engagement approach. Cooperation intervention involved a robust intervention, 
with the consent of the host country, to try to strengthen the fragile institutions and the state 
(Greg. Fry & Kabutaulaka, 2008, p. 10). The doctrine of cooperative intervention was initiated 
after Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, returned from a meeting with US President, 
George Bush, and his war on terror efforts that followed the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 
September 2001. Howard announced that Australia had a special responsibility to reverse the 
failed states in the region, which he referred to as ‘our patch’ (Howard, 2003), so they would 
not ‘become safe havens for transnational criminals and terrorists’ (Parliament of Australia, 
2003; Sydney Morning Herald, 2003). The fear that fragile states in the region would provide 
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a foothold for transnational crime syndicates, and a haven or transit point for terrorist groups 
like the Indonesian-based Jemaah Islamiah, was a concern for Australia; its close alliance with 
the US raised concerns regarding terrorist reprisals for the war on terror (Dupont, 2001; 
O'Keefe, 2009; Van Fossen, 2003). These emerging fears were further aroused by the weak 
law enforcement capacity of the Pacific Island countries (McCusker, 2006; Windybank, 2008). 
The idea of cooperative intervention became powerful in the Pacific because of the number of 
fragile states and their proximity to Australia. As a foreign policy doctrine, cooperative 
intervention was given added impetus and legitimacy because of the broader war on terror. 
 
Australia’s fears in the region were hardened by the events that transpired in the ‘arc of 
instability’ (Ayson, 2007; Evans, 2012; Wallis, 2015), a term used to describe the string of 
weak, fragile and artificial states and sub-states in the region, ranging from the separatist 
Indonesian province of Aceh in the west to the coup-stricken Fiji islands in the east (Ayson, 
2007, p. 220), that posed security challenges to Australia. The instabilities were manifested in 
the 2002 Bali bombings in Indonesia, the bombing of the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, the 
ongoing Bougainville crisis in PNG and the civil conflict that beset the Solomon Islands from 
1998 to 2003 (Fry, 2004). The Solomon Islands experienced a difficult period between 1998 
and 2003. A civil conflict evolved into a lengthened period of violence and, subsequently, 
engendered lawlessness. The conflict devastated the economy, crippled the government 
mechanism and brought the country to the brink of collapse (Kabutaulaka, 2005; Moore, 2005; 
Nanau, 2008). The Solomon Islands were heading towards a failed state. The country was in 
dire need of help, which essentially could not come from within. It required foreign 
intervention. In 2003, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) was 
formed in response to a request for international aid by the Solomon Islands Government. 
Australia spearheaded RAMSI and took a leading role marshalling support for the regional 
mission and providing the bulk of funding and personnel. The rationale for the intervention 
was that a failing state would not only endanger the lives of Solomon Islanders, but it could 
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also pose significant threats to the whole region (Hameiri, 2007, pp. 410–411). Howard made 
no secret of his government’s rationale for intervention in the Solomon Islands. He said: 
 
We know that a failed state in our region, on our doorstep will 
jeopardise our own security. The best thing we can do is to take 
remedial action and to take it now (Howard, 2005b). 
 
The remedial action was to directly intervene and take a more active role in arresting 
the threat. The fear that fragile states in the region posed significant security threats was 
particularly concerning. RAMSI was involved in rebuilding the failed state (Barbara, 2008, p. 
123), which included restoring law and order, rebuilding national institutions, stabilising the 
economy and improving service delivery. The ECP in PNG was structured in a similar context 
of institutional strengthening and capacity building in a potentially ‘fragile state’ (O'Keefe, 
2009, p. 2). Australia was conscious of PNG’s potential for becoming a ‘failing state’ (Chan et 
al., 2006, p. 79). The pervasive and systemic weaknesses in the state’s capacity to provide 
effective government, as well as chronic lawlessness, make the country more vulnerable. This 
gives overseas commentators, academics and scholars the opportunity to stigmatise PNG as a 
‘weak state’ (Wainwright & White, 2004, p. 4), a state ‘on the brink’ (Manning & Windybank, 
2003, p. 1), a ‘basket case’ (Radio Australia, 2003; Walton, 2013), a ‘ruined state’ (Patience, 
2011), a ‘dysfunctional state’ (Hughes, 2002), a ‘fragile state’ (O'Keefe, 2009, p. 2), a ‘failing 
state’ (Chan et al., 2006, p. 79) and, in the extreme form, a ‘failed state’ (Windybank, 2003). 
There are conceptual and contextual variations between the various descriptions. However, the 
often repeated cliché of ‘failing state’ became increasingly associated with PNG (Dinnen, 
2004, p. 4; Patience, 2005, p. 3). The perception of PNG as a failing state gave impetus to the 
ECP. Australia positioned PNG as a potential security threat that it must stabilise from the top-
down. 
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Governance in PNG, as mentioned, has been one of the most difficult of PNG’s 
development challenges. Apart from weak institutions and lack of capacity to deliver essential 
services, other issues that posed significant development challenges included corruption, 
political instability, ineffective leadership and a thin civil society that was unable to hold the 
government to account (Laki & May, 2009; Rynkiewich & Seib, 2000; Sullivan, 2004). 
Various PNG governments have made attempts to address some of the governance problems, 
but they have rarely succeeded. For example, between 1999 and 2002, Sir Mekere Morauta’s 
government adopted the World Bank’s structural reform programs, which included broad 
goals: promote good governance and strengthen the institutions of state; build macro-
economic, financial and budget stability; introduce public sector reform for improved public 
sector performance; remove obstacles to economic growth (Kavanamur & Turner, 2009, p. 18); 
and create political stability and integrity (Okole, 2012). Despite the government’s efforts, 
governance indicators have shown that governance has been declining. For example, in 2003, 
the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators showed all six categories of governance 
(control of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, the rule 
of law, and voice and accountability) in PNG were worse than they were in 1996 (World Bank, 
2017d). Poor governance has been a growing concern for the Australian authorities because 
poor governance together with widespread corruption limited the effectiveness of development 
assistance (DFAT, 2000). From 1975 to 2003, Australia provided more than US$6.896 billion 
(in current US dollars) ODA to PNG (World Bank, 2017b). Despite a long history of aid, PNG 
continued to face substantial development challenges that included dysfunctional service 
delivery mechanisms, the public sector’s limited capacity to deliver services, weak law 
enforcement capacity, deteriorating infrastructure, poorly functioning systems of government, 
law and order challenges and corruption. The domestic challenges impeded PNG’s ability to 
meet international development goals and national targets. The growing problems in PNG was 
an increasing source of frustration for Australia as PNG’s principal development partner. 
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Australia considered poor development outcomes a sign of both corruption and 
malfeasance on the part of PNG and its ability to be a constructive partner in pursuit of shared 
aid objectives. Frustration with poor development outcomes in PNG became an increasing 
preoccupation of policymakers in Canberra. Senior officials in the Australian Treasury, in the 
Prime Minister and Cabinet and in Foreign Affairs and Trade concluded that efforts to 
strengthen PNG institutions had largely failed, partly due to the ‘general lack of accountability 
in Papua New Guinea for Australian aid’ (Dollery et al., 2008, p. 60). A significant source of 
concern in Australia was the issue of corruption and the degree to which Australian aid 
resources were inappropriately used or wasted by the PNG Government. For example, aid 
intended for a particular sector has often been diverted to another and subsequently siphoned 
off from the system by a few political elites. Similarly, for every dollar Australia spent on 
health, the PNG Government would spend less on health, spend more on dubious projects 
(Callick, Hughes, Vincent & Weisman, 1990) and thus raise concerns about corruption and 
mismanagement (Simons, 1997, pp. 14–15). Part of the problem identified in the critique of 
Australian aid was the way in which aid was managed. The Howard government became 
impatient with how Australia’s aid programs were administered by the Australian Agency for 
International Development (AusAID) and related agencies (Patience, 2005). For instance, for 
almost 16 years (1989–2005), Australia committed more than A$240 million to strengthen 
PNG’s law and the justice sector. The substantial aid targeted for the policing component of 
the law and justice sector produced little sign of sustained improvement in the organisational 
and operational performance of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) (Dinnen, 
2009, pp. 252–254; Dinnen & McLeod, 2008, p. 26). The efficacy of the development projects 
was widely criticised (Aid Watch, 2005; Shek, 2005) and many of the criticisms and concerns 
were related to the mode of aid delivery (Wainwright & White, 2004; White, 2005; Windybank, 
2003). Professor Hugh White, a former ministerial adviser, think-tanker, academic and the 
principal author of Australia’s 2000 Defence White Paper, argued that helping PNG ‘cannot 
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be done through the conventional forms of development aid’ (White, 2005) and together with 
Elsina Wainwright, Strategic and International Program Director at the Australian Strategic 
Policy Institute, proposed that Australia could help by taking ‘over key responsibilities for 
government in PNG’ (Wainwright & White, 2004, p. 40). It was perceived that the existing aid 
program, delivered through AusAID, had failed. Their proposal effectively called for direct 
intervention and formed part of the broader pressure for change in the approach to aid 
disbursement. 
 
In his statement to the Australian Parliament on Australia’s development cooperation 
in the region on 24 September 2002, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Alexander Downer, argued 
that Australia cannot walk away from the ‘poor performing states’ that are identified ‘mostly 
in Melanesia’. He added that Australia’s ‘continued priority will be to strengthen the 
institutional capacity of legal and policy systems’ and ‘will continue to engage governments 
on good governance’ (Downer, 2002). Consistent with this policy statement, the Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee alluded on 28 March 2003 to ‘direct 
intervention’ as an ‘absolutely essential’ (Commonwealth of Australia, 2003, p. 414) approach 
for helping PNG address its significant and challenging development issues. In mid-2003, the 
Australian Government decided to take a more direct role in helping PNG address its core 
challenges (Parliament of Australia, 2005). This marked the beginning of the ECP. 
 
In Canberra, the National Security Committee of Cabinet resolved that Australia would 
take a more active and even interventionist approach in PNG. On 20 August 2003, Downer 
suggested that Australia increase its involvement. On 29 August 2003, the National Security 
Committee of Cabinet dispatched a special team led by senior diplomat, Bob Cotton, from 
Canberra to Port Moresby to deliver a letter to the PNG Government (ABC News, 2003). The 
contents of the letter were not disclosed, but it contained a thinly veiled threat—if PNG did not 
improve its governance and take control of the corruption that has plagued the country’s 
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institutions, Australia’s aid would be reassessed (Allard, 2003; Chan et al., 2006; Marshall, 
2005). That letter marked the beginning of ECP negotiations. Several ministerial meetings were 
subsequently held between the foreign ministers of the two countries, Honourable Alexander 
Downer and his PNG counterpart, Sir Rabbie Namaliu. 
 
On 18 September 2003, Downer and Namaliu met in Port Moresby to set the framework 
through which the key elements that underpin the PNG–Australia relationship could be further 
advanced with existing arrangements to assist PNG in addressing the social and economic 
challenges that affect its development. The two ministers agreed that a functioning public 
service and a committed law and order and justice sector were fundamental for development. 
They acknowledged that progress had been made in strengthening these sectors, but that more 
needed to be done in advancing this progress, with further support and involvement of 
Australia. In this regard, the ministers agreed on a framework that included: 
 
A firm commitment to work as close partners in addressing core 
challenges in Papua New Guinea in the areas of governance, law and 
order and justice, financial management, economic and social progress 
as well as capacity in the public service … An agreement in principle 
to examine the placement of Australian officials in positions in 
departments and agencies (DFAT, 2003b). 
 
The news of the ECP attracted widespread public support in PNG (Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2004). There was a growing nostalgia for the colonial era, particularly in the rural areas 
and among the older generation, when government services were efficient and reliable. The 
extent to which state services had withdrawn was apparent in the country (Patience, 2005). For 
instance, in 1996, only 39 per cent of health facilities were in a satisfactory condition and less 
than 70 per cent of rural aid posts were operating (World Bank, 1999, pp. 87–89). Therefore, 
improving the government’s capacity was considered one way for vital services like health to 
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be restored. Many young people—disillusioned (in growing numbers and with increasing 
bitterness) with their politicians, constantly struggling against inadequate facilities for training 
and higher education and struggling to find secured employment—felt defeated in the face of 
the enormous challenges the country faced. The disillusioned generation saw little future for 
themselves, or for the next generation, and looked to the ECP as a panacea for their problems 
(Patience, 2005). There were widespread beliefs and expectations among the community that 
the ECP would ameliorate the law and order and governance problems that contributed to 
socio-economic problems. The idea of intervention indicated that Australia would play a more 
active role in improving service delivery in the areas where the PNG Government had failed. 
 
The general public’s reactions were not the same at the political level. The ECP brought 
mixed reactions. Some ministers and members of parliament welcomed the proposed program, 
while others had ambivalent feelings. The Prime Minister, Sir Michael Somare, resisted the 
ECP partly because Australia labelled the Pacific Island countries as ‘failed states’ and saw the 
region as its ‘patch’ (Fry, 2008, p. 76; Howard, 2003). The prime minister, angry and defensive, 
said: 
I would like to tell you, my friend, we are not a failed state. We can 
make it work. We’ve made it work for 30 years now. When we gained 
independence, and I want to emphasise that, when we gained 
independence, there was no military coup in this country, there was no 
sabotage. Yes, there were change of governments. We had seven prime 
ministers. But we have no military coups like they have in African 
countries, like they have in other parts of the world. Never (Somare, 
2005b). 
 
According to the elites, the factors that impede progress in PNG are no different than 
those of troubled areas throughout the postcolonial world. The rush to independence on a 
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timetable dictated by the administrators without properly designed institutions for government, 
the weak post-independence governments operating on inadequate revenue bases, the poor 
economic performance and high population growth that fuels tensions over land, the tribal and 
ethnic clashes that challenge the capacity and authority of the state and the collapse of the rule 
of law that descends into corruption, criminality and maladministration are universal patterns 
in many post-independence developing countries (Wainright, 2003, pp. 18–19). These factors 
often contribute to state failure. PNG has experienced some of these problems, but the state has 
not failed. A failed state is often used to describe cases of complete state collapse, either into 
civil war or anarchy (Migdal, 1988, pp. 4–5). Classifying PNG as a failing state, in terms of 
the lack of good governance and law and order problems, underestimates the dynamic forces 
that generate conditions that prompt the symptoms of its fragility. In PNG, state institutions 
continued to perform to varying degrees and success. Many state institutions are overwhelmed 
with capacity issues, but some have managed well despite the limited resources and 
impediments. For example, funding the government’s school fee subsidy policy for all primary 
and high school children under the National Education Plan (1995–2004) declined in 1999, but 
schools throughout the country continued to provide education to all primary and high schools 
students (Guy, 2009). This suggest that some state institutions are functioning as expected, 
while others are not. Somare opposed the ECP because Australia labelled PNG a failed state. 
 
The mindset that PNG was a ‘failing state’ (Patience, 2005, p. 3) or ‘failed state’ (Fry, 
2008, p. 76) insulted the government, particularly when PNG governments have worked to 
carry out reforms for improving governance and reducing law and order problems. Successive 
governments that have attempted to improve efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector 
by restructuring organisational structures (Laki & May, 2009; Wolfers & Dihm, 2009) have 
started addressing law and order problems (INA, 2004) and have implemented reforms that 
were declared essential by outside agencies, including the World Bank’s SAPs (Weise, 2002; 
World Bank, 1990b). Essentially, successive governments have struggled to improve 
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governance by carrying out reforms, but the implementation of reforms has remained weak 
(Kavanamur & Turner, 2009). In addition, the government has commissioned inquiries and 
investigations into allegations of corruption and malpractice, including inquiries in the forestry 
industry (Barnett, 1989, 1990), an inquiry into the engagement of Sandline International in 
1997 (Andrew, 1997), an investigation into transparency, government dealings and 
accountability of public office holders (1997–1998) and an inquiry into the National Provident 
Fund in 2000. The government also commissioned an inquiry into the general conduct of the 
Privatisation Commission, the matters relating to the privatisation of Finance Pacific Limited 
and the sale of the Papua New Guinea Banking Corporation (2000–2003). These inquiries were 
well intentioned, but the recommendations were never implemented. 
 
As for reforms in governance, the government’s endeavour to strengthen political 
parties, promote more broadly supported candidates and increase political stability is worth 
noting. These three goals found their institutional expression in several pieces of legislation 
that were introduced in 2001 and 2002, most notably the Organic Law on National and Local-
Level Government Elections and the Organic Law on the Integrity of Political Parties and 
Candidates (Baker, 2005; Okole, 2012; Sepoe, 2005). Since the reforms, there were ‘clear 
improvements in political stability, party system cohesion and electoral processes’ (Reilly, 
2006, p. 193). Although measurable improvements have occurred since the implementation of 
these reforms, they have not altered fundamentally established political practice or ‘political 
culture’ (Morgan, 2005, p. 3; Standish, 2013, p. 8). Overall, constructing the inquiries and 
taking steps to improve governance indicated that PNG was concerned about addressing issues 
of corruption and, more generally, governance in the country. For this reason, labelling PNG 
as a failed state irked the government. 
 
The PNG Government largely welcomed Australia’s efforts to help PNG address its 
development problems. However, labelling PNG a failed state as a rationale for intervention 
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irked the PNG intellectuals and political elites. The former commander of the PNGDF, Jerry 
Singirok, denied that PNG was a failed state and contended that neglect and poor funding of 
the government institutions by successive governments over the years have contributed to weak 
institutions (Singirok, 2004, p. 106). The mindset that PNG was a failed state and that Australia 
could help through direct intervention has evoked sentiments of nationalism, particularly 
among the new generation of PNG elites and leaders who saw Australia’s intervention as 
infringing upon Papua New Guinea’s sovereignty (May, 2006, pp. 167–168). Somare, in 
particular, took it personally. The notion that PNG was a failed state, with allusions to 
governance and corruption, was an affront to Somare’s leadership. He saw governance—the 
act of governing—as his sphere and the notion of promoting governance through direct 
intervention undermined his leadership, as the program proposed a deep form of intervention 
that included the deployment of Australian officials into the PNG Government system. 
 
Somare believed that the extent of Australia’s planned involvement in PNG 
underscored their neo-colonial and paternalistic attitude. Similar sentiments were shared by 
some members of the opposition, including influential actors such as the Governor of Morobe 
and former National Court judge, Luther Wenge. Namaliu also had similar views. Wenge was 
cautious when news soon leaked about the appointment of an Australian as solicitor-general in 
PNG. He claimed that the two countries were conspiring to break the law: 
 
I am saying that whoever they appoint must comply with the laws of 
this land. To date, we know that they are trying to appoint an Australian 
to be the Solicitor-General. This contravenes the law relating to the 
appointment because one of the criteria is that you must work in Papua 
New Guinea, in the legal practice for five years (Wenge, 2003). 
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Wenge detected breaches in the PNG constitution and vowed to challenge the program 
in court. He would eventually challenge the legality of the program not because of the 
appointment of the solicitor-general, but because of the issue of granting immunity to the 
Australian police officers that were part of the program (Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea, 
2004). Namaliu was one of the few senior ministers in the Somare government ‘who viewed 
the package as an unwarranted intervention in PNG affairs’ (Chan et al., 2006, p. 84). During 
the breakfast meeting of the Business Council of PNG on 4 June 2004, he said ‘the issue of 
immunity was the sticking point that needed to be resolved before ECP could be implemented’ 
(Namaliu, 2004). Namaliu was concerned about the insertion of foreign police in an 
independent country, but he mellowed after a series of meetings with his Australian 
counterpart. Somare was perhaps one of the few senior politicians in government who openly 
and more frequently expressed his opposition to the program. During an interview with the 
ABC’s AM program on 5 September 2003, Somare said: 
 
They have not identified the areas where we’ve gone wrong. They have 
not come and sat with us. They may have sat with the Planning Office, 
they may have gone out and interviewed people outside and not talking 
to the Executive of the Government, people who are planning the 
process, people who are ensuring that the money is channelled into the 
right channels. And that perception is an absolute rubbish (Somare, 
2003a). 
 
Somare accused Australia of failing to consult with his government and maintained that 
there was no reason for Australia’s intervention. He viewed Australia’s intervention as 
disrespect for his government and his accusation stemmed from the approach to the program 
delivery. The proposed program was a direct government-to-government initiative that 
eschewed the traditional approach in which aid programs involved joint steering committees 
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and a clear definition of objectives (Dixon, Gene & Walter, 2008, p. 17). Somare viewed the 
new approach as bypassing his government on important issues such as financial management 
and governance (DFAT, 2003b), as disrespecting authority and as insulting his administration. 
Somare insisted that PNG was a developing but sovereign country. Therefore, it could not be 
forced to accept the ideology of what he called ‘good governance’, which he argued the ECP 
was seeking to impose. These sentiments were expressed during the official visit to PNG by 
the Malaysian Prime Minister, Dr Mahathir Mohamed, in October 2003. Somare did not miss 
the opportunity to express his opinions on dealing with the question of Australian aid. In his 
welcoming speech, Prime Minister Somare said: 
 
We are led to accept someone’s acceptance of good governance, even 
when that someone refuses to accept that it took him over 100, or 200 
years, what he now enjoys, while he requires us to achieve it in one or 
two years or three years (Somare, 2003b). 
 
 Somare’s speech was an indirect statement to look beyond Australia, should Australia 
insist on imposing its ideals of good governance on PNG. Malaysia had a similar experience 
and moved away from Australia. In 1993, Dr Mahathir refused to participate in the inaugural 
APEC summit and pushed for the exclusion of Australia, claiming that Australia did not belong 
in Asia. This prompted then prime minister, Paul Keating, to label him ‘recalcitrant’ (Shenon, 
1993; Stewart, 1993). In response, Dr Mahatir told reporters, ‘I can’t understand these 
Australians’, adding that Australia ‘talks down to Asia—it tells the Asians how to behave 
themselves, even when the Australians themselves are not very well behaved’ (Shenon, 1993). 
To a large extent, Somare’s veiled remark supported the look north policy that was discussed 
in Chapter 3. The look north policy is more a sentiment than a policy and it is normally 
expressed as a desire to move away from Australia. It had its roots in the thoughts of leading 
PNG politicians and bureaucrats who thought that their country was still in the shackles of 
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colonialism. The policy was specifically announced to reduce dependence on Australia, but 
since its announcement in 1994, the policy did not materialise. PNG continued to rely on 
Australian aid and often used the look north policy as a rhetoric to move away from Australia 
when its relations with its traditional partner is strained. 
 
While Somare was expressing his concerns about the ECP, policy discussions between 
his foreign affairs minister, Sir Rabbie Namaliu, and his Australian counterpart continued. 
There was a lack of coordination between the offices of the prime minister and foreign minister. 
This lack of coordination stemmed from a misunderstanding of the program, specifically the 
negotiation of the ECP. According to Namaliu, Somare was disgruntled with the program 
because he thought that the agreement was made with minimal consultation with PNG, but he 
capitulated to the ECP after he was advised that the program followed negotiations: 
 
What has changed basically is this. There was a perception out there, 
here, and obviously that was the perception that the Prime Minister had 
at the time, that the proposal to inject Australian officials into some of 
these positions would be done on the basis that Australia would be 
putting, offering them to us without our input, without our 
consultations, and once that was cleared, you know that wasn’t a 
package that they were about to shove down our throats but in fact it’s 
a package that is subject to discussions, which exactly happened 
yesterday and once that was cleared, we then said well, this is 
something that we’ve been doing anyway (Namaliu, 2003). 
 
Somare distanced himself from discussions while negotiations between the two foreign 
ministers continued, partly because he strongly felt that his government was not consulted 
(Somare, 2003a). Besides in the prime minister’s office, there was a lack of consultation 
between the foreign ministry, other ministries and line departments that would be affected by 
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the program. Namaliu was the only minister in the Somare government who negotiated the 
ECP with the Australian Government. During the 15th Australia–Papua New Guinea 
Ministerial Forum in Adelaide on 11 December 2003, the two foreign ministers reaffirmed the 
joint statement of 18th September and agreed to the ECP’s details. 
 
In a joint statement, the two foreign ministers agreed that up to 230 Australian police 
officers, known as Australia assisting police (AAP), would be placed in the RPNGC (DFAT, 
2003a). It was also agreed that 18 Australian specialists would work in non-policing law and 
justice agencies and positions, which include that of solicitor-general, three litigation lawyers 
in the solicitor-general’s office, five prosecutors in the prosecutor’s office, two correctional 
service managers, four expatriate judges appointed to the National and Supreme Court and 
lawyers and specialist officials in other key justice agencies. While policing was a primary 
focus, the ECP also included a broader state building program with a strong focus on economic 
governance. According to the joint statement, 36 Australian officials would work in key 
economic, finance, planning and expenditure agencies to help the country better utilise the 80 
per cent of its budgetary resources that was derived internally. The key priorities included the 
establishment of fiscal sustainability and transparency, restoration of the budget institutions 
and systems integrity, elimination of weaknesses in the civil service payroll, provision of 
economic policy advice, improvements in provincial budget management and stronger public 
sector performance and outcomes. Of the 36 Australian officials: 10 would help streamline 
PNG’s immigration services, border and transport security and management and aviation 
safety; four immigration officials would help hone border control and migration management; 
two transport security officials would be placed within the PNG Department of Transport and 
Civil Aviation to help guarantee the security and safety of its aviation and maritime transport 
system and to meet international transport security obligations; one official would be placed as 
a deputy chief executive in the Civil Aviation Safety Authority to assist PNG maintain its air 
safety management and governance at a high level; and three customs officials to help improve 
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revenue collection, international trade security and border integrity. Skills transfer and capacity 
building would be key features of this assistance. The proposed program was comprehensive 
and broadly focused on strengthening key governance institutions. Although it was composed 
of two parts, governance and law and justice, the major focus was on law and justice with a 
strong focus on policing because the program proposed the deployment of many Australian 
police officers. 
 
Under this new arrangement, Australian officers would be inserted into ‘in-line’ 
(Dinnen, 2009, p. 255; Hawksley, 2005, p. 36) positions in key government agencies, which 
signifies that Australian officials would not only play advisory roles, but would participate in 
operational duties as well (DFAT, 2003a). Simply put, they would operate as employees of the 
host government agencies and exercise delegated powers. Australia has been previously 
sensitive to allegations of neo-colonialism and interference with national sovereignty (Dinnen, 
2004, p. 1). Therefore, its aid to the region was provided with a ‘hands-off’ approach, in which 
Australian consultants were attached to PNG Government departments as advisers who worked 
alongside local counterparts. The shift in the mode of assistance was the embodiment of 
cooperative intervention, in that it represented a more demanding and robust form of 
engagement that linked expectation of influence to the provision of aid. Australia wanted more 
control to implement and direct the aid program to improve prospects. The new mode of aid 
delivery included a strong focus on the use of technical assistance, whereby Australian advisers 
were deployed to government agencies to implement aid objectives and build the capacity of 
local officials. The proposal to insert Australian officials into in-line positions within the core 
institutions of government was considered more likely to be influential in pursuing reform 
agendas or determining program priorities. However, the power, or influence, of Australian 
officials over their PNG counterparts and vice versa was not clear. Nonetheless, the proposed 
program was controversial, as it was a clear reversal of the non-intervention policy that marked 
a deeper form of intervention and that arguably encroached on sovereignty. 
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PNG accepted the ECP package in general, but the program could not be fully 
implemented because a treaty-level agreement between Australia and PNG that covered the 
ECP, including the passage of enabling legislation and other legislative amendments, was yet 
to be concluded. The requirement of a treaty on the program was consistent with Australia’s 
past aid programs to PNG. Past aid programs were guided by treaties and agreements and the 
ECP was no exception. For example, the Treaty on Development Cooperation stipulated that 
budget support assistance would be reduced in favour of programmed aid ("Treaty on 
Development Co-Operation between the Government of Australia and the Government of 
Papua New Guinea," 1989). Therefore, a treaty that provided the framework for the proposed 
program was required. The drafting of the ECP, however, was controversial. 
 
Australia’s DFA, AusAID, the Australian Federal Police and the Attorney General’s 
department collaborated and prepared the ECP (Hawksley, 2005; Parliament of Australia, 
2005) without consultation with the PNG authorities who would be affected by the program. 
These departments and agencies included Police, Civil Aviation, the Attorney General, 
Customs and National Planning and Monitoring. The exclusion of the key government 
departments in the consultation process was later revealed by Namaliu, who pointed out that 
‘Australian officials had been deeply involved in writing the legislation’ (Namaliu, 2005). He 
further claimed that ‘an Australian police commissioner’ and other Australian ‘police personnel 
that served in the PNG police force helped draft the laws’ (Nicholas, 2005). Moreover, there 
was no inter-departmental dialogue between the departments and agencies that would be 
affected by the program because ‘little was known about the contents of the agreement’ (Amet, 
2005; Solomon, 2005a) on which inter-departmental discussions could be centred. More 
importantly, the State Solicitor’s Office, which is responsible for advising the government on 
bilateral treaties, was overlooked (Niesi, 2005b). Australian authorities designed the ECP in 
Canberra and exported it to PNG with limited consultation with the PNG Government (The 
National, 26 May 2005, p. 2). Namaliu and his government had little influence in drafting the 
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program. The only times that the ECP came under the jurisdiction of the law-making authorities 
in PNG were when the two governments negotiated it and when it was enacted in parliament. 
 
Part of the joint agreement on ECP contained provisions on jurisdiction that were 
designed to protect the AAP and officials deployed under the program, as well as to guard them 
against vexatious claims. Article 8 of the ECP dealt primarily with the protection of Australian 
officials from prosecution under PNG laws (Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation 
between Australia and Papua New Guinea, 2004). The AAP would not be subjected to PNG’s 
criminal and civil jurisdiction of the courts or to tribunals of PNG on acts or omissions done 
within the course of, or incidental to, official duties. The idea of granting immunity to the 
visiting AAP became a contentious issue in PNG when the Australian Government raised it. 
Although he PNG State Solicitor advised the government that granting immunity to the visiting 
AAP would be against the constitution, the government ignored this advice (Niesi, 2005b). On 
30 June 2004, during the 16th PNG–Australia Ministerial Forum in Lae, PNG, both 
governments entered into the Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation between Papua New 
Guinea and Australia and the two foreign ministers signed the treaty. On 27 July 2004, the 
ECP was enacted into law with less opposition in the PNG parliament. The prime minister 
strongly opposed the ECP, but he capitulated and voted in favour of the program with the most 
parliament members. The reason why Somare capitulated and accepted the ECP is explained 
by examining PNG’s prevailing economic environment. 
 
In 2003, the government faced significant challenges to its economy. The country was 
reeling from the effects of poor economic performance between 1997 and 2002 due to a 
combination of both internal and external factors (Asian Development Bank, 2002; Gaglioti & 
Phillips, 1999; Theodore, Levantis & Yala, 1998). The challenges included a significant 
downward pressure on the kina, price inflation pressures with a subsequent rise in the interest 
rates on government stock, pressure on the balance of payments, limited cash throughout the 
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remainder of 2002 due to excessive spending in the first eight months of the year and a 
recession for some years with negative total GDP growth in 2000, 2001 and 2002 (Price 
Waterhouse Coopers, 2002). The economy was in bad shape for three consecutive years (see 
Figure 4.5). 
 
Figure 4.5. Papua New Guinea GDP growth (annual percent), 1997–2004. 
Source: World Bank, 2017b. 
 
PNG was slowly recovering from the poor economic performance in 2003 when the 
ECP was negotiated. PNG’s interest was focused on improving the economy, which would 
include accepting outside offers of help to boost economic growth. Australia was conscious of 
PNG’s economic predicament and knew that, in the end, PNG would accept the Australian 
ultimatum because its government had no choice (Somare, 2003a). That is, Australia took 
advantage of PNG’s poor economic condition and used its economic power to influence a 
policy proposal that favoured its interest. Nonetheless, it was apparent that the acceptance of 
the ECP was influenced by the domestic economic environment. 
 
For many politicians, foreign aid was important under the prevailing economic climate 
and could not be refused for the sake of political rhetoric, even though both Somare and Wenge 
preferred non-interference from Australia. Somare saw governance—the act of governing—as 
his sphere and he wanted limited interference. This is because the ECP was more interventional 
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than other aid programs. As stated in this chapter, the program proposed a deep form of 
intervention in the PNG Government system. Many members of the PNG parliament, however, 
could not be bothered by the prime ministers’ concerns about Australia’s interference. Australia 
had a long history of supporting PNG in terms of aid and development assistance. Successive 
Australian governments have been involved in providing aid, targeting training in good 
governance, providing advisory support and helping PNG strengthen its government 
institutions to improve governance and law and order through bilateral agreements. For 
example, under the Joint Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Australia and 
Papua New Guinea in 1992, Australia has been providing development assistance ‘as part of 
an agreed program of cooperation which contributed to development and self-reliance in Papua 
New Guinea’ (DFAT, 1992). The ECP was one such agreement that involved a substantial 
amount of aid. A total of $1.1 billion was earmarked for the program over five years 
(Parliament of Australia, 2005) and would be spent on the programs that were identified under 
the Agreement. 
 
Somare’s acceptance of the ECP, despite his tirades and criticisms, demonstrated 
contradictory policy positions. It demonstrated that it was difficult for PNG to disentangle itself 
from the dependent nature of its aid relationship with Australia. The underlying reason for 
accepting the ECP was known later in 2005 during an interview with the SBS Dateline program. 
Somare said: 
 
Don’t you think you are corrupting my mind also? You can’t refuse 
800 million, you must accept it. Don’t you think it’s corruption? When 
you impose your will upon me to accept your money, I think fair and 
reasonableness and understanding each other, mutual understanding 
are better ways of solving issues, not the imposition of money (Somare, 
2005b). 
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Somare’s statement was crucial. It underscored the reason why he capitulated after 
protracted wrangling. He admitted that he could not refuse the A$800 million tied to the 
program, so his government had to push through the ECP. Nonetheless, his resistance to the 
ECP was perhaps the first time a PNG Government resisted Australian aid.  
 
The ECP was one of the few items of legislation that got passed into law in a very short 
time and the ECP was adopted on the 9 August 2004 (Enhanced Co-operation between Papua 
New Guinea and Australia Act, 2004). Article 2 of the schedule to the act sets out the purpose 
of the law: 
 
Australia may, in consultation with the Government of Papua New 
Guinea, deploy police and other personnel to Papua New Guinea to 
work in partnership with the Government of Papua New Guinea to 
address core issues in Papua New Guinea in the area of governance, 
law and order and justice, financial management, economic and social 
progress as well as capacity in public administration, including the 
Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary. 
 
The new legislation empowered the Australian officials to work alongside their PNG 
counterparts in various sectors of government. Under the ECP, the officials would be treated 
differently from their PNG counterparts. They would exercise almost all the operational 
functions of the organisations they were to be attached to, but they would be immune from 
prosecution for any acts or omissions done within the course of, or incidental to, their official 
duties. As part of the agreement under the ECP (Article 11), PNG citizens were to be prevented 
from seeking redress for wrongs committed by Australian officials who were engaged in the 
program (Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea, 2004). The ECP shielded the visiting AAP from prosecution under PNG laws. 
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The first contingent of AAP was deployed in Port Moresby soon after the passing of 
the ECP. The impact of the program’s policing component was felt immediately. A youth from 
the highlands of PNG, living in Port Moresby, remarked: 
 
In the past, our police officers used to be very abusive. They do not 
know how to deal with the public and how they handle public 
complaints. Whatever little they do, they expect some form of 
recognition. This attitude of policing changed when the Australian 
police came. We saw dramatic changes. The Australian police officers 
interacted well with us and treated us as human beings. It would be 
better if our police officers emulated their policing attitude5. 
 
There had been more interaction and engagement, more friendly reaction and less 
violence from the Australian police officers. They had seen little from the RPNGC, whose 
policing attitudes were often violent and less responsive. People at the grassroots level saw a 
new dimension to the policing component, such as responsiveness to complaints, and gave their 
support to the ECP (Kimisopa, 2005a). Many people in the wider PNG community were neither 
concerned about the sovereignty issues that lengthened negotiations, nor about the politics 
involved in the ECP. In general, the ECP was well received by many Papua New Guineans, 
particularly the policing component. The impact of the governance component, however, was 
not felt immediately. 
 
On 8 December 2004, Wenge, a very vocal critic of the ECP, filed a special reference 
to the Supreme Court challenging the validity of the new legislation. Wenge read the fine print 
                                               
5 Excerpt from a conversation with Moss Dama on 6 July 2013, in Port Moresby. 
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of the ECP, called the legislation ‘deplorable, discriminatory and in contravention of the 
constitution of PNG’ and further declared that the entire agreement and the manner in which it 
was rushed through was a ‘charade’ and an ‘insult’ that would not stand the scrutiny of PNG 
law or international standards (The National, 16 May 2005, pp. 1–2). He brought a series of 
seven overlapping and interrelated questions touching on PNG’s sovereignty before the court. 
The Supreme Court detected not only inconsistencies in the ECP, but also contradictions within 
the Act itself; it expressed its concern that the national parliament could have considered and 
complied with section 38 of the constitution at the time the ECP was passed (Supreme Court 
of Papua New Guinea, 2004). The inconsistencies and contradictions with the ECP indicated 
poor vetting in the policymaking process on the part of PNG’s government. A working 
committee, if one ever existed, failed to sift through the Agreement before it was endorsed by 
the PNG parliament as law. Moreover, the Supreme Court found that the ECP encroached on 
section 38 of the constitution and provisions of the Police Force Act (Supreme Court of Papua 
New Guinea, 2004). 
 
On 13 May 2005, the Supreme Court declared that the new legislation was illegal and 
the AAP withdrew. Many ordinary Papua New Guineans were disheartened and disappointed 
when the AAP departed (Gumuno, 2005). Many of the grassroots population who were daily 
exposed to PNG’s law and order and socio-economic problems did not see any benefits arising 
from the collapse of the ECP’s first attempt (Laracy, 2006, p. 24). The policing component of 
the ECP halted and was withdrawn after less than a year in operation, following the court’s 
ruling. The Supreme Court’s ruling only affected the placement of the police component, but 
it did not alter the operating mode of the ECP personnel significantly. The governance aspect 
of the ECP, including assistance to economic and legal or judicial areas of government, 
continued under the PNG Governance Facility. 
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The Supreme Court’s decision exposed tensions within the PNG Government and not 
all PNG politicians were happy with the court’s ruling. Some members of the government, such 
as Somare, wanted the program back. The Police Minister, Bire Kimisopa, said the 
‘devastating’ (Kimisopa, 2005b) ruling created a critical challenge for PNG and the 
government that was struggling to reform a corrupt and dysfunctional police service. He said: 
 
The political hierarchy needs to humble itself. We’ve got to 
demonstrate leadership and resuscitate this program. Even if PNG were 
able to pick up the pieces, it could take more than a year to find a 
solution. We can’t continue our reforms without the ECP. We don’t 
have the luxury of the time to abandon this (Kimisopa, 2005b). 
 
Kimisopa was delegated the task of renegotiating the ECP. He stated that the 
government supported the program: 
 
The PNG Government now has of last week delegated me to re-
negotiate the police program so that we can … whatever needs to be 
done within the ECP Agreement, as far as the police component is 
concerned, it needs to be discussed, it needs to be agreed to as soon as 
possible and hopefully we need to go back to Parliament with a 
number, with a new agreement. That’s basically what the PNG 
Government is looking for. I mean, the public opinion, the public 
support for the ECP was overwhelming, and unfortunately the ECP was 
in operation for just only 6 months, I think, a little bit over 6 months 
and it got undone, but that doesn’t mean we should, you know, drop 
the program altogether, because this is something Papua New Guinea 
needs (Kimisopa, 2005a). 
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Many members in the PNG Government wanted the ECP, but their effort to implement 
the program jointly with Australia was interrupted by the Supreme Court’s ruling. Even Wenge, 
who took the matter to the Supreme Court, wanted Australia and PNG to return to the 
negotiating table (Wenge, 2005a). In an interview with Australia’s ABC PM program on 13 
May 2005, Wenge (2005b) said: 
 
I am not saying the Australians shouldn’t come here, make it clear to 
them they are good friends. They are certainly our good friends, our 
long-time friends. There’s no question about that and we must … that 
friendship must remain, but whatever dealing that happens in Papua 
New Guinea and Australia must be consistent and in compliance with 
the law. 
 
Wenge was concerned about the legal aspect of the ECP, particularly its infringement 
of the constitution. According to a report in the Sydney Morning Herald, dated 14 May 2005, 
Wenge said that future assistance should be in the form of logistical support, rather than 
dispatched Australian officers. His statement did not represent the government’s position on 
aid delivery. Somare welcomed the Supreme Court’s decision and said that ‘we would like to 
remove the umbilical cord of depending [on] Australia and diversify our relations with the 
region and the world’ (Somare, cited in Anderson, 2006). It was not clear how Canberra 
interpreted this statement, but the underlying message was apparent—Somare was annoyed by 
Australia’s patronage and wanted to diversify PNG’s relations to minimise its dependency on 
Australia. 
 
The issue of Australia’s unilateralism became a point of argument after the ECP 
collapsed and further deepened tensions in the bilateral relationship between the two countries. 
Australian foreign minister, Alexander Downer, blamed the PNG Government for the flawed 
legislation, claiming that Australia was not ‘involved with the actual legislation’ because it 
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‘was a matter for the PNG government’ (Solomon, 2005b; Marshall, 2005). However, his PNG 
counterpart, Sir Rabbie Namaliu, highlighted that Australian officials were deeply involved in 
writing the ECP and further stated that PNG would review not only the legal issue of immunity, 
but the substantial sections of the agreement as well: 
 
It shouldn’t be a one-way street, they [Australia] shouldn’t be 
expecting us only to be accommodative in this situation. After all, it’s 
supposed to be a bilateral arrangement that is adhered to by both 
countries (Namaliu, 2005). 
 
Namaliu maintained that the ECP was drafted offshore and pushed through bilateral 
arrangements, expecting PNG to be receptive to the program. Australian High Commissioner, 
Michael Potts, refuted this statement and claimed that it was ‘misplaced’ (Huafolo, 2005). The 
Australian Government wanted the police to return as soon as the legal obstacles were removed. 
In the wake of the court decision, Australian Prime Minister Howard insisted that the ECP 
should be resumed as quickly as possible. However, he insisted that the only way forward was 
to amend the PNG constitution to provide legal protection of the Australians deployed in PNG. 
In an interview with radio station 4BC on the 18 May 2005, Howard (2005a) said: 
 
We are not prepared to allow our police to continue to operate there 
without this immunity. It may well be that the only solution to the 
problem is an amendment to the PNG Constitution … So it’s back to 
the negotiating table with the PNG Government, the aim being to find 
a way whereby legal immunity on a constitutional basis can be 
provided. 
 
The idea of immunity is not foreign to international deployments (Akande & Shah, 
2010; Ladley, 2005). The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961 provides 
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immunity for representatives of foreign states on authorised business and the principle has also 
been extended to peacekeeping forces to avoid petty or vexatious litigation that detracts from 
the tasks at hand (Hestermeyer, 2009). Australia’s push for the immunity of its officials was 
consistent with the sorts of immunities that Australia seeks for its officials who are deployed 
in different parts of the world, including the Solomon Islands (Brown & Peake, 2005). Downer 
reasoned that these immunities were consistent with those granted to Papua New Guineans 
engaged in RAMSI and that there was nothing particularly surprising about it (Downer, 2005). 
Nonetheless, the immunity of Australian police officers in PNG proved to be a vexing issue, 
primarily because Australia used the same justification for RAMSI as a template for the ECP. 
The Australian-led RAMSI intervention was justified in Australia by the failed state paradigm. 
It was perceived that the failing state was unable to fulfil its obligation to protect its inhabitants. 
Some members of PNG’s political elite expressed their reservations about Canberra’s new 
approach and objected to the parallels drawn between PNG and the failing state in the Solomon 
Islands. Although there were similarities, there were also important differences between the 
two countries. For example, key institutions such as the police may be weak, but they have not 
collapsed (Dinnen, 2004, p. 8). Accordingly, the issue of immunity was the source of 
disagreement between the two governments. 
 
The demand for constitutional change allowed for what amounted to an abolishment of 
national sovereignty–fuelled tensions within the PNG ruling elite. It also fuelled the wider 
popular resentment and opposition to Australia’s brinkmanship. Many people, including the 
general public, said that it was ‘unreasonable’ to amend the constitution and that the proposal 
to amend the constitution was ‘colonialism reinvented’ (Niesi, Wakus & Rheeney, 2005)—
suggesting that the era of Australian colonialism has revived. Namaliu dismissed the possibility 
of changing the constitution and stated: 
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We both know that we are coming from two positions—that we 
obviously need to move gradually so that we can arrive at a common 
position. But if it’s to be done in the spirit of brinkmanship, then that’s 
where problems start (Namaliu, cited in Niesi, 2005a). 
 
Namaliu (2005) was adamant about the constitutional change and urged the Australian 
Government to understand PNG’s position. In response to Australia’s repeated demands, he 
stated: 
 
Well they [Australia] have to try and appreciate our position, that it is 
very difficult to amend the constitution. Particularly in the present 
environment, it’s not going to be that easy. 
 
Similarly, Somare opposed a change to PNG’s constitution. He countered by saying 
that there was no need to alter provisions of the constitution to cater for the immunity issue, 
adding that PNG is a sovereign nation and that amending the constitution to appease Australia 
would be undermining its sovereignty (Niesi, 2005a; Solomon, 2005a). Somare was bitterly 
disappointed in 2003 when Australia threatened to reassess its future aid packages to PNG, 
based on the outcome of negotiations relating to the ECP (Allard, 2003; Chan et al., 2006; 
Marshall, 2005). In an interview with the SBS Dateline program on 14 September 2005, 
Somare was asked what PNG would do if Australia ‘pulled the plug’ and said, ‘do it our way 
or there’s no money, you’d be in a crisis’ (Somare, 2005b), which alluded to Australia’s threat 
to reassess its aid package to PNG pending discussions on the ECP. Somare responded tersely: 
 
Of course, they can pull the plug. It’s their money. It’s their taxpayers’ 
money. We had an understanding they were going to help us but if they 
want to take it out, take it out for God’s sake. 
 
He then added: 
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I don’t really care. I say we have to work together but if they don’t want 
it, if they want to take their program away, take it away. My foreign 
minister has come out, said that. We cannot change the constitution. 
Change the constitution because of security problem for your police 
coming up and work here. We’re not going to treat Australians who 
come and help us, treat them with contempt or kick them around the 
streets and go to their compounds and raid their compounds. Look, 
nobody is stupid around here (Somare, 2005b). 
 
Somare’s long diatribe against the ECP underscored his government’s position after 
Australia insisted that PNG changed its constitution to cater for the ECP. The Somare 
government was adamant about amending the constitution for the ECP and further ignored 
Australia's attempts to revive other elements of the cooperation program. Somare refused to 
consider proposals about retaining some of Australia’s police and judicial officers. His 
government further worked to minimise Canberra’s direct control. For example, in June 2005, 
his government barred an Australian official attached with Department of Treasury from 
entering finance department offices after he was accused of spying (O'Connor, 2007). Somare 
then fell out of favour with the Howard government. 
 
The Howard government had no intention of backing down or conceding. Australian 
Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, was surprised at the refusal of the PNG Government to 
amend its constitution. On 24 August 2005, during the Australia–PNG Business Council 
breakfast meeting in Port Moresby, Downer said: 
 
We have obviously given thought as to whether we wanted to salvage 
it [ECP], or whether we didn’t. We have come to the conclusion that 
whilst the Papua New Government will clearly not, and the Papua New 
117 
Guinea Parliament by the way, will clearly not amend the constitution 
to provide for those immunities and we’re disappointed that they won’t. 
But we obviously accept that they clearly won’t. Even if they, the 
government itself, indicated it would be prepared to amend the 
Constitution it’s very questionable that they would get the numbers in 
parliament to achieve it. In any case, it would take a very long period 
of time involving enormous domestic controversies. So I’ve looked at 
this very closely, and I have come to the conclusion that the immunities 
simply aren’t going to be possible because the constitution isn’t going 
to be amended. We just have to live with the consequences of that. But 
we decided that what we would like to do is salvage as much of the 
Enhanced Cooperation Program as appropriate (Downer, 2005). 
 
Downer’s message to revive the ECP, along with the issue of constitutional amendment, 
brought little change to Somare’s attitude towards the program. It was apparent that the 
management and delivery approach of Australian aid to PNG would not be successful with 
Somare at the helm of PNG politics. Negotiations were lengthy and caustic. There were no 
signs of either side forgiving the other and the government shelved the idea of the ECP for 
almost four years. 
 
In late 2007, Kevin Rudd led Labor into government in Canberra. The change of 
leadership in Canberra provided an opportunity to change the direction of the relationship 
between Australia and PNG. In early 2008, Prime Minister Rudd visited PNG and presented a 
document titled ‘Port Moresby Declaration’. This document included the announcement of a 
new Pacific Partnership for Development aid program and, under this program, the Australian 
Government would provide increased development assistance over time, in the spirit of mutual 
responsibility. The partnership program committed the Pacific Island nations to improve 
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governance, increase investments in economic infrastructure and achieve better outcomes in 
health and education (DFAT, 2008). The fundamental idea behind the partnership program was 
joint ownership and cooperation to achieve shared goals. In the press conference associated 
with the release of the declaration, Prime Minister Rudd said: 
 
We are carving out a new chapter in the relationship between Australia 
and Papua New Guinea. We are carving out a new framework for our 
relationship with the rest of the Pacific Island countries (Rudd, 2008). 
 
The declaration was centred on the promotion of a closer relationship between Canberra 
and the Pacific States. It committed Australia to start a new era of cooperation with the island 
nations and to meet common challenges in the region. The new policy towards the Pacific 
Island countries constituted a ‘new approach to Australia’s arc of instability’ which proposed 
‘fresh ideas for future challenges’ (Rudd, 2007, p. 1). Australia’s new diplomatic approach 
with PNG and the rest of the Pacific Island countries was widely welcomed in the region. 
 
On 10 June 2009, during the 19th Australia–PNG Ministerial Forum, the Australian 
Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hon. Stephen Smith, and his PNG counterpart, Hon. Sam Abal, 
released a joint statement on the Strongim Gavman Program (SGP), which was the successor 
to the ECP. The SGP was rhetorically anchored to the Pacific Partnership for Development’s 
principles—mutual respect and mutual responsibility—through respect, openness, dialogue 
and consultation (DFAT, 2008). However, the SGP was similar to the ECP in many respects. 
It reaffirmed the fundamental focus of the ECP, which included institutional strengthening, 
good governance and security. Like the ECP, it aimed to strengthen the performance of key 
government agencies in the areas of economic and public sector management, law and justice, 
border management and transport security. The difference, however, was the placement of 
Australian officials. SGP officials were deployed as policy advisers rather than as ‘in-line’ 
officers. Experienced Australian Government officials in the Department of Treasury, 
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Department of Finance, the Australian National Audit Office, the Department of Defence, the 
Attorney General’s Department, the Australian Customs Service, the Australian Tax Office, 
the Department of Infrastructure, the Department of Immigration and Citizenship and the 
Australian Office of Financial Management were placed on long-term secondments in 
counterpart agencies of the PNG Government system to support capacity development and to 
foster institutional relationships between the two governments (DFAT, 2014c). Somare 
supported the SPG. During a reception hosted by the PNG High Commissioner to Canberra in 
April 2009, he said: 
 
Within the Strongim Gavaman Programme (SGP), I would like to see 
more resources directed towards having Australian judges, doctors, and 
teachers actually deployed around Papua New Guinea to work 
(Somare, 2009, p. 6). 
 
Somare did not oppose the SGP as he did the ECP, despite the fact that the SGP and 
ECP were similar. Rudd’s more tactful diplomacy partly influenced Somare’s reception of the 
SGP. For example, in the same speech, Somare said he was pleased that ‘the Partnership for 
Development Agreement affirmed the principles of mutual respect embodied in the Joint 
Declaration of Principles’ (Somare, 2009, p. 5). According to Somare, mutual respect and 
understanding were absent in the ECP. The absence of these values were partly the cause of 
his tirades against the Howard government, which were cited earlier in this chapter (Somare, 
2003a). Somare wanted mutual respect as the basis of the relationship between PNG and 
Australia. Rudd’s diplomatic approach to Australia’s ‘arc of instability’ departed from 
Howard’s new interventionism. Rudd bolstered the relations with PNG and the rest of the South 
Pacific ruling elites that had fractured under the former Howard government. He announced 
new aid packages and promised a new era of cooperation between Australia and the Pacific 
Island nations (Rudd, 2007, 2008). This approach appealed to national sovereignty and the 
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consensus politics of the Pacific way discussed in Chapter 2, which involves cooperation, 
respect for sovereignty and partnership. 
 
Although Rudd’s tactful diplomacy was central to the PNG–Australia relationship post-
ECP, the crux of the renewed bilateral relationship was PNG’s development needs and aid 
dependence. Somare’s reception of the SGP demonstrated the rooted nature of PNG’s 
dependence on Australian aid and the difficulty for PNG of freeing itself from the dependent 
relationship. It was often difficult for PNG to pursue its core domestic policies and programs 
in the areas of health, education, transport infrastructure, justice, and law and order without 
Australia’s assistance. The funding of programs and policies through the program, project and 
sectoral approaches has been the most notable (AusAID, 2009, 2010; DFAT, 2013b). PNG’s 
dependence on Australian aid has inadvertently strengthened Australia’s influence in the 
country, which is best reflected in the ECP. 
 
PNG’s reliance on Australian aid had created a legacy of dependency that has been 
described as a patron–client relationship (discussed in Chapter 2) in which Australia, who has 
consistently supported PNG, expected PNG to support Australia’s regional initiatives and 
policies. Australia’s Pacific Solution in 2001 (Parliament of Australia, 2013; Phillips, 2012; 
Warbrooke, 2014) is a case in point. It was an Australian Government regional policy of 
transporting asylum seekers, who were intercepted at sea, to offshore detention centres that 
were established on Nauru and PNG’s Manus Island. PNG accepted Australia’s regional policy 
because it was agreed that Australia would assist in the reform of the PNGDF with $20 million, 
as well as bear the cost of establishing and operating the immigration processing centre 
(Parliament of Australia, 2013). The aid and promise to maintain the asylum processing centre 
was predicated on the assumption that the processing centre would be established on Manus 
Island. PNG accepted Australia’s regional policy because the Pacific Solution was a source of 
revenue for the PNG Government (Wallis & Dalsgaard, 2016; Warbrooke, 2014). Australia 
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(the patron) used aid as an enticement and expected PNG (the client) to support its regional 
policy. Such expectations from Australia and compliance from PNG has reinforced colonial-
like behaviour, with the patronage through aid programs perpetuating this attitude. Somare was 
conscious of PNG’s predicaments vis-a-vis aid dependency. Being the first prime minister who 
led the new nation to independence in 1975, Somare did not want PNG’s national sovereignty 
undermined by continued dependence on foreign aid—a desire he and his fellow compatriots 
held since the 1970s. In April 2009, during the reception in Canberra, he announced the 
Australian Aid Exit Strategy. He stated: 
 
After over 34 years, Papua New Guinea must forge a new relationship 
of equitable partnership with Australia … The intention [of exit 
strategy] is to further fine-tune and normalise the development support 
from Australia to meet our long-term development objectives. 
Resources will initially be redirected to identified sectors to achieve 
better development outcomes with a view to eventually phase out the 
ODA. For instance, in the first instance, I would like to see more 
resources taken away from consultancies and allocated towards 
enhancing private sector development, including better access to 
finance. This is in recognition of the role of the private sector in driving 
economic growth. Likewise, I would like to see more resources shifted 
from the public service and policy improvement programmes to fund 
infrastructure development in the transport, health, and education 
sectors (Somare, 2009). 
 
Somare’s idea of the exit strategy demonstrated his frustration with PNG’s continued 
dependence on Australian aid. Essentially, Somare positioned the government’s thinking on 
the need to modify development cooperation arrangements, including modalities for the 
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delivery of Australia’s ODA to PNG, to better reflect PNG’s long-term development 
aspirations, which included gradual phasing out of Australia’s development assistance from 
over time. Somare’s ambitions to minimise PNG’s dependence on Australian aid will require 
long-term cooperation from Australia. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
What does the ECP case study reveal about contemporary foreign policy in PNG? The 
ECP highlights significant continuities in PNG foreign policy. It underscored the continued 
centrality of the PNG–Australia bilateral relationship in PNG’s foreign policy. The colonial 
legacy still exerts considerable influence over the relationship. It is difficult to imagine many 
former colonies willingly accepting police and officials from the colonial power back. 
Nonetheless, the most important centrality of the relationship is the continued dependence on 
aid and the degree to which this made PNG dependent on its major bilateral donor. Australia’s 
long aid history in PNG created a legacy of dependency. It was not easy for PNG to disentangle 
itself from the dependent nature of its bilateral relations with Australia. The angry outbursts 
from the prime minister, Sir Michael Somare, were demonstrations of frustration that relate to 
PNG’s continued reliance on aid. The dependent culture has been an affront to national pride, 
which essentially undermined national sovereignty. The desire to exercise sovereignty 
remained in the minds of PNG’s political elite, but this ambition is limited by PNG’s dependent 
relations, particularly with Australia. 
 
Much of the ECP controversy stemmed from a personal sense of aggrievement and 
reflected how the political elites understood the national interest. Somare and Wenge 
challenged the ECP because they viewed Australia’s new interventionism as neo-colonialism 
and as a violation of national sovereignty. Somare’s concern for national sovereignty was 
primarily driven by nationalist sentiments that were fuelled by the insult to his governance and 
leadership after the Australian prime minister called PNG a failed state and proposed to help 
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the PNG Government address its development challenges. His grievances—the insult to his 
governance and leadership—were personal. Similarly, his perception of national sovereignty 
was not shared by all the members of this government. Somare’s antipathy to the ECP was 
undermined by support from other foreign policy actors, particularly members of parliament 
who voted in favour of the ECP. Nevertheless, it demonstrated how political elites, particularly 
Somare and Wenge, understood the national interest. They opposed the ECP because they 
believed it violated national sovereignty. However justified, there was insubstantial evidence 
of the PNG system’s coherent ability to articulate and pursue an alternative national interest, 
such as the look north policy, to downplay Australia’s influence. The dominance of highly 
rhetorical personality politics arguably filled the vacuum in the absence of strong institutions 
and policy processes. 
 
The ECP case underscored the continued fragilities of PNG’s foreign policy institutions 
and processes and inferred that informal institutions are still dominant. PNG’s efforts to refute 
Australia’s demands were poorly coordinated and contradictory. For example, there was a lack 
of coordination between the offices of the prime minister and foreign minister. As a result, the 
prime minister perceived that there was minimal coordination between PNG and Australia (as 
stated by PNG’s foreign minister). Moreover, it is notable that, despite Somare’s opposition, 
his government still signed the agreement. It is also notable that, despite the inflamed rhetoric 
of Somare, the end point of the SGP was not significantly different to that of the ECP, which 
included the reversion to more traditional adviser modalities. It highlights the challenges in 
moving to more strategic policy and implementation. 
 
The ECP evolved from the existing bilateral relationship between its end point and 
Australia. This was mutually beneficial, as it would secure Australia’s strategic interests and 
simultaneously address two persistent development problems that were impeding PNG’s 
progress: governance and law and order problems. However, Australia’s handling of the ECP 
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was abrasive. For instance, the Australian Government threatened to reassess its aid package 
pending the outcome of the discussion on the ECP and further insisted on amending the PNG 
constitution to suit the program after it collapsed. This act of brinkmanship evoked sentiments 
of nationalism among the ruling elites and created bilateral tensions between the two countries. 
The prime minister particularly disapproved Australia’s new interventionism and moved to 
minimise Canberra’s influence in PNG, following the collapse of the ECP. The bilateral tension 
energised and renewed PNG’s efforts to ‘look north’. The inflamed rhetoric used by the prime 
minister was noteworthy and speaks of PNG’s frustration with Australia. It demonstrated the 
government’s willingness to push back on Australian aid for the first time in PNG’s political 
history. Concurrently, the ECP portends critical junctures in the relationship between the 
Somare and Howard governments. 
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Chapter 5: The Julian Moti Affair 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores the period between 2005 and 2007 and focuses on the Julian Moti 
affair. The Moti affair involved PNG’s refusal to extradite Julian Moti to Australian authorities, 
where he faced criminal charges. Instead of accommodating Australia’s request for extradition, 
the PNG Government under Prime Minister Somare secretly flew Moti to the Solomon Islands. 
The Moti affair touches on the issue of national sovereignty and the rule of law and it is 
significant for understanding the development of PNG’s foreign policy. The Moti affair 
emerged against the backdrop of Australia’s activism in PNG and the region at large, which 
was often resented in PNG and the region as overbearing and neo-colonialist in nature. The 
Somare government took subsequent steps to minimise Canberra’s influence in PNG. Somare 
and his supporters refused Australia’s extradition request and, in the process, violated domestic 
laws as well as international treaties and conventions. The Moti affair is interesting because it 
was a high-profile dispute with PNG’s leading bilateral partner and further demonstrated 
PNG’s willingness to question the status quo, which suggested shifts in the relations between 
the two countries. 
 
This chapter is divided into four main parts. The first describes the background to the 
Moti affair. It sets the scene for the case study by highlighting two factors that played influential 
roles in the decision to fly Moti out of the country: Australia’s decision to intervene in the 
Melanesian countries of PNG and the Solomon Islands and an incident at the Brisbane airport 
in which the prime minister, Michael Somare, was unceremoniously told to remove his shoes 
for a security check. These factors caused deep resentment towards the Australian Government 
and led PNG to resist Australia’s influence. The second part—the Moti affair—forms the core 
of foreign policy analysis. It covers the arrest and detention of Julian Moti, the investigations 
and inquiries and the narrative of the incident derived from the DFBI. The third part looks at 
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the Moti case from the foreign policy perspective. Drawing from concepts that were raised in 
Chapter 2, I look at the Moti affair using three frames of reference: the state, its formal 
institutions and the personalised nature of foreign policy. The conclusion, highlighting the key 
points, constitutes the final part. 
 
5.2 Backdrop to the Moti Affair 
The Moti affair is a part of the ECP story. It relates to the relationship between Australia 
and the Melanesian countries of the Solomon Islands and PNG that was soured after Australian 
Prime Minister, John Howard, called them failed states and referred to the region as its ‘patch’. 
The subsequent deployment of interventionist policies, RAMSI in the Solomon Islands and the 
ECP in PNG, as justification for intervention in the region (Fry & Kabutaulaka, 2008) irked 
the prime ministers of PNG and the Solomon Islands. Australia’s new interventionist policies 
in the region deepened its dominance and control. As interventionist programs, RAMSI and 
the ECP required ‘cooperative regimes’ (Haggard & Simmons, 1987, p. 495), or governments 
that facilitate cooperation. PNG Prime Minister, Michael Somare, and his Solomon Islands 
counterpart, Manasseh Sogavare, are two Melanesian leaders who had partly built political 
reputations by challenging Western dominance and influence in the region. They became 
increasingly antagonistic towards the Howard government. Somare challenged the ECP in 
PNG and Sogavare challenged Australia’s involvement in its internal affairs, including 
RAMSI. 
 
Sogavare had, over time, been critical of Australia’s influence in the region (Associated 
Press, 2006; Baker, 2006) and had turned against the Australian Government. Towards the end 
of 2006, he accused Australia of heavy-handed interference in the Solomon Islands domestic 
affairs and subsequently expelled Patrick Cole, Australia’s High Commissioner, to the country 
(Banham, 2006; Moore, 2007). Cole was declared persona non grata after he opposed the 
Solomon Islands Government’s decision to arrange a commission of inquiry into a riot 
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following the 2006 national elections, which severely damaged the island’s capital on 18 and 
19 April 2006 (Sydney Morning Herald, 2006a). On 18 April, a wave of lootings, arson and 
destruction of properties swept through Honiara following the announcement of Snyder Rini—
who has been deputy prime minister in the outgoing Kemakeza Government—as prime 
minister-elect (Hawes, 2006). Many Solomon Islanders anticipated a clean break from the 
corrupt and dysfunctional politics of recent years (Dinnen & Goldsmith, 2007, p. 1102). Rini’s 
election as prime minister triggered mass protests and riots because many Solomon Islanders 
accused him of being linked to corruption allegations that dogged the last government and of 
favouring wealthy Chinese businessmen (BBC News, 2006). Rini resigned on 26 April 2006 
(New Zealand Herald, 26 April 2006) and Sogavare was subsequently voted and sworn in as 
prime minister on 4 May 2006. 
 
Sogavare requested an inquiry into the causes and conduct of the riots that took place 
during Rini’s time as prime minister (Sogavare, 2006b). However, the Australian Government 
believed that the inquiry was designed to release two jailed MPs—Charles Dausabea and 
Nelson Ne’e, both allies of Sogavare—from the charges of inciting the riots that destroyed 
most of Honiara’s Chinatown and to deflect attention onto Australian police commanders’ 
handling of the situation (Sydney Morning Herald, 2006b; The Age, 2006). In defence of the 
proposed inquiry, Sogavare claimed that Australia ‘was not happy’ because ‘Moti was actively 
involved in the terms of reference of the commission of inquiry’ (Sogavare, 2006b) that his 
government proposed. Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, staunchly defended Cole and 
concurrently doubted the commission of inquiry: 
 
We don’t accept for a moment the expulsion of our High Commissioner 
Patrick Cole. He was doing the right thing, he was representing the 
interests of Australia. He’s concerned about corruption in the Solomon 
Islands. He’s concerned that the proposed Commission of Inquiry will 
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subvert the legal process and could work to the benefit improperly of 
the people who have been charged under the legal system of the 
Solomon Islands, based on allegations of criminal offences (Howard 
cited in Dorney, 2006). 
 
Australia made a formal request to the Solomon Islands Government to rethink its 
expulsion of High Commissioner Cole by sending foreign affairs envoy, David Richie, to meet 
Sogavare in Honiara. However, Sogavare refused to budge (Hall, 2006; Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2006a). In a televised address to the nation, Sogavare defended his decision: 
 
The Government and the people of Solomon Islands are concerned 
about the manner in which the Howard Government has continued to 
subtly dictate over sovereign issues that are beyond the jurisdiction of 
Canberra. The Government is seriously concerned that Canberra has 
been capitalising on the ignorance of both the Solomon Islands and 
Australian public about the real issues at stake within the so-called arc 
of instability. The conduct of a senior official such as Mr Cole is 
inconsistent with the rules of diplomacy, and impinges on matters of 
sovereignty due to political manipulation (Sogavare, 2006a). 
 
Sogavare not only accused Australia of interfering with the planned commission of 
inquiry into the April riots, but also accused Australia of using development aid as an 
instrument of foreign policy to address fundamental problems that otherwise could have been 
solved through diplomacy: 
 
We are concerned that Canberra’s policies are aimed at excluding and 
containing the peoples of the region, instead of working collectively to 
address fundamental problems of social instability that can only be 
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solved through dialogue, rather than the use of development aid, and 
political force as leverage, to dictate Australia’s involvement 
(Sogavare, 2006a). 
 
Sogavare’s criticism targeted Australia’s cooperative intervention that manifested in 
RAMSI. He was critical of the level of Australian involvement in RAMSI and called for it to 
be revised. He wanted Australia’s contribution to be reduced and for control over public 
administration to be returned to the Solomon Islands (Sydney Morning Herald, 2006c). 
Similarly, Somare was not comfortable with Australia’s cooperative intervention policy. He 
was deeply cynical about Australia’s interventionist policies. In an interview with SBS 
Dateline in 2005 he said: 
 
Their [Australia’s] real intention is they want to have some controlling 
device in the whole region. They want to control the region so that the 
Prime Minister can go back and talk to Prime Minister of Britain and 
President of United States and say, The Pacific is no problem, we’re 
looking after it. … the imposition of that kind of mentality in the Pacific 
amongst the Pacific leadership, you’re undermining the integrity of the 
Pacific Island people (Somare, 2005b). 
 
Somare questioned Australia’s motives in the region and claimed that Australia’s 
intervention was disrespectful to regional leadership. Both Sogavare and Somare shared the 
same views about Australia’s aid in the region. They resented Australia’s overbearing attitude 
and patronage through its aid programs, became increasingly hostile and acted in different ways 
to minimise Canberra’s influence. Somare has on many occasions criticised Australia’s neo-
colonial and paternalistic attitudes through its aid programs (McLeod, 2004; Somare, 2003a, 
2003b, 2005b). He has often criticised the Australian Government for using its aid programs 
to ‘impose its will onto a sovereign state’ (Somare, 2005b). As observed in the preceding 
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chapter, this was one of the reasons why he protested the ECP. The Howard government was 
not on good terms with Somare after the ECP collapsed and Somare’s subsequent efforts to 
frustrate Australia’s aid programs in the country worsened the situation. The relationship 
between the two governments further deteriorated after an unfortunate incident at the Brisbane 
airport, which is explained next. 
 
On 24 March 2005, Prime Minister Somare was in transit through Brisbane to Port 
Moresby after attending a regional leaders’ meeting in NZ. During a security check at the 
airport, Somare was asked to remove his shoes as he and his delegation passed through security. 
According to Somare, he was ‘forced’ (Somare, 2005a) to comply with security regulations 
even though he said he had nothing in the shoes. Somare was bitterly upset and told PNG’s 
television network EMTV News that: 
 
I said there was nothing in the shoes … I thought it was an insult to 
leadership in our region … I am going to take it up with the Foreign 
Minister [Rabbie Namaliu], and when they come here, they’ll be 
subject to the same kind of treatment that I have been subjected to 
(Somare, 2005a). 
 
He added that he had never received such treatment from other countries in the region. 
PNG gave preference to leaders that visited the country and though their baggage might be 
searched, the leaders themselves were not checked. Somare stated that Australian leaders 
would be treated the way he was if Australia does not change its policy (Somare, 2005a), 
referring to airport security checks involving leaders. Somare felt that his competence and 
worth as a leader were undermined. Namaliu stated that the incident breached protocol (Radio 
New Zealand, 2005). Somare summoned Australia’s high commissioner to PNG, High 
Commissioner Mike Potts, and demanded an apology from Australia. The PNG press presented 
the incident as an outrage. Following the incident, Post-Courier, one of the two daily 
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newspapers, printed the headline ‘Disgraceful!’ to highlight the distress that the incident had 
caused and emphasised the anger it had provoked among senior PNG Government officials 
(Post-Courier, 29 March 2005, p. 10). The Chief Secretary, Joshua Kalinoe, said: 
 
There was no indication of sympathy or regrets about the way the 
incident happened to an elderly statesman and Prime Minister of a 
foreign country and the least we expected from Australian authorities 
is that they say look it was a regrettable incident, we will be 
investigating this and try to reach an understanding that it doesn’t 
happen again in future … There was no sense of regrets on the 
situation, and there was no admittance that this thing happened and it 
was a regrettable occasion (Kalinoe, 2005). 
 
Following that, the PNG Government cancelled the ministerial forum between the two 
countries and further suspended Australia’s A$800 million aid program over the airport 
incident. The chief secretary said that the 149 Australian police and civil servants already in 
the country as part of the ECP would be allowed to stay, but that the government would not 
accept new personnel until the Australian Government apologised for Somare’s treatment 
(ABC News, 2005; The Age, 2005). Australia’s Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, was 
unapologetic about the incident, saying that Australia’s non-discriminatory airport security 
procedures were the norm around the world and would not be changed (ABC News, 2005). 
Australia’s refusal to apologise escalated in PNG. More than five hundred protesters marched 
to the Australian High Commission in Port Moresby and presented a petition demanding an 
apology and compensation for the way the prime minister was treated. One of the protest 
organisers, Steven Mera, said that the protest was held to demonstrate that Papua New 
Guineans were disgusted with the manner in which their leader was treated and that they would 
not let their Melanesian culture be insulted. He added: 
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We can’t continue to be insulted by Australians who continue to 
impose on us as if we are still a colony of Australia. Our prime minister 
is a world leader, not just in the Pacific. Sir Michael has been a 
politician longer than John Howard and most politicians in the region. 
John Howard thinks he’s another (US President) George Bush in the 
region but, sorry, not for Papua New Guineans. The new generation of 
Papua New Guineans will not accept that (Mera, cited in Sydney 
Morning Herald, 2005). 
 
The Melanesian culture referred to by Mera, in this context, alludes to the respect that 
the Melanesian people had for their leaders. To these protesters and the PNG Government, 
Somare’s treatment exemplified what they saw as Australia’s overbearing and bullying 
approach to the region, one that was also manifested in the ECP. Potts received their petition 
in front of the Commission building’s carpark, as PNG police and security officers watched 
on. The airport incident humiliated Somare’s status as a national leader and subsequently 
deteriorated his relationship with the Howard government. It inflamed tensions that existed 
over the ECP program and strengthened Somare’s resolve to resist Australia’s influence. 
 
The Moti affair is covered in the main body, but in this last part of the section, I 
elaborate on the connection between the Brisbane airport incident and the Moti affair. I 
examine the psychological and cognitive experiences of politicians and the influence that they 
have on decision-making. Hill (2003, pp. 116–117) emphasised how facts about the past can 
influence decision-making: 
 
History provides politicians with a welcome form of structure amidst 
uncertainty, as well as a way of mobilizing public opinion behind the 
government. As individuals they have personal memories, as 
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representatives of a political class, they inherit certain dominant myths, 
rituals and pieces of conventional thinking which they use and abuse 
but are also themselves trapped within. It is a common phenomenon for 
decision-makers to assume that there are ‘lessons’ to be drawn from 
history and indeed most human beings constantly refer to the past, so 
as directly or indirectly to measure their current situation against it. 
 
Hill argues that the historical experiences of key political actors influence their 
decision-making and he connected personal memories and experiences of political leaders to 
the environment of decision-making. Leaders can use personal memories in decision-making. 
Their psychological and cognitive experiences are critical in providing explanations for foreign 
relations behaviour and actions (DeRouen & Mintz, 2010; Hudson, 2007; Jensen, 1982). 
Therefore, the Brisbane airport incident on 24 March 2005 cannot be isolated from the Moti 
affair. The insult to Somare’s leadership at the airport was one of the determining factors that 
helped shape his decision to move Moti out of the country. 
 
As will be observed later in this chapter, Somare is a respected leader among the 
Melanesian societies and the wider Pacific region. He expected some degree of respect that is 
normally accorded to foreign dignitaries, prime ministers and presidents when travelling into a 
foreign country. For example, these important figures are normally greeted by government 
officials in private airport rooms, far from the public arrivals bay, and have their luggage 
delivered to them promptly. Special airport protocols have been established in many countries 
to deal with a set list of VIPs and dignitaries at the highest levels of government. When Somare 
passed through security at the Brisbane airport on 24 March 2005, such respect was not given 
to him. He was asked to remove his shoes at the airport for a security check, despite his 
insistence that he had nothing concealed in his shoes. The airport incident was a humiliating 
experience. It diminished his ego and self-esteem. Somare demanded an apology from the 
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Australian Government in response to this incident, but he received none. According to the 
PNG’s chief secretary, ‘there was no admittance that this thing happened and it was a 
regrettable occasion’ (Kalinoe, 2005). Essentially, there were no apologies from the Australian 
Government about the incident, for which Somare harboured a grudge. The incident was a 
personal experience with Australian airport authorities, but he told PNG’s EMTV News that 
PNG would treat Australian leaders the way he was treated, if Australia does not change its 
policy on airport security checks involving leaders (Somare, 2005a). This was a personal 
statement that did not reflect the position of the PNG Government. Nonetheless, it indicated 
how a personal experience from a key political figure could influence decisions and 
policymaking. The airport incident was a personal experience, but it was one of the influencing 
factors that shaped Somare’s decision to give safe passage to Moti. 
 
5.3 The Moti Affair 
Julian Moti is a Fiji-born Australian lawyer, in regard to his training and citizenship. 
He was close to the Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Manasseh Sogavare, with whom he 
shared a dislike of the Australian Government and its policies in the Solomon Islands 
(Kabutaulaka & Kabutaulaka, 2007, p. 601). In 2006, Sogavare appointed Moti as the Attorney 
General-designate of the Solomon Islands, with Moti out of the country at the time of his 
appointment. On the morning of Friday 29 September 2006, Moti arrived at Jacksons Airport, 
Port Moresby, on an Air Niugini flight en route from Singapore to Honiara, the Solomon 
Islands, where he was set to take his new post. While he was waiting in the transit lounge at 
Jacksons International Airport for his outbound flight to the Solomon Islands, members of the 
Transnational Crime Unit of the RPNGC arrested him. Moti’s arrest stemmed from a request 
from the Pacific Transnational Crime Coordination Centre in Suva, Fiji. This request was based 
on Interpol’s red alert notice to all its member countries and initiated by the Australian Federal 
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Police. The Australian Federal Police requested the arrest, detention and extradition of Moti to 
Australia for an alleged sex offence involving a minor in Vanuatu in 1997. 
 
Moti was temporarily detained at Boroko Police Station to await formal extradition to 
Australia after he was arrested at the airport. However, he was released to the custody of his 
PNG lawyers on the same day after his bail application was granted. Moti’s arrest was 
controversial. Officials in Canberra collaborated with Australian personnel working in PNG, 
who then secured an arrest warrant without the knowledge of the Somare government, or the 
state prosecutor (Chin, 2007, p. 204; Kelly, 2006). International extradition involves 
coordination between the public prosecutors of countries that have extradition treaties with 
partner countries (Attorney General's Department, 1988; Extradition Act, 2005). According to 
Somare in an interview with SBS Dateline, aired on 25 October 2006, the Australian 
Government issued the warrant without consulting the PNG state prosecutor (Somare, 2006). 
He viewed the bypass of the state prosecutor as illegal. However, Moti’s dramatic escape from 
PNG was even more controversial. The PNG Government disregarded Australia’s request for 
extradition, reneged on its commitment to the Chicago Convention, which was a treaty under 
the Charter of the United Nations, and secretly flew Moti to the Solomon Islands using the 
PNGDF CASA aircraft. 
 
Following revelations of the clandestine operation, the PNGDF suspended the senior 
officers who were involved and conducted its internal investigation. The investigation was 
commissioned by the PNGDF Commander, Peter Ilau, and was conducted by Colonel (retired) 
David Josiah (Rheeney, 2006c). However, the government rejected the internal investigation, 
saying that it believed the probe involved ‘some cover-up in the whole investigation’ (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 2006d). Without releasing the findings, the government launched a new 
inquiry into the Moti’s escape. Concurrently, the government suspended the heads of the 
defence and police forces and the chief secretary so that investigations could proceed 
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unobstructed. Meanwhile, the Ombudsman Commission of Papua New Guinea stated that it 
would conduct its investigation into the clandestine flight of Moti. The Commission’s initiative 
to conduct an independent investigation stemmed from public concerns that leaders had 
compromised the national security of the country. Many of these concerns related to the breach 
of procedures, protocols and the violation of the constitution and its by-laws. However, little 
was heard of this investigation and its findings (Rheeney, 2007). Under sustained pressure from 
the Howard government (O'Connor, 2007), a more substantial and independent inquiry was 
commissioned by the Minister for Defence, Martin Aini, a Pangu representative in the 
governing coalition. This DFBI was chaired by Justice Gibbs Salika, Deputy Chief Justice of 
PNG, and was convened to inquire into the arrest, detention and escape of Moti using a PNGDF 
CASA aircraft. 
 
The main purpose of the DFBI was to investigate and report the covert operations that 
were conducted by members of the PNGDF in collaboration with government officers to use 
the CASA aircraft and aid Moti’s escape. The wide-ranging scope of the DFBI revealed 
numerous breaches of domestic and international laws and, inadvertently, illuminated the inner 
workings of the government. The late Hank Nelson, one of Australia’s foremost historians of 
the Pacific and PNG, described the DFBI in Moti’s arrest and escape as providing ‘outsiders 
with frank information into the way the government works’ (Nelson, 2007, p. 4). The inquiry 
into the Moti affair, in which Somare was heavily implicated, was commissioned by the 
Minister for Defence, Martin Aini. Aini came from Pangu Party and Somare from the National 
Alliance Party. The DFBI’s commission inquiry revealed competing interests and dissensions 
within the coalition government, which culminated in the removal of Aini as the Minister for 
Defence. Almost all the people involved in aiding and abetting Moti’s escape, including the 
prime minister and those who concealed the truth and misled the inquiry, were recommended 
to be charged under various PNG laws. The DFBI team presented the Moti report to the prime 
minister at Parliament House on 28 February 2007. The Minister for Defence, who 
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commissioned the DFBI, was unable to receive the report because he was decommissioned and 
replaced by the prime minister, who assumed responsibilities in the defence ministry. This ploy 
was part of Somare’s overall strategy to sabotage the DFBI’s recommendations. The report has 
not been tabled on the Parliament floor and those implicated are still at large. Nonetheless, the 
narrative of this chapter, which forms the basis of foreign policy analysis, is sourced from the 
DFBI. 
 
According to the DFBI, the PNG Government received two diplomatic notes soon after 
Moti was first arrested. The first diplomatic note, dated 2 October 2006, was from the 
Australian Government requesting the formal extradition of Julian Moti. The diplomatic note 
was accompanied by supporting documents for extradition. It had the brief description of Moti, 
the sex offence he was alleged to have committed with a minor in Vanuatu and other relevant 
documents required to have him extradited from PNG to Australia (Australian Government, 
2006). The second diplomatic note, dated 4 October 2006, came from the Solomon Islands 
Government. It requested PNG’s cooperation in according Moti a free and safe passage to 
Honiara (Solomon Islands Government, 2006). This diplomatic note was personally conveyed 
to the PNG prime minister by two senior government officials from the Solomon Islands, Mr 
Robson Tanabose, a senior public servant, and Mr Christopher Hapa, a lawyer. An introductory 
letter, dated 3 October 2006, accompanied the diplomatic note. The introductory letter was 
addressed to the PNG prime minister and it introduced the two government officials as 
representatives of the Solomon Islands Government. The letter requested Somare’s assistance 
in helping the two gentlemen accomplish their assignment, which was to provide personal 
assistance to Moti in the extradition case that he was facing with the Australian Government in 
Port Moresby (DFBI, 2007, pp. 40–41). The letter was signed by Prime Minister Manasseh 
Sogavare of the Solomon Islands. 
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The diplomatic note from the Solomon Islands was a five-page note stating the reasons 
why the Solomon Islands Government wanted PNG to accord safe passage to Moti. The 
important part of this diplomatic note is the passionate request for Moti’s safe passage, which 
is expressed in these sentiments: 
 
As the founding country of the Melanesia Spearhead Group and our 
region’s largest nation that has pioneered the establishment of a capable 
and independent Melanesian identity, the Solomon Islands 
Government now seeks to secure your understanding and cooperation 
in our effort to resolve the existing impasse (DFBI, 2007, p. 39). 
 
The ‘existing impasse’ referred to the deteriorating relationship between the Solomon 
Islands and Australia that culminated in the expulsion of Cole from the Solomon Islands. The 
Australian Government told representatives of the MSG countries that Australia does not need 
mediators to help resolve Canberra’s damaging row with the Solomon Islands (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 2006e). The dispute between the two countries had reached an impasse, as 
neither side would compromise. The dispute over Moti was the latest instalment in Canberra’s 
worsening relations with Honiara. Sogavare pleaded for Somare’s help in the Moti saga, 
claiming that Australia has ‘shut its doors for dialogue’ and further stating that shutting doors 
was not ‘the Melanesian way of dealing with things’ (Sogavare, 2006b). His note to Somare 
was imbued with deep sentiments attached to Melanesian identity and solidarity. It explicitly 
called for understanding and cooperation on the Moti issue and requested cooperation from 
Somare. The cooperation was essentially a request to give safe passage to Moti back to the 
Solomon Islands before the Australian authorities caught him. 
 
In the same diplomatic note, Sogavare asked Somare to invoke section 176(3)(b) of the 
PNG constitution to direct the public prosecutor to withdraw and discontinue the pending court 
cases against Julian Moti (DFBI, 2007, p. 39). According to the PNG constitution, the Office 
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of the Public Prosecutor is not subject to the direction and control of any person or authority. 
However, section 176(3)(b) states that only the Head of State, acting with and on the advice of 
the NEC, can give direction to the public prosecutor on any matter that might prejudice the 
security, defence or international relations of PNG (Constitution of Papua New Guinea, 1975). 
Simply put, the prime minister is the only authority that could withdraw or advise the public 
prosecutor to discontinue any cases against the government of any country or international 
organisations. He could, in this context, terminate or dismiss Moti’s pending cases and 
invalidate Australia’s extradition request. 
 
After receiving the two diplomatic notes, the PNG Government took inconsistent 
positions. The first was a political position taken by the prime minister and his deputy, 
Honourable Don Polye. It was a position consistent with the Melanesian solidarity and 
brotherhood sentiments that were expressed by the Solomon Islands Government in its 
diplomatic note. It was focused on moving Moti out of the country before the courts could 
deliberate on his extradition case. The second was a bureaucratic position taken by Chief 
Secretary Joshua Kalinoe and other bureaucrats at Waigani. Their position was to respect and 
allow the judicial processes to take their normal course before any decision or actions could be 
taken. 
 
According to the DFBI, Somare’s directive to ‘get rid of Moti’ was given on 4 October 
2006, after he received the second diplomatic note from the Solomon Islands Government. He 
went on air with Radio Karai, the local radio station, in the evening and said that PNG had no 
law to ‘hold people in ransom’ (DFBI, 2007, p. 29) and emphasised that PNG had no 
extradition laws. He further stated that Moti was cleared by a competent court in Vanuatu and 
that there was no reason for the Australian court to pursue this matter. His remark, ‘let Moti 
go’ (Rheeney, 2006a), was reported in the print media the next day. Somare’s decision to let 
Moti go was premised on the assumptions that there were no proper extradition orders for the 
140 
arrest and extradition of Moti and that the Vanuatu judicial system had cleared Moti. However, 
evidence submitted before the DFBI proved the contrary. 
 
According to a letter from the registrar of the Supreme Court in Vanuatu, tendered as 
evidence in the DFBI, the allegation against Moti of child sex abuse was dismissed by a 
magistrate at the lower courts in Vanuatu on 23 August 1999. However, the Vanuatu public 
prosecutor applied to the Supreme Court on 8 September 1999 to have the decision of the lower 
court rescinded and the allegation against Moti to be transferred to the Supreme Court for 
hearing. The application was accompanied by affidavits in support of the case to be revived 
and heard. This application was still pending before the Supreme Court of Vanuatu because 
Moti had not returned to the Vanuatu jurisdiction and was, therefore, unavailable to be heard 
by the Supreme Court (DFBI, 2007, p. 36). Essentially, Moti still had a case to answer. Somare 
misled the country on Moti’s legal status when he said Moti was cleared by a competent court. 
Further, PNG adopted the Extradition Act in 1975, which was repealed and replaced by the 
Extradition Act 2005. The Extradition Act 2005 provided for the extradition of criminals who 
were wanted for crimes committed in other countries before fleeing into PNG. It required PNG 
to assist in extraditing fugitives with arrest warrants for crimes they commit in one country, or 
who are convicted of an offence against the law of that country, before fleeing the country. Part 
two of the Extradition Act 2005 indicated that PNG had an obligation to extradite fugitives to 
forum countries, with forum country under the Act referring to a country that is a member of 
the PIF (Extradition Act, 2005). Australia is a member of the PIF, so PNG thus had an 
obligation to cooperate with Australia on extradition matters. Again, Somare misled the 
country when he claimed that PNG had no law to hold people in ransom. 
 
An NEC submission, dated 27 October 2006, stated that Julian Moti was never a 
national security concern (National Executive Council, 2006). The submission stated that Moti 
did not pose a threat to PNG. The prime minister, as chairman of the NEC, sponsored and 
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signed the submission. In publicly justifying his position, Somare stated that his decision to 
give Moti safe passage was in line with the strong relationship that existed between PNG and 
the Solomon Islands. In parliament, on 15 November 2006, he said: 
 
As the House will recall, a few days before the event, I made an off the 
cuff remark that the Attorney General designate of the Solomon Islands 
should be assisted with ‘safe passage’ through to the Solomon Islands 
because I consider this matter to be basically between the Solomon 
Islands and Australian governments. I made this comment against the 
backdrop that as a Melanesian Spearhead Group country we have a 
very closely tied relationship with the Solomon Islanders (DFBI, 2007, 
p. 43). 
 
Somare attested his support for Melanesian solidarity in the PNG parliament, but he 
said that the remark ‘let Moti go’ was ‘off the cuff’. In other words, Somare claimed that he 
made the statement about Moti’s release to the Solomon Islands without having prepared or 
thought about the statement. However, the DFBI disagreed by stating that the prime minister’s 
remark ‘let Moti go’ was consistent with the request by his Solomon Islands counterpart for 
his personal attendance, which was contained in the Solomon Islands Diplomatic Note No. 39-
2006 (DFBI, 2007, p. 44). That is, Somare’s remark was not ‘off the cuff’. He made the 
comments in full knowledge of the close bond between the two countries and the expectation 
that each country had of the other. His statement on the floor of parliament indicated that his 
decision to let Moti go was deliberate and consistent with his ideology of Melanesian solidarity. 
 
Somare instructed the safe passage of Moti on 4 October 2006 to his two close 
confidants, Leonard Louma, his chief of staff, and Barnabas Rongap, the Special Projects 
officer in his office. Both men relayed the prime minister’s directive to two important office 
holders in the PNG Government system at different times, Joshua Kalinoe, Chief Secretary to 
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the Government, and Joseph Assaigo, the Director General of the Office of Security 
Coordination and Assessment (OSCA). The Chief Secretary to Government is the senior officer 
of the National Public Service. He or she occupies the apex of the administrative hierarchy in 
the country, is the principal adviser to the prime minister and the NEC and ensures that the 
National Public Service implements the decisions, directions and policies of the NEC. In the 
same manner, he or she ensures that the public service performs effectively and is accountable 
to the NEC and Parliament (Prime Minister and National Executive Council Act, 2002). The 
OSCA is one of the divisions in the Department of Prime Minister and NEC. It provides 
assessment, advice and support to the National Security Advisory Committee (NSAC), prime 
minister and the Cabinet on matters relating to security issues that affect the sovereignty, 
integrity and security of PNG and its people. It also provides guidance and direction to the 
government agencies responsible for matters affecting peace and good order in PNG, for 
combating subversion and espionage and for defending against military attack or armed 
incursion into PNG’s sovereign territory (Department of Prime Minister & National Executive 
Council, 2016). Both offices are primarily involved in foreign policy and its making. 
 
Following up closely with the two officers, Louma coerced them to execute the 
directive without delay. According to the DFBI, two executive meetings were held in Port 
Moresby after the prime minister went on air on 4 October 2006. The purpose of these meetings 
was to assess and advise the PNG Government of their position on the Moti case. The first 
meeting was conducted on 5 or 6 October 2006 within the DFA. It was an in-house committee 
meeting established by the chief secretary to investigate and inform the government of their 
position (the bureaucratic position) on the issue. The meeting was chaired by Veali Vagi and 
attended by Lucy Bogari and two senior officers in the DFA: a representative of the Attorney 
General’s department and the prime minister’s chief of staff, Leonard Louma. Louma knew of 
the prime minister’s directive, but he took a passive stance and did not disclose the instruction 
to aid Moti to those who attended the meeting. The committee members resolved that the 
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government should allow the judicial and extradition processes to continue before any action 
could be taken. 
 
The second meeting involved the NSAC, an important bureaucratic committee 
empowered under the Prime Minister and National Executive Council Act 2002 that monitors 
and assesses all domestic and international security matters affecting the country. Members of 
this committee include the chief secretary (chairman), the secretary for personnel management 
(deputy chairman), the commissioner of police, the commissioner of correctional services, the 
commander of the PNGDF and the secretaries for defence, finance, treasury, planning and 
intergovernmental relations. The committee advises the National Security Council (NSC), the 
body that has overarching authority on all issues relating to national security and is chaired by 
the prime minister ("Prime Minister and National Executive Council Act," 2002). The NSAC 
met on Sunday 8 October 2006. The purpose of this meeting was to assess and advise the 
government on the national security implications of the Moti case. Kalinoe knew of the prime 
minister’s directive to get Moti out of the country. He could have easily disseminated this 
directive during the meeting, but he chose not to do so. The NSAC unanimously agreed that 
the government should respect and allow the judicial process to continue (National Security 
Advisory Committee, 2006). The NSAC’s resolution was in line with the DFA committee 
meeting. They resolved that the legal process should be allowed to take its course. 
 
According to the evidence tendered to the DFBI, Somare disregarded the bureaucratic 
position taken by NSAC and the DFA. He was annoyed that the inner core of the bureaucracy, 
composed of the senior officers in his department, delayed executing his instruction. His 
concerns were verbally conveyed by his chief of staff to the director general of OSCA on 
Monday 9 October. The events that transpired on Monday 9 October 2006 exposed the inner 
workings of the government and how it managed a foreign policy issue that relates to the 
extradition of a wanted person. It was the day after the NSAC meeting and the day Moti was 
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flown out of the country. Apart from the acting commander of the PNGDF, whose office is 
housed at Murray Barracks, almost all the offices of the key players in the Moti affair were 
located in the same building at Morauta Haus in Waigani. On this day, the DFBI revealed that 
many telephone calls and one-on-one meetings were held between the key players inside this 
building. The one-on-one meetings were isolated from other key players and bureaucratic 
protocols were overlooked. For instance, the chief secretary was bypassed, instructions were 
issued to junior officers without his knowledge, no typed or written instructions were issued 
and no records of meetings were kept, which one might expect in a formal office environment. 
All directives were issued verbally through telephone and face-to-face conversation (DFBI, 
2007, pp. 10–37). The oversight of conventional bureaucratic principles and practices was 
primarily attributed to the covert nature of the operation. Nonetheless, it underscored how the 
bureaucracy operated in Waigani and, moreover, how they orchestrated Moti’s escape from the 
Australian authorities. 
 
On the morning of 9 October 2006, Louma, seemingly frustrated by the failure of the 
chief secretary and the director general of OSCA to execute the prime minister’s directive, 
approached Assaigo and said, ‘you Sepiks, you and the Chief Secretary are gelygelys’ (DFBI, 
2007, p. 46). The word gelygely in PNG (synonymous with ‘girlie’ in English) is used as slang 
for a man who behaves and acts in a feminine way. It is an unpleasant and offensive word that 
is often used to degrade men who surrender easily, play passive roles and who are unable to 
behave and perform acts that are traditionally thought to be typical or suitable for men. The use 
of such a word against provincial and ethnic groups has been a source of tension and violence, 
particularly in the major towns and cities in PNG, where people are strongly affiliated to their 
provincial and regional groupings. Louma has used the word as a challenge to complete the 
job. Louma’s statement, ‘you Sepiks’, indicated that the job of getting Moti out of the country 
was explicitly assigned to a closed group from the Sepik province. Both the chief secretary and 
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Assaigo are from Sepik, as is Somare. In the PNG context, they are wantoks—or people who 
share the same language. 
 
Assaigo countered and told Louma to consult the chief secretary for a more coordinated 
effort. Both men went to their respective offices after the brief encounter. During the day, two 
more meetings were held between them. In each meeting, Louma reiterated the prime 
minister’s disappointment with Assaigo and the chief secretary for failing his directive to fly 
Moti out of the country. Louma then ‘asked’ Assaigo to take a leading role (DFBI, 2007, p. 
31). The request was more of order, as it came from a senior bureaucrat in the hierarchical 
structure. Under normal reporting conditions, the Chief of Staff Louma would issue 
instructions to Chief Secretary Kalinoe, who would relay it to Director General of OSCA 
Assaigo. However, this did not happen, as the chief secretary had already expressed his opinion 
in favour of a more legal and diplomatic approach. Louma intentionally bypassed the chief 
secretary and communicated directly with Assaigo because the chief secretary opposed the 
political stance of the prime minister. 
 
Assaigo communicated with the Acting PNGDF Commander, Captain Tom Ur (the 
Commander, Peter Ilau, was overseas on official duties), at some time before his subsequent 
meetings with the prime minister’s chief of staff and had already made plans to use the PNGDF 
for the clandestine operation. Assaigo told the acting PNGDF commander that he received 
directives from the top to remove Moti from the country and ordered him to find options for 
getting rid of Moti. He never disclosed who at the top gave the directions when he engaged 
with the acting PNGDF commander, but he always maintained that the direction to manage 
Moti came from the top at Waigani. Captain Ur asked Assaigo if the chairman of the NSAC 
(Kalinoe) and the chairman of NSC (prime minister) were aware of the task, to which Assaigo 
responded ‘yes’ (DFBI, 2007, pp. 42, 45–56). Assaigo assured Captain Ur that he would take 
care of the formalities at the NSC and NSAC level, as they were within his jurisdiction. Captain 
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Ur returned to Murray Barracks to meet with his officers after the meeting with Assaigo at 
Morauta Haus, Waigani. At Murray Barracks, Captain Ur consulted his senior staff, Colonel 
Vagi Oala, Commander of the Joint Operations Centre, and Lieutenant Colonel Ron Hosea, 
Director of Air Operations. Lieutenant Colonel Hosea advised the acting commander that the 
PNGDF CASA aircraft had sufficient hours to operate and that the job could be done. Captain 
Ur then issued the orders to execute the direction. After the meeting, Colonel Oala left to 
prepare his plans on the security aspects of the operations, while Lieutenant Colonel Hosea 
went to prepare the aircraft for the trip (DFBI, 2007, p. 11). Assaigo laid the groundwork for 
the covert operation without approval from the chief secretary. He was the middleman between 
Waigani and Murray Barracks and the mastermind behind the covert operation. 
 
In an affidavit statement deposed to the DFBI by Assaigo on the 7 February 2007, 
Assaigo said he met with the chief secretary at the chief secretary’s conference room at around 
3.30 pm to discuss logistics, mobility and how they could get rid of Moti (Assaigo, 2007, p. 3). 
The chief secretary did not deny his statement. According to the chief secretary, Assaigo 
suggested the use of the police helicopter, or the defence aircraft, to airlift Moti out of the 
country. It is worth noting that Assaigo already planned to use the PNGDF CASA aircraft when 
he spoke to the acting PNGDF commander. He arranged the aircraft without approval from the 
government. His meeting with the chief secretary was to purposely seek assent from his office 
to commit the PNGDF. That is, he was covering his tracks, should the clandestine operation 
backfire. However, Kalinoe was adamant that the government stood by NSAC’s resolution that 
everything would remain as it was until the extradition process was completed. He warned 
Assaigo against the use of the Defence Force, or the police aircraft (Kalinoe, 2006, p. 16). 
Kalinoe knew that Assaigo was planning and coordinating the operation, but he could not stop 
Assaigo because he knew that Assaigo was facilitating a directive from the prime minister 
(DFBI, 2007, p. 37). Around 5:00 pm, Assaigo went to Murray Barracks and met with Captain 
Ur and his military strategists and planners, who were working on the details to get rid of Moti. 
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He was briefed on the plan and left soon after the meeting with Captain Ur and his senior 
officers. 
 
The DFBI revealed that on the 9 October 2006, in the cover of darkness, Jerry Fruanga, 
an employee of OSCA and a relative of Assaigo, took Moti from the Solomon Islands 
chancellery in Waigani and drove him to his hostel. Balthazar Wali, a driver in the Office of 
the Chief Secretary and a relative of Fruanga, took both men from Waigani Hostel and drove 
them to the PNGDF Air Transport Squadron, Jacksons Airport. Assaigo joined them later. He 
drove to a designated location near the airport, took Moti and the others and drove them to the 
Defence Force hanger (DFBI, 2007, p. 51). Just after midnight on 10 October 2006, the PNGDF 
CASA stealthily rolled out onto the runway at the Defence Force hanger. Nine passengers, 
including the two pilots, three soldiers, Moti, the two government officials from the Solomon 
Islands (Tanabose and Hapa) and another unidentified person were on board the flight 
codenamed Eagle 502 (DFBI, 2007, p. 19). By 12.45 am, Eagle 502 was already airborne and 
heading for Munda airstrip in the Western Province of the Solomon Islands. To avoid detection, 
the pilots did not submit flight plans, flew the plane without any lights, maintained radio silence 
during the entire flight and kept the aircraft at the height of 17,000 feet to avoid detection from 
Australian radar (DFBI, 2007, pp. 51, 67). In doing so, the PNG Government, through the 
negligence of its military pilots, reneged on the country’s obligations to comply with Rule 
9.407 of the Civil Aviation Act (CASA, 2000) and, subsequently, Articles 11 and 37 of the 
Chicago Convention (Convention on International Civil Aviation, 1944), which elaborates on 
flight plans. The Somare government successfully evacuated Moti on a state-sponsored illegal 
operation. 
 
The PNGDF suspended the senior officers involved and conducted its internal 
investigation, following the revelation of the covert operation. In this internal investigation, 
Captain Ur justified his actions in these terms: 
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I asked if Chief Secretary and the old man (PM) are aware of this and 
Mr Assaigo said yes. So I told him that I will check the status of the 
aircraft with staff and then let him know if we can help (DFBI, 2007, 
p. 13). 
 
Captain Ur did not hesitate to commit state resources for the clandestine operation as 
soon as he knew that the ‘old man’ knew of the operation. In PNG political and bureaucratic 
circles, Somare is affectionately known as the ‘old man’. As mentioned earlier, the government 
rejected the internal investigation because it believed that the investigation involved cover-ups. 
Nonetheless, Captain Ur stated in the DFBI: 
 
As Acting Commander, I believe that the direction was from the 
government of PNG, and it is my duty to carry them out and not 
question those directions … In a high context culture like PNG, the 
mention of names of people that we have respect for is good enough 
for me to act upon their direction (DFBI, 2007, pp. 12–13). 
 
Captain Ur asserted that it was culturally acceptable to act on orders from ‘people that 
we have respect for’ (DFBI, 2007, pp. 12–13), alluding to Somare. Captain Ur’s statement in 
both inquiries is important, as it sheds light on the influence of culture on the formal policy 
process. More importantly, the evidence strongly suggested the influence of culture on foreign 
policymaking. 
 
The DFBI revealed that the Acting Commander of the PNGDF, Captain Ur, went 
outside his jurisdiction to commit state resources for the clandestine operation (DFBI, 2007, p. 
56). He overlooked provisions of the constitution that guided the functions of the PNGDF. 
Section 205(1) of the PNG constitution is explicit on the PNGDF functions: 
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The Defence Force or part of the Defence Force may be ordered on 
active service only by the Head of State, acting with, and in accordance 
with, the advice of the National Executive Council and may be sent out 
of the country only by the authority of and on conditions imposed by 
the Head of State, acting with, and in accordance with, the advice of 
the National Executive Council (Constitution of Papua New Guinea, 
1975). 
 
The decision to engage the PNGDF, or sections within the PNGDF, would have to come 
from the National Parliament of PNG or the NEC. No one, not even the prime minister, has the 
authority to commit the PNGDF for any operation. The Secretary of the NSC (Kalinoe) and 
the Secretary of the NEC (Ms Winnie Kiap) said the NSC or the NEC did not give the orders 
to evacuate Moti out of PNG’s jurisdiction secretly (DFBI, 2007, p. 38). Captain Ur committed 
men and resources to an operation that was not sanctioned by the PNG authorities. In addition, 
section 205 of the constitution outlines the active service of the PNGDF: 
 
The Defence Force or a part of the Defence Force may not be ordered 
on, or committed to active service or an international peace-keeping or 
relief operation, outside the country without the prior approval of the 
Parliament (Constitution of Papua New Guinea, 1975). 
 
The only peacekeeping operation approved by the National Parliament and NEC at the 
time of Moti’s escape from PNG was the Australian-led RAMSI operation in the Solomon 
Islands. The flight taken by the PNGDF CASA aircraft on 9 October 2006 was not part of the 
RAMSI operation. Further, section 205(4a) of the constitution makes allowance for ‘normal 
administrative or training purposes’ (Constitution of Papua New Guinea, 1975). However, 
there was no training conducted between the defence forces of the Solomon Islands and PNG 
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at the time of Moti’s escape. Captain Ur breached the provisions of the constitution that guide 
the operation and functions of the PNGDF. 
 
Relations between Australia and PNG rapidly deteriorated after Australia discovered 
that Moti secretly flew out to the Solomon Islands. Australia suspended ministerial contacts 
with PNG and barred the PNG prime minister from visiting Australia until an investigation was 
undertaken (Nicholson & Skehan, 2006). Foreign Affairs Minister Downer denounced PNG 
for violating international agreements on the extradition of alleged fugitives who were wanted 
for arrest. He said the issue also raised concerns about the continuation of Australia’s A$300 
million aid program to PNG (Rheeney, 2006b). Australia further postponed the annual PNG–
Australia Ministerial Forum that was suspended after the collapse of the ECP, insinuating that 
the PNG Government facilitated the escape. In turn, PNG recalled for consultation its high 
commissioner to Australia, Sir Charles Lepani and the Commander of the PNGDF, Peter Ilau, 
who had gone to Australia on official duties. By the end of the Howard government in 2007, 
Australia’s diplomatic relations with PNG were at a low point. 
 
The new Australian Government under Kevin Rudd, which took office in November 
2007, recalibrated Australia’s diplomacy. Shortly after taking office, Rudd was invited by 
Somare to visit PNG, which he did in March 2008. During that visit, he delivered the Port 
Moresby Declaration, as discussed in the last chapter. The declaration stated that Australia 
wanted ‘a new era of cooperation’ with PNG and other Pacific Island states and would work 
with them ‘on the basis of partnership, mutual respect and mutual responsibility’ (Rudd, 2008). 
Somare observed that ‘this is the beginning of our revised and new relationship’ (Post-Courier, 
6 March 2008, pp. 3–5). The relationship between the two countries improved, following 
Rudd’s gesture of reconciliation. The annual PNG–Australia Ministerial Forum resumed in 
April 2008, after four years of postponement. 
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5.4 The Moti Case and Foreign Policymaking 
The Moti case touches on the rule of law and foreign policy. Somare and his followers 
violated the constitution and its by-laws, as well as international treaties and norms, when they 
disregarded Australia’s request for extradition and flew Moti safely to the Solomon Islands. 
Under those circumstances, the Moti incident was illegal and subsequently became the subject 
of the DFBI. In this section, I look at the Moti case in relation to foreign policy. I start by asking 
the question: what influenced the Somare government to disregard Australia’s extradition 
request and give safe passage to Moti? This is an important question, as it highlights the 
underlying factor that drove foreign policy. I reflect on this question by reviewing the main 
point that was raised in the beginning of this chapter and Chapter 4. Prime Minister Somare 
viewed Australia’s new interventionism as a violation of national sovereignty and pushed back 
on Australia in the ECP case. However, he failed, as the government embraced the SGP. The 
Moti case, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, is a part of the ECP story. Prime Minister 
Somare, working in tandem with the Solomon Islands prime minister, moved to minimise 
Canberra’s influence in PNG. Somare used the same rationale—national sovereignty—as 
justification and gave safe passage to Moti. 
 
This justification of national sovereignty was strengthened after Somare alleged that 
the Australian Government, without consulting the PNG state prosecutor, went ahead and 
issued a warrant of arrest for Moti. As mentioned, he claimed that the bypassing of the state 
prosecutor’s office was illegal. He viewed it as a violation of national sovereignty. The incident 
inflamed sentiments of nationalism, which existed since the ECP was announced. 
Subsequently, Somare commenced the campaign to let Moti go. Somare’s idea of nationalism, 
which focused on minimising external influence in PNG, influenced his decision to give safe 
passage to Moti. He refused Australia’s extradition orders in defence of what he believed to be 
PNG’s national interest—national sovereignty. 
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Somare’s idea of the national interest—national sovereignty—was not widely shared. 
The public saw the Moti affair as a violation of international treaties and norms, as well as the 
violation of the constitution and its by-laws. This prompted the Ombudsman Commission of 
PNG to conduct an independent investigation. Similarly, the coalition partners in Somare’s 
government saw the Moti affair as illegal and unrepresentative of collective government 
interest. The interest of the coalition government (and the bureaucracy that deliberated on the 
Moti issue) was to uphold the government’s commitment to international treaties and norms, 
as well as to maintain its close relations with Australia. The illegality of the Moti affair formed 
the basis of investigations and inquiries including the DFBI. 
 
Nonetheless, the national sovereignty rationale influenced foreign policy decision-
making in the Moti affair. At the core of the national sovereignty rationale is the issue of PNG’s 
ambition to chart foreign policy that is independent of Australia’s influence. This ambition has 
been the driving force behind PNG’s evolving foreign policy approach, which is reflected in 
the doctrines of universalism and then active and selective engagement. This key point is 
important and it provides the basis for analysis in the Moti case. 
 
5.4.1 Weakness of state 
Foreign policy, as discussed in Chapter 2, is a state function. The state is responsible 
for foreign policy. For this reason, it is important to evaluate the state in relation to the Moti 
case. The Moti case essentially highlights the weakness of the state. To support this point, I 
look at the concept of state and its capacity to support the government’s ambitious foreign 
policy—to chart foreign policy that is independent of Australia’s influence. A state is ‘a set of 
organized governing institutions which are formally connected to each other and have some 
cohesiveness’ and are ‘run in large part by bureaucracies’ (Dryzek & Dunleavy, 2009, pp. 2, 
5). The strength of the state is measured in terms of the capacity of its formal institutions—
state bodies such as the courts, legislatures and bureaucracies—to support basic economic 
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functions, deliver basic services, keep law and order and support government functions and 
policies. The state’s formal institutions (and statutory authorities) carry out these functions. 
The strength of the formal institution is defined in terms of its capacity to support government 
functions and policies. The Moti case exposed the weakness of the state. As mentioned, the 
government deployed nationalist rhetoric to justify PNG’s independence and national 
sovereignty in giving safe passage to Moti. National sovereignty, as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
is understood as the recognised right of domestic political authorities to be the only arbiters of 
legitimate behaviour within the territorial boundaries of their state, free from external 
interference (Krasner, 1999, p. 4). This includes control over economic sovereignty by external 
actors. It is not realistically possible to exercise state power and justify such actions with 
nationalist arguments unless the state is genuinely independent. As mentioned in Chapter 4, 
PNG is dependent on Australia, even in the twenty-first century. The government’s ambition 
for independence from external influence is limited. Its capacity to institutionalise this 
ambitious foreign policy in the form of a coherent set of policies shared across the government 
is limited. As a result, the government deployed the rhetoric of national sovereignty as 
justification for minimising Australia’s influence in PNG. 
 
The state’s weakness was also reflected in its political institutions and bureaucracy. For 
instance, the formal institution’s strength is defined in terms of its effectiveness, with its 
effectiveness, in turn, depending on the extent to which rules and procedures that exist on paper 
are enforced or complied with in practice (Helmke & Levitsky, 2006, p. 6). The commander of 
the PNGDF overlooked Section 205(1) of the PNG constitution, which guided the functions of 
the PNGDF. The weak enforcement of rules and laws pointed to the state’s weak political 
institution. Moreover, bureaucracy holds the essence of the state. Modern-day governance 
largely occurs in and through the bureaucratic mechanism, with emphasis placed on hierarchy, 
management by written and inflexible rules, regulations, procedures and impersonal 
relationships to make the system more effective (Blau & Meyer, 1971; Downs, 1967). The 
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government often operates on the basis of legal–rational authority. In the Moti case, a selection 
of highly placed bureaucrats with varying abilities and positions of power used their offices, 
chose strategies and carried out a foreign policy directive in quite dysfunctional ways. They 
bypassed formal channels of communication and authority. For example, under the 
conventional hierarchical structure, the chief secretary—who occupies the apex of the 
administrative hierarchy—would issue instructions and directives to departmental heads. 
However, the chief secretary was bypassed because he was considered a major stumbling block 
for completing the operation. His position to respect the rule of law and allow the judicial 
process to take its normal course worked against the prime minister’s interest. The chief of 
staff bypassed the Office of the Chief Secretary and gave directions to the director general of 
OSCA, a junior officer, who subsequently influenced the acting commander of the PNGDF to 
commit state resources for the operation. Moreover, they avoided bureaucratic protocols (e.g., 
formal meetings) and bent the formal rules in international relations (the Extradition Act 2005 
and Chicago Convention). These examples point to weakness of the state’s institutions and 
bureaucracy. 
 
However, not all political institutions involved in the Moti case are weak, which is 
defined in terms of the capacity to carry out their functions. The collective decision of senior 
representatives from the National Security Council (NSC), NSAC, the DFA and the 
Department of the Attorney General to respect the extradition and judicial process 
demonstrates their resolve to adhere to laws and processes. They planned to enforce the rules 
and laws that would consolidate and strengthen the power and position of the respective 
institutions. However, the prime minister, in his capacity as chairman of the NSC, used his 
power to override their decisions. This is further discussed in the later part of this analysis 
under the subheading ‘personalised nature of foreign policy’. 
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5.4.2 Signs of informal institutions 
The state’s weakness discussed so far is caused by the influence of informal institutions 
on formal government institutions. The Moti case displayed signs of informal institutions. In 
this section, I examine the informal institutions and reflect on their influence on foreign policy. 
I start by considering the definition of informal institutions. Helmke and Levitsky (2004) 
defined informal institutions as ‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, 
communicated, and enforced outside officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke & Levitsky, 
2004, p. 727). This intuitive understanding of informal institution has been applied to a variety 
of phenomena, including clans and mafias (Collins, 2002, 2003; Lauth, 2000), folkways (D. H. 
Fischer, 1991; Matthews, 1959; Sumner, 1906), corruption, clientelism, patrimonialism 
(Böröcz, 2000; Dahlström & Lapuente, 2012; Lauth, 2000; O'Donnell, 1996; Pejovich, 1999; 
Persson, Rothstein & Toerell, 2012; Taylor-Robinson, 2006), personal networks (Wang, 2000) 
and culture (Dia, 1996; Pejovich, 1999). This wide range of phenomena encompass all 
behaviours that are not accounted for by the written rules. 
 
Cultural, personal and wantok networks featured prominently in the Moti affair. In this 
section, I unpack the key concept of culture to determine its influence on foreign policy. I 
highlight the ‘big man’ personality and wantok network as intrinsic parts of the Melanesian 
culture and society and show how they play out in the Moti affair. Culture is defined as ‘those 
customary beliefs and values that ethnic, religious, and social groups transmit fairly unchanged 
from generation to generation’ (Manz, Sapienza & Zingales, 2006, p. 23). It is a system of 
inherited conceptions that shape the patterns of thought, human behaviour and action. Cultural 
beliefs are an important component of culture: 
 
Cultural beliefs are the ideas and thoughts common to several 
individuals that govern interaction—between these people, and 
between them, their gods, and other groups—and differ from 
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knowledge in that they are not empirically discovered or analytically 
proved. In general cultural belief’s become identical and commonly 
known through the socialisation process by which culture is unified, 
maintained and communicated (Greif, 1994, p. 915). 
 
Captain Ur’s previous statement, ‘in a high context culture like PNG, the mention of 
names of people that we have respect for is good enough for me to act upon their direction’ 
(DFBI, 2007, pp. 12–13), reflected a causal link between cultural belief and its influence on 
decision-making. His statement, ‘the mention of names of people that we have respect for’, 
identifies Somare with the ‘big man’, whose directions cannot be questioned. 
 
The ‘big man’ is a type of leadership that it is closely associated with the traditional 
Melanesian culture and society. Its status is attained by ‘the outcome of a series of acts which 
elevate a person above the common herd and attract about him a coterie of loyal lesser men’ 
(Sahlins, 1963, p. 289). His power, regarded as ‘personal power’ (Sahlins, 1963, p. 289), is 
often more influential than legal–rational authority (which is further discussed in next section). 
The ‘big man’ is a highly influential individual that has a large group of followers, both from 
his clan and from other clans. In particular Melanesian tribes, the phrase ‘big man’ also denotes 
‘man of importance’ or ‘man of renown’ (Sahlins, 1963, p. 289). In the Pacific region, two 
types of leadership are common: the ‘big man’ leadership systems of Melanesia and the 
chieftains of Polynesia. Leadership in Polynesia is inherited. Leadership in Melanesia, by 
contrast, is usually determined by the personal prestige of community members (Goldman, 
1970; Sahlins, 1963; Sand, 2002). However, this system of leadership has limits. In parts of 
New Caledonia, Vanuatu, the Solomon Islands and PNG, chiefs were hereditary over several 
generations (Sand, 2002, p. 290). Somare is one of the very few leaders in the region who 
straddles both systems. In his Karau village in the Murik Lakes of East Sepik, he is barely 
acknowledged as the prime minister. In this village, he carries a more important title, the chief, 
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like his father before him. In PNG, he is the prime minister. He is regarded as the founding 
‘father of the nation’ (Chin, 2003, p. 460; Griffin, 1997, p. 77) who brought the country to 
independence in 1975 and became its first prime minister. In contemporary PNG society and 
politics, Somare is affectionately referred to as the ‘old man’, or ‘grand chief’. His face’s 
appearance on the PNG’s legal tender, kina (50-kina denomination), symbolises respect for the 
national leader. Captain Ur’s reference to Somare as the ‘old man’ (DFBI, 2007, p. 13) and 
‘people that we have respect for’ (DFBI, 2007, pp. 12–13) demonstrated the link between 
Somare’s ‘big man’ personality and its influence on his followers. The acting PNGDF 
commander ignored Section 205 of the PNG constitution because he believed that the 
instruction came from a respectable person in society (DFBI, 2007, pp. 12–13), despite its 
questionable nature. This is because in Melanesian and Polynesian societies, leaders and chiefs 
are treated with great respect. This example revealed the influence of the ‘big man’ personality 
on foreign policy decision-making. 
 
The various actors involved in the Moti affair are wantoks, which in Melanesian Pidgin 
means ‘one talk’, or someone who shares the same language. In practice, a wantok group is 
based on shared language, family or tribal relations, regional location and other forms of 
association (Dinnen, 1997, p. 12). Wantok more generally refers to a system of socio-economic 
obligation, reciprocity, status and preferential treatment that binds members of a group (Alpers, 
2005, p. 34). The wantok network or system is an informal institution, in that its operation is 
largely based on unwritten rules that are socially shared. Understanding the wantok system as 
a socio-economic and political network is critical to understanding Melanesian societies and 
political behaviour in the country and region. 
 
Excluding the prime minister’s chief of staff, all the key players are from the Sepik 
province, or the same province as the prime minister, including the chief secretary, the acting 
commander of the PNGDF, director general of OSCA and the two drivers (Jerry Fruanga and 
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Balthazar Wali), who drove Moti out of the chancellery to the airport. The prime minister’s 
chief of staff knew that wantoks from Sepik were specifically assigned to perform the illegal 
operation when he said ‘you Sepiks, you and the Chief Secretary are gelygelys’ (DFBI, 2007, 
p. 46). The involvement of the various actors who carried out the clandestine operation may 
have been involuntary, but the fact that this group of elites came from the same province as the 
prime minister underscored the wantok network in the Moti affair. It left the impression that 
wantoks were specifically selected for the purpose. The highly placed Sepik group also engaged 
relatives (the two drivers) to perform the operation. 
 
The wantok label is also extended to the wider Melanesian societies who share the same 
cultural features and identity. This brings the Solomon Islands Prime Minister, Manasseh 
Sogavare, into the picture. Somare and Sogavare are wantoks; they share the same Melanesian 
cultural identity. States that have identical cultures often engage in cooperative and integrative 
behaviour. They relate easily to each other with mutual understanding and cooperation (Cobb 
& Elder, 1970; Rummel, 1979). Somare and Sogavare’s behaviours and actions in getting Moti 
out of PNG, against Australia’s extradition request, can also be understood from the wantok 
network and their identity as Melanesians. They colluded to oppose Australia’s extradition 
request and, more generally, to influence in the region. The collusion between the two prime 
ministers, for instance, was manifested by the consent to use the Solomon Islands territorial 
airspace without prior arrangement. There was no complaint of territorial violation when the 
PNGDF CASA aircraft flew into the Solomon Islands airspace without permission. In 
international relations, when one state violates the territorial airspace of another, there is 
usually a diplomatic protest in the strongest terms possible against such intrusion or invasion. 
The Solomon Islands Government did not send a protest note to PNG against the illegal entry 
into its airspace. The inability to protest the violation of its territorial airspace indicated that 
there was a consensual agreement between the two governments for the clandestine operation. 
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5.4.3 The personalised nature of foreign policy 
The Moti case highlights the personalised nature of foreign policy. In this part, I look 
at the term ‘personalised’ more closely to understand how it influenced foreign policy in the 
Moti case. The term personalised identifies with personalism, which raises associations of 
absolute power in the hands of one person who is surrounded by a loyal group of followers 
(Van den Bosch, 2015, p. 12). Simply put, power is largely in the hands of one leader. In the 
last section, I identified this power—personal power—with the traditional Melanesian society 
and associated it with the ‘big man’ leadership. Bratton and Van de Walle (1994, pp. 474–475) 
describe the personalisation of power in these terms: 
 
[The leader] rules personally by controlling the flow of public revenues 
and selectively disbursing rewards to a narrow entourage of familial, 
ethnic, or factional clients. He takes exclusive charge of policy-making 
(rather than relying on technocratic planning) and implements 
instructions through personal emissaries (rather than formal 
institutions). 
 
The Moti case underscored the personalisation of power and its influence on foreign 
policy. The prime minister wielded power and exerted influence on both the policy process and 
the political institutions. Somare went on air on Radio Karai in the evening, after he received 
the diplomatic note from the Solomon Islands, and explained why PNG should release Moti to 
the Solomon Islands instead of handing him over to the Australian authorities. He then issued 
instructions to his close confidants to get rid of Moti, but he used the personal and wantok 
network instead of formal government institutions. Somare’s loyal supporter functioned as a 
personal emissary to implement the prime minister’s instructions, as there are almost no 
institutions left that would be able to do this (and, in the process, disregard formal rules and 
laws). Somare used his veto to override the bureaucratic position, sponsored and signed an 
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NEC submission with the claim that Moti was not a threat to security (after the NEC deliberated 
that Moti posed a security threat to PNG) and defended his decision to let Moti go on the PNG 
Parliament floor. These actions demonstrated the prime minister’s personalised power. This 
power was further reflected when Somare sacked the defence minister and assumed 
responsibility of the ministry after the completion of the DFBI. The purpose was to prevent 
tabling the report in Parliament. Altogether, the Moti case revealed the considerable power of 
the prime minister who used it to manipulate foreign policy. It underscored the personalised 
nature of foreign policy. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
What does the case study of Julian Moti reveal about contemporary foreign policy in 
PNG? First, the Moti case demonstrated the influence of culture on foreign policy. The ‘big 
man’ leadership and personality, the personal and wantok network and the Melanesian cultural 
identity have all shaped foreign policy decision-making. Second, the prime minister wielded 
power over foreign policy. This manifested in several ways: he used his power to influence the 
policy process and subsequently pushed his interest, he used his power to override the 
collective bureaucratic decision to respect the extradition and judicial processes and he exerted 
pressure on the bureaucracy to carry out the foreign policy direction. Essentially, the prime 
minister dictated foreign policy. Third, the Moti affair exposed informality, or the absence of 
formality, in foreign policy. It highlighted the tension between the aspiration for independence 
and the weakness of a Melanesian state with limited capacity to identify and implement 
coherent policies in pursuit of a commonly shared national interest. Somare’s ambition for the 
independence from external influence in PNG, which discussed in the ECP case study, marked 
the beginning of a more contentious bilateral relationship with Australia. However, the political 
institutions who were responsible for foreign policy development did not support this ambition. 
The Moti case reflected the limited capacity of formal institutions to institutionalise the 
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ambition for independence from external influence. As a result, Somare deployed the 
nationalist rhetoric of national sovereignty as a justification for foreign policy, which the 
bureaucracy supported in a dysfunctional way. Finally, the Moti affair strengthened PNG’s 
Melanesian identity and solidarity, but it destabilised its bilateral relationship with Australia. 
The affair created a rift in bilateral relations with Australia, with no development of a realistic 
alternative. Tension in the bilateral relationship between the two countries simmered for almost 
three years. Prime Minister Rudd diffused the tension when he assumed office in late 2007.  
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Chapter 6: West Papua 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines PNG’s foreign policy in relation to West Papua. On 5 February 
2015, PNG Prime Minister, Peter O’Neill, made a statement about human rights abuses in West 
Papua. He acknowledged the atrocities committed against the Melanesian people and vowed 
to lead discussions in the region. His statement was stronger than any of his predecessors. It 
signalled a departure from the non-interference policy, which holds that a state should not 
meddle in the internal affairs of another state. The case of West Papua is interesting because it 
demonstrates the emergence of a coherent foreign policy. It is one of the first instances of 
foreign policy that is supported by resourcing and a degree of policy coherence. It is also 
important in the analysis of the development of foreign policy in PNG. 
 
The story of West Papua is about the struggle for the political independence of the 
Melanesian people living in Indonesia. It is a continuing struggle that seemingly has no end. 
The story started soon after the Dutch Government ceded authority to the Indonesian 
Government in 1949. It has many parts with different issues and dates back to the 1940s. To 
avoid tangential information, I will focus on the period 2015–2017. This period is significant 
because PNG overturned the non-interference policy and supported a West Papuan group to be 
a member of the MSG, which gave them a voice to be heard in the region. However, I will 
provide a historical background from the period 1960–2014 to illuminate previous 
governments’ foreign policies on the ‘West Papua issue’. 
 
In this chapter, the West Papua issue denotes both the political freedom for West 
Papuans and the human rights abuses committed against them. I further refer to West Papuans 
as the inhabitants of both the Papua and West Papua provinces. The chapter is divided into 
three main parts. The first is the story of West Papua, in which I provide the historical 
background of the West Papua case and shed light on the geopolitics of West Papua. The 
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second part outlines PNG’s foreign policy on West Papua and it is divided into two sub-parts: 
1960–2014 and 2015–2017. The former explores past foreign policies and the latter examines 
the contemporary period. Foreign policy analysis vis-a-vis West Papua is covered respectively 
in the two periods under review and the conclusion constitutes the final part. 
 
6.2 The Story of West Papua 
West New Guinea was also known as Dutch New Guinea, or Netherlands New Guinea, 
during the Dutch rule (see Figure 3.1). After its annexation in 1969, it became known as West 
Irian Jaya, or Irian Barat, and it was renamed Irian Jaya in 1973 by the Suharto administration. 
The region was administered as a single province—Irian Jaya—until 2003, when it was split 
into the provinces of Papua and West Papua. Papua is bordered by the nation of PNG to the 
east and its capital is Jayapura. West Papua is a province composed of the western parts of 
Papua province and its capital is Manokwari (see Figure 6.1). In this chapter, the terms Irian 
Jaya and West Papua are used variously, according to the political context in which the 
reference is being made. 
 
Figure 6.1. Map of Indonesia and PNG showing West Papua and Papua. 
Source: CartoGIS, The Australian National University. 
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The history and occupation of West Papua have been covered by many writers (Bohane 
et al., 2003; King, 2004; May, 1986a; Nyamekye & Premdas, 1979a; Ondawame, 2010; 
Saltford, 2003; Webster, 2001; Wesley-Smith, 1987). In brief, the Dutch transferred 
sovereignty to Indonesia on 2 November 1949, but refused to relinquish the South Molucca 
Islands and West New Guinea soon after Indonesia declared independence. On 27 December 
1949, the Dutch Government issued a decree that established a permanent colonial 
administration for West New Guinea under a governor appointed by, and responsible to, the 
Dutch Government alone. This decree, embodied in the Treaty of The Hague, prevented 
Indonesia from including West New Guinea as its territory in the transfer of sovereignty to 
Indonesia. The departing Dutch Government appealed to the principle of self-determination 
and insisted on a special status for West New Guinea. It argued that the people were ethnically 
and culturally different from rest of the people in the Indonesian archipelago and that the Dutch 
had an obligation to offer them an opportunity to determine their future (Cozens, 2005, p. 488; 
Nyamekye & Premdas, 1979a, p. 930; Saltford, 2003, p. 5). The Dutch wanted West New 
Guinea to be liberated from the rest of Indonesia, who took an opposing view. They dismissed 
the ethnic and cultural argument as an irrelevant basis for determining national boundaries. In 
Indonesia’s view, its sovereignty extended to all the territories that were held by the Dutch 
before 1949. As a result, the Treaty of The Hague was revoked in 1956 and Indonesia 
subsequently extended its control over West New Guinea. 
 
The confrontation between the Dutch and Indonesian Governments over West New 
Guinea after 1949, known as the West New Guinea dispute (1950–1962), intensified to the 
point of warfare. During the first phase of the West Irian dispute (1950–1954), Indonesia 
pursued bilateral negotiations with the Netherlands. During the second phase (1954–1958), 
Indonesia attempted to raise support for its territorial claims in the UN (Djiwandono, 1996, pp. 
1–2). During the third phase (1960–1962), Indonesia pursued a policy of confrontation against 
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the Netherlands that combined diplomatic, political and economic pressure with limited 
military force. The final stage of the confrontation with Indonesia involved a planned military 
invasion of the territory. Military weapons and support for the planned invasion were sourced 
from the Soviet Union, which induced the US to react (Djiwandono, 1996, pp. 122–135). In 
1962, the US intervened and played a third party role in settling the dispute in what became 
known as the New York Agreement (United Nations, 1962). This agreement was established 
between the Netherlands, Indonesia and the US and provided for the administration of the 
disputed territory. It was supervised by the UN. The agreement sustained Indonesia’s claim to 
West New Guinea despite Dutch efforts to exercise control, but it conceded the principle of 
self-determination demanded by the Dutch. This strategy was a face-saving device intended to 
salve Dutch pride (Nyamekye & Premdas, 1979a, p. 930). West Papua’s political fate was 
effectively sealed with the signing of the New York Agreement. 
 
The agreement marked the end of a lengthy and bitter dispute between the Dutch and 
Indonesia over the future of the territory, but it did not specify who would determine the ‘will 
of the people’ that was demanded by the Dutch. The actual mechanism of determining the will 
of the people was left deliberately vague, except that it was to be carried out ‘in accordance 
with international practice’ (Saltford, 2003, p. 94). There was no mention of the words 
referendum or plebiscite in the New York Agreement and no real hope that the rights of the 
West Papuans would be respected (Bohane et al., 2003, p. 8; Saltford, 2003, pp. 93–94). In 
1969, seven years after the New York Agreement, the Act of Free Choice was administered. 
Article XVIII(d) of the New York Agreement specified that all men and women in Papua who 
were not foreign nationals had the right to vote in the Act in accordance with international 
practice (United Nations, 1962). However, between 14 July and 2 August 1969, the Indonesian 
Government selected 1025 men and women out of an estimated population of 800,000 as the 
Western New Guinea representatives for the vote. They were asked to choose between two 
alternatives: either to remain with Indonesia, or to sever ties with Indonesia and become an 
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independent state separate from Indonesia. Their views were identified not by means of a 
referendum, but by the Indonesian process of musyawarah, or ‘consultation’, between 
government officials and the 1025 selected representatives (Wesley-Smith, 1987, p. 47). The 
process has been widely condemned by human rights groups because the ballot was far from 
free and fair. The men who were selected for the vote were subjected to a series of threats, 
insults and bribes for voting against independence (Saltford, 2009, p. 65). The farcical nature 
of this exercise was reflected in the fact that this self-determination principle was governed by 
Indonesia and overseen by the UN. Moreover, it was scheduled seven years after Indonesia 
assumed control of West New Guinea. 
 
The passing of the Act was a serious diplomatic setback for West Papuans. More than 
179 people petitioned the UN representative and expressed their concerns over the conduct of 
the Act. They complained to the representative that the vote was not legitimate, but the UN 
representative could do little as an observer (Ondawame, 2010, p. 56). According to human 
rights groups, the Act of Free Choice was devised in such a way that the outcome of the 
elections was guaranteed before a ballot was cast. For example, Article XVIII(a) of the Act of 
Free Choice called for ‘musyawarah with the representative councils on procedures and 
appropriate methods to be followed’ (United Nations, 1962), which effectively ruled out free 
and fair elections. Human rights groups and OPM activists called the exercise the ‘Act of No 
Choice’ (Nyamekye & Premdas, 1979a, p. 930). The Act of Free Choice was often cited as one 
of the most disruptive events in Papuan history (Cozens, 2005; Heijmans, Simmonds & Veen, 
2004; King, 2004). It endorsed Indonesia’s takeover of West Papua and was rubberstamped by 
the UN. 
 
The ramifications of the events surrounding the Act and Indonesia’s handling of the 
process undermined a wide variety of human rights, not only that of self-determination. It 
brought West Papua into a new era of colonialism. Since Indonesia’s occupation of West 
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Papua, serious human rights violations and atrocities against indigenous West Papuans have 
increased. For a number of years, different sources including the US State Department, Tapol, 
Human Rights Watch, Yale Law School and Amnesty International have reported occurrences 
of torture, rape, harassment, unlawful detention and extrajudicial killing of the people 
perceived to be politically opposed to the Indonesian Government (Amnesty International, 
2011; Hayworth, 2012; Human Rights Watch, 2007; US Department of State, 2013). 
According to a report by the Allard K. Lowenstein International Human Rights Clinic at Yale 
Law School, the main perpetrators were the Indonesian military and security forces who had a 
long history of mistreating the indigenous Papuans frequently and with impunity (Brundige, 
King, Vahali, Vladeck & Yuan, 2004, pp. 59–63). Over 500,000 civilians are believed to have 
been killed in a genocide against the indigenous population (Robinson, 2012). The Indonesian 
Government has time and again denied the allegations of human rights violations in West 
Papua. Indonesia’s denial of human rights abuses lacked credibility, as it banned UN and non-
government human rights monitors, including foreign journalists, from visiting and preparing 
reports on the allegations of human rights abuses. In August 2010, the Indonesian Government 
banned the Dutch international aid organisation Cordaid from West Papua, asserting among 
other things that the organisation had assisted Papua pro-independence activists (The Jakarta 
Post, 2010). In 2011, the Peace Brigades International had to close its Papua operations because 
the Indonesian Government imposed a series of challenges and constraints during the past years 
that have severely limited its ability to adequately protect human rights defenders at risk (Peace 
Brigades International, 2010, p. 5). International human rights organisations, such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, and foreign academics have also been denied access 
to West Papua (Human Rights Watch, 2015a, pp. 47–57). 
 
The issue of West Papua was embroiled in Cold War geopolitics. The rights of West 
Papuans to national self-determination would typically have found support from Americans, 
who present themselves as a world champion of democracy, liberty and peace. However, 
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human rights concerns in West Papua were pushed aside by the US as part of its efforts to 
contain communism. The Americans turned away from the Dutch and supported Indonesia’s 
claim of West Papua. They supported Indonesia to keep the country out of the communist camp 
and were prepared to sacrifice the future of the West Papuans for regional stability (Bohane et 
al., 2003, p. 5; Penders, 2002, pp. 290–295). In brief, West Papuans were sacrificed in the name 
of Cold War politics. Moreover, the US had substantial commercial interests in West Papua’s 
mineral reserves. The American company Freeport, one of the world’s largest producers of 
copper and gold, is involved in Indonesia’s mining industry. It is Indonesia’s largest export 
earner (Leith, 2003, p. 84). Freeport was central to Indonesia’s economy as well as to the 
shareholders of the company. Therefore, it was not in the best interest of the US to destabilise 
its relationship with Indonesia over West Papua. 
 
The UN did not discharge its mandate in West Papua. It accepted the flawed Indonesian 
system of voting, which indicated that it sanctioned the illegal procedure. The UN’s oversight 
in handling the West Papua issue and its failure to achieve an acceptable solution that 
represented the interests of the West Papuans proved to be disastrous, as it had raised a then 
reasonably low-key issue into a full-blown international human rights violation concern 
between the Indonesian Government and indigenous West Papuans. The UN and the 
international community have not taken any action to redress the injustice. Subsequently, the 
UN lost its credibility in West Papua and was considered an organisation that the powerful 
states use to pursue their interests. 
 
The West Papua issue has also been complex in terms of regional politics. In Australia, 
two dominant and opposing schools of thought have emerged vis-a-vis West Papua. One is 
adamant that moral imperatives should take precedence over diplomatic niceties. This is 
primarily influenced by the human rights abuses in the provinces. A central feature in this 
school of thought is the belief that the Australian Government has a moral obligation to act as 
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a voice for the West Papuan people. The other dominant strand of thought believes that the 
Australian Government’s support for West Papuan independence would be counterproductive 
and would bring disastrous foreign policy implications (Day, 2015). This said, Australia’s 
interest has been pragmatic and focused on respecting Indonesia’s sovereignty over West 
Papua. Australian policymakers have believed that the appeasement of Indonesian nationalism 
is in the broader security interests of Australia (Australian Department of Defence, 2009, 
2013). It is not in the interest of Australia to side with any factions, groups or individuals that 
fight for the rights of the oppressed in West Papua, as it could threaten more important national 
interests like security and trade (O'Keefe, 2013). 
 
Various Australian governments, including the Rudd and Abbott governments, have 
maintained strong support for Indonesia’s sovereignty over West Papua (O'Keefe, 2013). The 
Howard government has also maintained a similar stance on West Papua and had declared, on 
multiple occasions, that it would not support the West Papuan separatist movements (Elmslie, 
2007; Fernandes, 2006; Rimmer, 2006). However, in 2006, the Australian Government granted 
temporary protection visas to 42 West Papuan asylum seekers who arrived on Australian shores 
by canoe. Indonesia considered the Australian Government’s action, although inherently 
humanitarian and based on Australia’s commitment to human rights and obligations to the 1951 
United Nations Refugee Convention, an act of betrayal and a sign of Australia’s support for the 
West Papua independence movement. Relations between Australia and Indonesia fell to its 
lowest point. Indonesia recalled its ambassador to Australia, signifying the tense state of 
relations between the two countries (Dempster, 2006; Robertson, 2006). The incident 
destabilised the relationship between the two countries. Following this experience, Australia 
tightened foreign policy and migration laws to make it increasingly difficult for West Papuan 
asylum seekers (Jennett, 2006; Rimmer, 2006). Further, the Lombok Treaty signed in 
November 2006 between Australia and Indonesia, reinforced Australia's stance on West Papua. 
The treaty reaffirmed Australia’s security and strategic interests. Defence cooperation between 
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the two countries has increased significantly since the signing of the treaty (Habir & Roberts, 
2014; Leahy, 2010; McGrath, 2013) and the relationship between the two countries was 
elevated to a ‘strategic partnership’ in March 2010 (Habir & Roberts, 2014, p. 1). In the light 
of these developments, it was difficult for Australia to accommodate the West Papua issue. 
 
The support for West Papua varied between MSG member countries. Vanuatu and the 
FLNKS (Kanak and Socialist National Liberation Front) are the staunchest supporters of West 
Papuan emancipation and liberation (Blades, 2015a; Cain, 2014; Cullwick, 2013). FLNKS has 
been sympathetic, given its struggles for independence from France. Vanuatu has consistently 
been at the forefront of lending support for West Papua political freedom. In June 2010, the 
Government of Vanuatu unanimously adopted the Wantok Blong Yumi Bill to express their 
support for West Papua liberation and freedom from oppression (Buchanan, 2010). Vanuatu 
wanted MSG to push for West Papua’s political independence, an issue that has often created 
a difference of opinion between political elites in the sub-regional group. Political elites have 
been ambivalent about backing West Papua against human rights violation and supporting it 
for political independence. Some political elites in the MSG have been cautious about political 
independence, but they have at times alluded to self-determination and autonomy for West 
Papua. Indonesia has been aware of West Papua support within the Vanuatu body politic for 
many years, but it has only recently sought to counter it. For example, Indonesia offered former 
Vanuatu Prime Minister Sato Kilman lavish trips to Jakarta, forged a closer relationship 
between the two countries and offered direct aid, such as police uniforms (Dorney, 2013). 
However, Kilman was forced to resign on 21 March 2013 ahead of a non-confidence vote, 
largely due to his dealings with Indonesia. Kilman’s successor, Moana Carcasses Kalosil, 
reaffirmed Vanuatu’s support for West Papua’s political freedom (Makin, 2013). 
 
The Solomon Islands Government’s decision on West Papua has been wavering 
between autonomy for West Papua and its economic interests. The trade volume between the 
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Solomon Islands and Indonesia has progressively increased over many years, to the benefit of 
the Solomon Islands. For example, in 2012, Indonesia’s import share was 2.25 per cent and its 
export share totalled 0.52 per cent, while in 2013, Indonesia’s import share was 2.32 per cent 
and its export share was 0.34 per cent (World Bank, 2013). The balance of trade was in the 
Solomon Islands’ favour. The increase in import share, though minimal, indicated that 
Indonesia was an important trade partner in terms of the overall import profile of the Solomon 
Islands economy. Despite government pledges to support West Papua’s right to self-
determination, no concrete actions have been taken to support the cause in regional and 
international forums, primarily because of the economic benefits the Solomon Islands would 
forego should it support the West Papua issue. However, the incumbent prime minister, Gordon 
Darcy Lilo, pledged in 2014 to pursue the West Papua issue through the Solomon Islands’ 
newly established diplomatic office in Indonesia (Theonomi, 2014). The Solomon Islands’ 
position on West Papua did not change after Prime Minister Lilo vacated office. In 2015, Prime 
Minister Manasseh Sogavare assured the people of West Papua that his government will 
support West Papua’s bid to join the MSG (Sogavare, 2015).  
 
Fiji has a long history of flirting with Indonesia. Relations between Fiji and Indonesia 
were minimal under previous civilian governments, partly reflecting Fiji’s disapproval of 
Indonesia’s treatment of the West Papua Melanesian people. Since the military takeover in 
2006, relations between Fiji and Indonesia have improved. One of the reasons for the 
improvement in this relationship stemmed from Fiji’s suspension from the PIF and 
subsequently the Commonwealth of Nations, following the military coup (Firth, Fraenkel & 
Lal, 2009; Herr, 2010). Perceived as a pariah state, Fiji ‘looked north’ and elsewhere under the 
leadership of Commodore Bainimarama for international recognition and support. Relations 
between Indonesia and Fiji improved after Commodore Bainimarama looked to Indonesia. Fiji 
established its embassy in Jakarta in 2011, which paved the way for more efforts to enhance 
relations between the two countries. Fiji enjoyed a close relationship with Jakarta and 
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supported its belief that West Papua is an integral part of Indonesia. Overall, West Papua posed 
a significant challenge for MSG leaders; they faced the difficult task of managing their 
economic relations with Indonesia, of responding to regional human rights concerns and of 
supporting their liberation from Indonesia’s authority, based on the Melanesian ethnicity. 
 
6.3 West Papua and PNG’s Foreign Policy 
PNG’s foreign policy on West Papua is traced back to the Dutch decolonisation of 
Indonesia. Resistance to Indonesian rule commenced almost immediately after the Dutch 
withdrew. The transfer of West Papua sovereignty to Indonesia provoked strong Melanesian 
resistance. While the Dutch abandoned their desire to retain Irian Jaya, many Irianese 
nationalists did not. The armed guerrilla group OPM, or the Free Papua Movement—an 
umbrella term for the independence movement—appeared from this residual group. The OPM 
has been the central vehicle of West Papua nationalism. It has often organised military actions 
against Indonesian soldiers and installations and has been using the PNG side of the border as 
a base and refuge from persecution (May, 2004, pp. 286–301). Throughout the 1960s and early 
1970s, sporadic armed clashes throughout Irian Jaya between the OPM and Indonesian 
authorities produced widespread unrest, violence and fear among the people. Since the 1960s, 
the Irianese have been crossing the border into PNG in search of refuge due to the armed 
confrontations. The government responses to the border crossers since the 1960s varied, which 
reflects both contradictory and ambiguous foreign policies. I observe PNG’s foreign policy vis-
a-vis West Papua from 1960–2000 to examine the different positions of the PNG Government. 
 
6.3.1 1960–2014 
In this part, I examine PNG’s foreign policy on West Papua since Indonesia’s 
decolonisation. As mentioned earlier, the Irianese resistance to Indonesian rule commenced 
soon after the Dutch departed. After Indonesia extended its control over Irian Jaya in 1962, 
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hundreds of people per year crossed over into the Australian-administered territory of PNG. 
By the end of 1968, more than 1200 refugees had crossed into PNG (Budiardjo & Liem, 1988, 
p. 94; May, 1986b, p. 89). Australia, who had supported the Indonesian nationalists in their 
struggle against the Dutch, were less tolerant of anti-Indonesian movements and deported most 
of the refugees for illegal entry into the territory. In late 1968, over 200 refugees were granted 
permissive residence (Budiardjo & Liem, 1988, p. 94). Sixty-nine of them were moved from 
Vanimo to offshore Manus to prevent their participation in anti-Indonesian politics in the 
Territory of Papua and New Guinea (Maclellan, 2006; Neumann, 2004). Independent PNG did 
not depart from the colonial administration’s policy of permissive residence. Between 
September 1975 and June 1977, 157 Irianese were granted citizenship (May, 1986b, p. 135). 
However, the new Somare government that emerged after independence understood that the 
presence of Irianese nationalists endangered its diplomatic relations with Indonesia. In the 
1980s, those granted refugee status were moved with the assistance of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to third countries such as Sweden and Greece (May, 
2004, p. 290; R. Osborne, 1986, p. 59). 
 
In 1994, more than 12,000 West Papuans crossed over into PNG in three groups, as a 
result of sustained armed confrontation between the OPM and the Indonesian military 
(Hewison & Smith, 1986, p. 202; Preston, 1992, p. 849). The first group of refugees, 95 
altogether, crossed into Vanimo, Sandaun Province, in early February. The PNG Government 
applied its standard border crosser policy—arrest of illegal border crossers (Blaskett, 1989, p. 
283; Glazebrook, 2001, p. 269). In handing down the decision in Vanimo on 21 March, by 
which time the number of border crossers charged had increased to 111, 84 crossers were found 
guilty by one magistrate, while the second magistrate dismissed the case against the other 27. 
Seventy-three of those convicted were sentenced to six weeks imprisonment, but their 
conviction was quashed by the National Court (Hewison & Smith, 1986, pp. 203–204; May, 
1986b, p. 116). It was unclear whether those freed by the National Court qualified for refugee 
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status, but PNG’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Rabbie Namaliu, announced that OPM rebels 
and army defectors would be sent to a third country. He further announced that none of the 
refugees would be charged with illegal entry (Glazebrook, 2001, p. 271). This was because 
some of the border crossers had their traditional lands straddling the international border; they 
had been moving freely over what is considered by many as an arbitrarily determined 
international boundary by colonial powers. This group of border crossers crossed en masse 
because they fled to seek safety from actual or expected persecution from the Indonesian 
military (Amankwah, 1990). Namaliu’s announcement of the non-arrest reflected a departure 
from the standard border policy that called for the arrest of border crossers. 
 
The second group of refugees, as many as 3000, crossed into areas near the Sandaun 
Province between March and April 1984 (Hewison & Smith, 1986, p. 204; May, 1986b, p. 
120). The PNG Government, confronted with a growing volume of border crossers, met with 
Indonesian officials on 13 April 1984 to discuss repatriation of the refugees (May, 1986b, p. 
116). The meeting agreed on the repatriation of border crossers, but three major obstacles 
frustrated the agreement. First, the PNG Government’s official position was to secure Jakarta’s 
assurance of safe conduct before it could return the Irianese refugees (May, 1986b, p. 123; 
Premdas, 1985, p. 1065). Namaliu was verbally guaranteed the safety of refugees on more than 
one occasion, but when he first sought a written undertaking and, subsequently, a formal 
commitment from both the foreign minister and military as part of a joint repatriation 
agreement, it met resistance. Second, the PNG Government considered the human rights and 
humanitarian aspects of the problem and requested the involvement of the UNHCR. However, 
Indonesia refused UNHCR’s intervention because it opposed internationalisation of the issue 
and Indonesia claimed that involving the UNHCR would complicate the repatriation process. 
Finally, Indonesia asked for a list of names and details of key refugees before deciding on 
repatriation, which PNG was reluctant to provide (Hewison & Smith, 1986, p. 204; May, 
1986b, pp. 123–124). Although there was a mutual desire on both sides to resolve the refugee 
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issue, talks between the two governments on the issue of repatriation became deadlocked and 
remained deadlocked, even after the extra sessions. Nevertheless, repatriation was one of the 
policy options. 
 
Between April and July 1984, the third group of refugees crossed into the Western 
Province along a 150 kilometre stretch of the border from the northern end of the Fly River to 
the border between Sandaun and Western Provinces because of the intensified military activity 
in Irian Jaya. Faced with a stalemate in its repatriation program, the Somare government ‘opted 
to take a harder line with the border-crossers, permitting conditions in the camps to deteriorate, 
to try to persuade their inhabitants to return home’ (Harris & Brown, 1985, p. 42). The national 
government stopped assisting the government officers in Western and Sandaun Provinces to 
mitigate the costs of administration (Fitzer, 1987), instructed officials to send refugees back 
(Hewison & Smith, 1985), discouraged the involvement of UNHCR (Hewison & Smith, 1986), 
devoted minimal resources and prevented church groups from sending food and medical aid to 
some camps (Blaskett, 1989; May, 1986b). The policy, by virtue of its harshness, was 
tantamount to the government’s policy of forced repatriation. However, the government was 
forced to shelve this plan because of the death of 92 refugees from starvation and malnutrition-
related causes in a southern border camp in August 1994, combined with criticisms from the 
PNG parliament (Bell, Feith & Hatley, 1986, p. 542; Preston, 1992, p. 858), the general public 
(through the local media), worldwide media (Glazebrook, 2001, p. 11), churches (Blaskett, 
1989, p. 290) and university students (Blaskett, 1989, p. 291). 
 
Among the intellectuals of Port Moresby and university students in the border 
provinces, there was a growing sympathy for fellow Melanesians from the West who had ‘dark, 
frizzy-haired people like ourselves’ and were fleeing Indonesian oppression (Bell et al., 1986, 
p. 541). Concerns about the Melanesian brothers increased, but relations between the PNG 
Government, the OPM and its supporters simultaneously deteriorated (May, 1986b, p. 135) 
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because the OPM has often used the PNG side of the border as a sanctuary and base for attacks 
against the Indonesian army. PNG governments have always believed that they cannot afford 
to antagonise Indonesia by harbouring the OPM guerrillas, or by being too welcoming to 
refugees fleeing its rule. Moreover, the PNG Government had no policies in place that would 
help to cope with the situation in either international political arenas or locally. There were no 
plans for food relief, shelter or medical assistance and no policy in respect of the relations 
between host communities and the government (Preston, 1992, p. 856). Much of the initial 
assistance in providing for the refugees came from the UNHCR (Blaskett, 1989, p. 283) and 
partly by church organisations (May, 2004, p. 293). Assistance also came from the Red Cross 
and Austcare (Crowe, Mongi & Raper, 1984; Hewison & Smith, 1985, p. 92). 
 
Since the 1980s, the government employed a variety of policies to discourage the 
movement of OPM guerrillas and of West Papuans fleeing Indonesia’s rule into the PNG 
border. These policies include repatriation (forced and voluntary), relocation to East Awin in 
Western Province, deportation, resettlement and offering permissive residence to refugees that 
were found to be genuine. Occasionally, the PNGDF and mobile police squads were deployed 
in the border area to discourage the movement of OPM guerrillas into the PNG border (May, 
2004, p. 294). These deployments were a major foreign policy decision by the government, as 
they represented what Premdas (1985) called, an ‘aggressive posture against the OPM’ 
(Premdas, 1985, p. 1072). It was an aggressive PNG Government policy position, as it 
demonstrated the deployment of armed forces (PNGDF and mobile police squads) against West 
Papuans. 
 
PNG’s policy on West Papua varied. Sometimes, the government adopted policies that 
were ambiguous and, at other times, adopted policies that were contradictory. For example, 
PNG displayed much sympathy to the early group of asylum seekers and granted them 
permissive residence. However, government attitude changed throughout the 1970s, as 
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tensions along the border increased. Many asylum seekers were found guilty of being illegal 
immigrants and were subsequently imprisoned or deported to third countries (Preston, 1992). 
Since the early 1980s, PNG developed ambivalent attitudes to refugees and OPM guerrillas 
alike. The government offered limited assistance to the refugees and expected them to leave, 
while conversely offering assistance to those in need of it. The various government policy 
positions were partly a consequence of diverse pressures. Some of these pressures emerged 
within PNG and others outside PNG. 
 
The internal pressures affecting decision-makers came from three broad sources. First 
was the ‘Melanesian brother’ (Nyamekye & Premdas, 1979a, p. 939) pressure that was driven 
by ethnic bonds, cultural identity and cultural links between the Melanesian residents on both 
sides of the border. The Melanesian brother pressure came from a significant segment of 
individuals and groups—including churches, university students, human rights NGOs, anti-
colonial political movements, the PNG Parliament (Bell et al., 1986, p. 542; Blaskett, 1989, 
pp. 290–291; Preston, 1992, p. 858) and even political parties and leaders in opposition—who 
opposed the PNG Government’s recognition of Indonesian territorial sovereignty over West 
Papua (King, 2004, pp. 171–173; Nyamekye & Premdas, 1979a, p. 940). Sympathy with the 
plight of the Melanesian brothers across the border was often reinforced by nationalist anger at 
the Indonesian military incursions along the unmarked frontier in the course of anti-OPM 
operations (MacQueen, 1989a, p. 532). The Melanesian brother pressure not only had its 
origins in PNG, but also elsewhere in the region that had Melanesian societies. The second 
source of pressure came from the church. The church exercised strong influence over public 
opinion through pastors, priests and missionaries. Its concerns largely hinged on human rights 
and the rights of the minority of Christians in a dominantly Muslim community (May, 1986b, 
p. 146). The third source of pressure came from the opposition members of the PNG Parliament 
(Nyamekye & Premdas, 1979a, pp. 943–944). Since the 1980s, the opposition members led by 
Sir Iambakey Okuk have expressed strong support for the self-determination of the West 
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Papuans. In the mid-1980s, opposition members like former prime minister, Julius Chan, 
United Party Leader, Paul Torato, Deputy Opposition Leader, Steven Tago and Ted Diro have 
strongly opposed repatriation (May, 1986b, pp. 150–154). These leaders blamed the 
government’s acquiescence to Indonesian pressure, which prompted the government to prolong 
its repatriation policy. 
 
The external pressures on West Papua came from three primary sources. The first came 
from Australia, who was faced with the challenge of managing border security issues from its 
two northern neighbours. The northern islands of PNG and Indonesia were important to 
Australia for security and strategic reasons. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Australia was cautious of its northern borders (Hunt, 2017; Laki & May, 2009). It took 
precautions to secure the border by helping PNG increase the number of patrol posts, provide 
rudimentary schools and health centres and construct government councils to establish 
presence on the border (Herlihy, 1981, p. 172). Concurrently, Canberra developed equally close 
relations with Jakarta to secure the border area (Blaskett, 1989, p. 64). Canberra’s position has 
been one of ‘moderation and accommodation on both sides’ (Nyamekye & Premdas, 1979a, p. 
942) and has often exercised caution on the border tensions between PNG and Indonesia. 
Canberra’s views about how the border should be managed have often been communicated 
through its behaviour. For example, in April 1985, the premiers of Fly, Morobe and the North 
Solomon provinces offered to resettle refugee families temporarily in their respective provinces 
(Blaskett, 1989, p. 295). Canberra feared that providing long-term accommodation for West 
Papuans in PNG would encourage more border crossings. As a result, Australia withheld funds 
for relocation, insisting that the UNHCR should instead persuade Indonesia to allow an 
international agency to monitor the return of refugees (Tapol, 1988, p. 2). The second source 
of pressure came from the UN. PNG was expected to justify its refugee policy within the 
forums of the UN family. As such, Port Moresby was concerned about avoiding the 
unnecessary criticisms on the grounds of denying humanitarian assistance to those in need of 
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it (Nyamekye & Premdas, 1979a, pp. 942–944). The final source of pressure came from 
Indonesia. 
 
Successive PNG governments have long balanced competing tensions: domestic and 
international pressures, populist sentiments in support of West Papuan rights, growing 
economic links with Indonesia and ASEAN (which was explained in Chapter 3), border 
management following the Border Agreements6, strong ethnic and religious links between 
Melanesians in PNG and West Papua and the moral obligation to raise the plight of 
Melanesians in Indonesia in international bodies and forums. Successive governments have 
often been placed in delicate situations, as they balance these competing imperatives in their 
relationship with Indonesia. Moreover, they have been preoccupied with PNG’s security along 
the border. As mentioned before, PNG governments have always believed that they cannot 
afford to antagonise Indonesia by harbouring the OPM guerrillas or by being too welcoming 
to refugees fleeing its rule. They believed that Indonesia was too powerful to antagonise 
(Nyamekye & Premdas, 1979a, p. 941). As such, various PNG governments were concerned 
about the implications of the situation in West Papua for the stability and security of PNG and, 
ultimately, of Australia and the rest of the South Pacific region (MacQueen, 1989a; Nyamekye 
& Premdas, 1979a). The security emphasis has subsequently diverted attention from other 
equally important aspects, notably the welfare of the West Papua people, their political 
oppression, economic exploitation and human rights abuses that include torture, death and 
politically motivated violence (Brundige et al., 2004; Budiardjo & Liem, 1988; Ondawame, 
2010). The various prime ministers have disregarded the human rights violations that were 
committed against West Papuans. Their respective governments have refrained from 
                                               
6 Agreement between Australia and Indonesia concerning certain boundaries between Papua New Guinea and 
Indonesia, 1973, Border Agreements between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, 1979 and Treaty of Mutual 
Respect, Friendship and Cooperation, 1986. 
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condemning human rights abuses, often claiming that it was Indonesia’s domestic problem, 
and have consistently denied OPM supporters and rebellious West Papuan groups opposing 
Indonesia’s sovereignty access to their territories. 
 
The OPM’s existence is premised on the illegitimacy of Indonesian control of Irian 
Jaya. The challenge constituted a fundamental threat to the territorial integrity of Indonesia. As 
PNG and Indonesia share a common border, Indonesia often put pressure on PNG to quell the 
OPM. However, successive PNG governments have not seriously considered the option of 
military operations along the border to quell OPM operations. Such operations would trigger 
protests in PNG and other Melanesian societies in the region, given the widespread sympathy 
for the Melanesians living in Indonesia. Instead, successive governments have sought to 
manage the border problems with Indonesia through peaceful means. The cooperation between 
PNG and Indonesia to deal with problems arising from the common border has been captured 
in various border agreements. The agreements called for collaboration and cooperation, but 
‘non-interference’ into the internal affairs of the other. 
 
The non-interference policy is recognised by the Charter of the United Nations. Article 
2(7) recognises ‘the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal 
affairs of any State’ (United Nations, 1945). This is based on the notion that a state should not 
interfere in the internal politics of another state, as well as the principles of state sovereignty 
and self-determination. The non-interference policy has been accepted and practiced by many 
countries that are bounded by the Charter of the United Nations. Indonesia has a longstanding 
preference for non-intervention and an opposition to external attempts to meddle in the internal 
affairs of others; this aligns conveniently with its desire to avoid criticism of its own domestic 
agenda. This is one motivation behind Indonesia’s failure to ratify the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, which supported an end to genocide, to crimes against humanity, 
war crimes and crimes of aggression. PNG has long been committed to the non-interference 
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policy. In 1988, PNG’s then Foreign Minister, Akoka Doi, reinforced the non-interference 
policy. He said that Port Moresby recognises West Papua as ‘an integral part of Indonesia’ and, 
in his words, a ‘mistake done by the colonial powers so let it stay as it is’ (Doi, cited in 
MacQueen, 1989a, p. 534). Successive governments have continued to maintain the non-
interference policy. 
 
6.3.2 2015–2017 
The period 2015–2017 was a significant period, in that PNG overturned the non-
intervention policy. However, the events that set the foundation for this date back to the 
beginning of the twenty-first century. The period was marked by renewed populist support for 
the West Papua movement, partly due to the improved mobile phone network and wider 
coverage of the issue. The dissemination of information and pictures of brutality through the 
internet and social media has mobilised opinion, raised public awareness and gained wider 
support for the West Papua movement as people subscribed to the improved network coverage 
and communication technology. The adoption and use of information communication 
technology in PNG has significantly increased in the past decade. This is reflected in the mobile 
phone network coverage, which grew from 4.7 per cent in 2007 to 47 per cent in 2015 (Galgal, 
2017). Increased access to mobile phones, the internet, Facebook, Twitter and other forms of 
social media increased the political engagement and participation in democratic debates of 
more people (Watson & Duffield, 2016, p. 278). The issue of West Papua also became a 
discussion topic in many social media forums. The prime minister acknowledged the ‘pictures 
of brutality of our people’ that ‘appear daily of social media’ (O'Neill, 2015a), as will be 
observed later in this chapter, when he spoke about human rights in West Papua. 
 
Populist support for West Papua gained momentum at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century as the civil society—including NGOs, students, human rights advocacy groups, 
prominent PNG citizens and church groups—joined the call to end human rights violence in 
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West Papua. For example, in early October 2012 at a Lutheran women’s conference in Lae, 
Morobe Province, a conference representative named Rose Muingepe appealed to the 
government and said: 
 
We are asking the government to raise the plight of the West Papuans 
on the floor of parliament. We know that women are being raped, men 
are being tortured and we want our government to pay attention to the 
issue (EM TV News, 2012). 
 
O’Neill responded, saying that his government would deliver a diplomatic note through 
the DFA that expressed the concerns of PNG citizens to the Indonesian Government. He said: 
 
We need to respect international conventions made in organisations 
like the United Nations. We also need to respect that Indonesia is a part 
of those organisations. Through those conventions, we will deliver a 
diplomatic note raising the concerns of our citizens over some of the 
reports that we are getting from West Papua on human rights abuses 
(EM TV News, 2012). 
 
The DFA did not make any representation to the Indonesian Government through 
PNG’s Jakarta office via diplomatic note as promised by the prime minister. Nonetheless, 
O’Neill’s acknowledgement of human rights abuses and his pledge to address the issue was the 
first known position of the O’Neill government regarding West Papua, after a church group 
urged the government to raise the plight of West Papuans in Parliament. 
 
Even members of the PNG Parliament supported the West Papua movement for ending 
the human rights abuses against West Papuans. Powes Parkop, National Capital District 
Governor, parliamentary leader of the Social Democratic Party and one of the coalition partners 
in the O’Neill government, had been a human rights activist, lawyer and vocal supporter of the 
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free Papua movement even before entering Parliament. Both Parkop and Gary Juffa, Governor 
of Oro Province and ardent supporter of the West Papua movement, are members of the 
International Parliamentarians for West Papua—a cross-party group of politicians from around 
the world whose primary objective is to promote international parliamentary support and 
awareness for the West Papuan independence movement. Pressure from the Parliament to 
support the West Papua cause emerged from two controversial issues: the Paul Paraka case and 
a controversial United Bank of Switzerland (UBS) loan. These two issues implicated the prime 
minister of corruption and misconduct in office. They are covered by many writers (Cochrane, 
2014; Garnaut, 2015a, 2015b; May, 2017), though this chapter will not dwell on them. The key 
issue, however, is that the allegations almost led to the prime minister’s political demise. The 
Paul Paraka and UBS loan cases were major issues that brought the prime minister’s integrity 
and leadership into disrepute. The allegations incited public debate and mostly criticised 
O’Neill’s leadership and alleged corrupt practices. The allegations of corruption and 
misconduct went viral on the internet and were met with widespread criticisms among anti-
corruption bodies, including the PNG branch of Transparency International (Yalo, 2014). The 
civil society, members of the opposition and the Transparency International PNG branch called 
for the prime minister to step down while investigations continued (Pok, 2014; Yalo, 2014). 
The pressure to support the West Papua cause during this period would have emerged from the 
government’s coalition partner—the Social Democratic Party—because responding to the 
coalition partner’s interest (West Papua) was one of the ways to consolidate government 
solidarity at a time when the prime minister was urged to relinquish his position. I make 
inference here because in PNG’s political culture and landscape, political party-hopping and 
switching of alliances from the government to opposition and vice versa is common for 
political and other reasons and interests (May, 2003c; Okole, 2012; Standish, 2007, 2013). 
 
Subtle pressure to support the West Papua case came from the Melanesian societies, 
including the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP). ULMWP is an 
184 
umbrella organisation that represented the different factions of the West Papua independence 
movement including the Federal Republic of West Papua, the National Coalition for Liberation 
and the West Papua National Parliament. Benny Wenda, an international lobbyist, is the 
chairperson of the group. Together with other lobbyists like John Otto Ondawame and 
supporters of the free Papua movement, they have carried out extensive peacemaking and 
public awareness activities in various countries by promoting a peaceful solution to the conflict 
in West Papua and establishing solidarity links among oppressed, colonised and indigenous 
peoples. They encountered different people in the countries that they visited (including 
prominent ministers, politicians and university students), talked to the media and, in the 
process, widened the support and campaign for West Papua liberation. On 4 February 2015, 
ULMWP applied for membership to MSG. 
 
The following day on 5 February 2015, during a leadership summit7 in Port Moresby, 
Prime Minister O’Neill said: 
 
Papua New Guinea today is a respected regional leader. After 40 years 
of undisturbed democracy, we are in a unique position to lead mature 
discussions on issues affecting our people in the region. Our leading 
role in encouraging Fiji to a democratically elected government and 
voicing our concerns about the plight of our people in New Caledonia 
are examples of our growing influence. We have also participated in 
the restoration of democracy and law and order in countries like 
Vanuatu and Solomon Islands. But sometimes we forget our family, 
                                               
7 Cabinet ministers, provincial governors, business leaders and development partners including Australia attended 
the summit.  
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our brothers and sisters, especially those in West Papua. I think as a 
country the time has come for us to speak about oppression of our 
people. Pictures of brutality of our people appear daily on social media 
and yet we take no notice. We have the moral obligation to speak for 
those who are not allowed to talk. We must be the eyes for those who 
are blindfolded. Again, Papua New Guinea, as a regional leader, we 
must lead these discussions with our friends in a mature and engaging 
manner (O'Neill, 2015a). 
 
Prime Minister O’Neill’s remark was a significant policy statement in that it departed 
from the traditional non-interference policy. It was the first time an incumbent PNG prime 
minister spoke directly about the rights of West Papuans concerning torture and politically 
motivated violence against them in a public forum. 
 
Prime Minister O’Neill’s statement about human rights in West Papua is not purely 
influenced by human rights concerns. This is because PNG has rarely fixed its human rights 
issues. PNG’s record of human rights abuses has been a worrying concern for human rights 
advocacy groups. For example, a country report on human rights practices, released by the 
United States Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labour in 2015 noted that: 
 
The principal human rights concerns were severe police abuse of 
detainees and police and military abuse of citizens; violence and 
discrimination against women and girls; and vigilante killings and 
abuses, some related to alleged involvement in sorcery and witchcraft. 
A significant area of controversy involved the Australian-run refugee 
processing centre on Manus island … Other human rights problems 
included poor prison conditions; lengthy pre-trial detention; 
infringement of citizens’ privacy rights, particularly in highland areas; 
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government corruption; discrimination against persons with 
disabilities; intertribal violence; and ineffective enforcement of labour 
laws (US Department of State, 2015, p. 1). 
 
Similar concerns of human rights abuses were raised by the Human Rights Watch, an 
international NGO that conducts research and advocacy on human rights. In its 2015 annual 
assessment of more than 90 countries, it noted that: 
 
Despite Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) current extractives-led economic 
boom, an estimated 40 percent of the country live in poverty. Pressing 
human rights issues include gender inequality, violence, corruption, 
and excessive use of force by police. Rates of family and sexual 
violence are among the highest in the world, and perpetrators are rarely 
prosecuted … Physical and sexual abuse of detainees—including 
children—by police and paramilitary police units continues to be 
widespread … Members of PNG’s notorious paramilitary police units 
(Mobile Squads), detention centre staff, and local residents were 
implicated in excessive use of force in quelling protests in February 
2014 at the Manus Island detention centre, which holds asylum seekers 
transferred by Australia for refugee status determination and 
resettlement … Papua New Guinea is one of the most dangerous places 
in the world to be a woman, with the majority of women experiencing 
rape of assault in their lifetime and women facing systemic 
discrimination (Human Rights Watch, 2015b, pp. 425–426). 
 
The two reports raised concerns about human rights abuses, including gender 
inequality, violence, corruption, excessive use of force by the police (RPNGC) and the 
government’s failure to take sufficient steps to address them. It also raised concerns about the 
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RPNGC’s lack of accountability and prevailing impunity for violations by members of the 
organisation who commit extrajudicial punishments, killings, torture and sexual violence. This 
is additional to the increasing incidences of violence against women and sorcery-related attacks 
in the PNG highlands. The reports did not portray PNG as a keen observer of human rights. 
Indeed, these concerns have lowered PNG ratings as a protector of human rights by world 
standards (Human Rights Watch, 2015b, pp. 425–429). This leads to an important question: 
why did PNG raise concerns about human rights abuses in West Papua when its own record of 
defending human rights is relatively poor? I reflect on this question by looking at PNG’s efforts 
to address its human rights issues and its growing confidence in the foreign policy. 
 
In 2010, the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading 
treatment and publishment visited PNG and made a series of recommendations to prevent 
torture and improve the conditions of detention in the country (US Department of State, 2011). 
In 2012, the government invited the Special Rapporteur on violence against women to conduct 
a human rights fact-finding mission on violence against women in PNG (UNHR, 2012). 
Following these visits, the government endorsed several legal initiatives, ratified human rights 
treaties and withdrew laws that supported the perpetuation of violent crimes. For instance, in 
2013, the government repealed the Sorcery Act, which provided a defence for violent crime if 
the accused was acting to stop witchcraft. The government took steps to build government 
institution capacities and it supported the activities of national human rights institutions and 
faith-based organisations so it could observe the laws and customs of human rights that were 
espoused by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This indicated that the government 
considered human rights issues in the country. PNG’s focus on human rights in West Papua, 
however, was more related with regional politics. 
 
PNG became increasingly confident in international relations at the beginning of the 
twenty-first century, partly because of the frictional relationship it had with Australia (which 
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was discussed in the ECP and Moti cases). Since the 2012 general elections, the O’Neill 
government became much more present in the Pacific Islands region in terms of investment, 
development assistance and diplomacy (which is discussed in detail later in this chapter). 
PNG’s confidence was also reflected in its dealings with Australia. In 2012, O’Neill demanded 
that Australia’s aid program be realigned to support his government’s priorities, including 
roads, schools and hospitals (March, 2012). Accordingly, Australia directed aid away from its 
governance and public sector management priorities towards the PNG Government’s preferred 
infrastructure projects—though some of the programs remained focused on Australia’s core 
interests in health, education and policing (DFAT, 2013a, 2014a). O’Neill’s demand was made 
against the backdrop of PNG’s accommodation of the Pacific Solution, an Australian 
Government policy of transporting asylum seekers to detention centres on Manus Island and 
Nauru. However, PNG’s demand on where Australia should expend its aid program 
demonstrated PNG’s self-confidence in its dealings with Australia and the region. PNG’s 
confidence is also reflected in its hosting of the APEC Summit in 2018. The government’s 
foreign policy on human rights in West Papua is part of the demonstration of PNG’s growing 
confidence in dealing with regional issues. 
 
PNG has been developing a stronger sense of its place in the region and has increasingly 
seen itself as an important regional power with a role to play in shaping regional order. The 
prime minister was clearly focused on building and securing PNG’s reputation as a regional 
leader. Not only that, but the prime minister was also projecting his views about how PNG and 
its Pacific neighbours should interact in the region. For example, on 28 November 2014, Prime 
Minister O’Neill urged Fiji and the Pacific Island countries to accept Australia and NZ as part 
of the Pacific community, after Fiji sought to exclude Australia and NZ from the PIF. 
According to Fiji, Australia and NZ are outsiders and not part of the Pacific Islands region 
(Dobell, 2014). Fiji contended that the two regional powers have been interfering with the 
ability of the Pacific Island states to look for solutions to the regional problems that are 
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affecting the Pacific Islands (Bainimarama, 2013). Prime Minister O’Neill said that the 
structure of the PIF does not need changing: 
 
We must make sure that we don’t forget that we all live in the same 
region and Australia and New Zealand are very much part of that region 
… We need to encourage more dialogue and more common sense to 
prevail in these discussions … Our traditional partners like Australia 
and New Zealand continue to be important to the Pacific Island 
countries. It is foolhardy to think this is not the case because we live in 
the region, we understand each other, our people travel between our 
countries (O'Neill, 2014b). 
 
O’Neill’s concern about maintaining the regional order demonstrated his views about 
how the Pacific Island countries should interact in the region. His emphasis on dialogue and 
common sense in conversations in the region is significant in the case of West Papua because 
Prime Minister O’Neill would push for Indonesia to be included in the dialogue on human 
rights in West Papua, as will be explored later in this chapter. O’Neill’s statement is significant 
in terms of leadership because he saw PNG as a regional power with responsibilities to shape 
regional order. 
 
Prime Minister’s O’Neill’s perception of PNG as a regional leader is captured in his 
speech on 5 February. He projected PNG’s leadership image more than concerns about human 
rights. O’Neill used PNG’s undisturbed democracy as a benchmark for leadership against other 
MSG member countries in the region. Other member countries of the MSG had experienced 
some form of disturbance in their political history: in 1980, Vanuatu had the democratically 
elected government of Father Walter Lini challenged by an insurgent group led by Jimmy 
Stevens (which was discussed in Chapter 3); Fiji has had four different coups d’état in the past 
20 years (Firth et al., 2009); and the Solomon Islands slid into anarchy after a civil conflict 
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between two major island provinces, Malaita and Guadalcanal, evolved into a lengthened 
period of violence and lawlessness, which brought the country to the brink of collapse 
(Kabutaulaka, 2005; Moore, 2005; Nanau, 2008). Prime Minister O’Neill perceived PNG as a 
regional leader because it played a part in restoring peace and democracy in these troubled 
Melanesian states. PNG, with support from Australia, quelled the rebellion in Vanuatu. It 
helped Fiji back to democracy. In April 2013, the PNG Government helped fund Fiji’s first 
elections since the 2006 coup by contributing K50 million. PNG topped the list of international 
donors. Indeed, PNG’s contribution exceeded the cost to hold the polls. Its contribution of 
FJD18.6 million was twice as much money as the Fiji government’s contribution for its 
elections (Radio New Zealand, 2014; Saneem, 2014; Swami, 2014). Further, PNG contributed 
to RAMSI to restore peace, law and order in the Solomon Islands. According to Prime Minister 
O’Neill, PNG’s undisturbed democracy and, moreover, its contributions to peace and 
democracy in the region set it apart from the rest of the Melanesian states. As a regional leader, 
PNG felt it had a moral responsibility to speak for the oppressed in West Papua. O’Neill’s 
statement on 5 February demonstrated PNG’s confidence in dealing with a complex policy 
issue that has troubled successive PNG governments for many years. 
 
PNG’s confidence as a regional leader was strengthened by a decade of economic 
growth. This was expressed by the prime minister on 15 May 2014, during the launch of the 
first LNG cargo’s first shipment. Prime Minister O’Neill said: 
 
This project puts PNG on the world stage as a country that can work 
with foreign investors to deliver projects on time. It instils confidence 
in this country, and that is something for all of Papua New Guinea to 
be proud of (O'Neill, 2014a). 
 
The LNG project is the largest investment from ExxonMobil, the world’s largest oil 
and gas company, operating in PNG. ExxonMobil initially invested US$19 billion in the LNG 
191 
project (ExxonMobil, 2016). The LNG project is a newly developed project in the extractive 
industry that has contributed to the national economy. PNG, however, has experienced an 
economic transformation since 2002 because of a resource boom. The economic growth, which 
is represented GDP, is shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2. PNG GDP growth (annual per cent), 1997–2014. 
Source: World Bank (2017b). 
 
Because of the strong economic growth, PNG increased its aid diplomacy and role as a 
development partner in the region, which means it supported more activities and devoted more 
money to development assistance. PNG supported the Solomon Islands’ internal development 
programs. The 2013 Solomon Islands budget records indicate that PNG funding was $75 
million (Solomon Islands Budget, 2013). In 2013, it funded the creation of a permanent 
secretariat and headquarters for the parties to the Nauru Agreement. In the same year, PNG 
helped fund Fiji’s election, as mentioned earlier. The government also committed $150 million 
to the Pacific Small Island Developing States. This amount was intended to be spread over five 
years to address challenges in education, health, capacity building, climate change and 
infrastructure rehabilitation and development, following natural disasters in their countries 
(United Nations, 2015). 
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In December 2014, Prime Minister O’Neill said PNG’s expansion of its regional 
support program to help other developing Pacific nations was a consequence of the country’s 
ongoing economic development. He stated that PNG has a responsibility to strengthen the 
relationship with its Pacific neighbours, as well as an obligation to continue representing them 
in some of the global forums, such as the APEC meetings, to deliberate on issues like climate 
change, fluctuations in energy prices and the transmission of communicable diseases (Post-
Courier, 11 December 2014, p. 3). This statement is important because PNG saw itself as a 
regional leader representing the smaller island countries in the Pacific. As a regional leader, 
PNG felt that it had a responsibility to speak of issues that are central to the Pacific Island 
nations. In this context, PNG felt that it had a responsibility to speak against human rights 
abuses in West Papua, which is an issue that is central among the Melanesian societies. 
 
O’Neill was not the first prime minister to disburse aid to the Pacific Islands, but the 
increased distribution of wealth during his term so far has surpassed that of his predecessors 
(Batley, 2015). The provision of aid became a significant part of PNG’s regional diplomacy. 
The amount of aid it disbursed to other Pacific Island countries is not large by global standards, 
but it gave PNG greater leverage. It provided the platform for the government to pursue its 
commercial interest in the region. For example, PNG’s pension fund, NASFUND, formed joint 
ventures with other pension funds and businesses to invest in Fiji and the Solomon Islands, 
PNG’s BMobile acquired a telecommunications licence in the Solomon Islands (Kumul 
Consolidated Holdings; NASFUND, 2015) and PNG’s Bank South Pacific acquired banks in 
Cook Island, Samoa, Tonga, the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu (Bank of South Pacific, 2017). 
The deployment of aid—a foreign policy tool—to consolidate, influence and enhance PNG’s 
commercial interest in the region is important in the analysis of PNG’s foreign policy 
development. The case of West Papua is seen in this light. PNG used its nascent foreign policy 
tool to consolidate its position, commit resources in the region and subsequently push for West 
Papuan rights. 
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For the rest of this chapter, I return to the prime minister’s statement on 5 February 
2015, regarding West Papuan rights. O’Neill’s statement reflected an unstable foreign policy. 
I use the term unstable policy to denote the contradiction, rhetoric and ambiguity of PNG’s 
foreign policy on West Papua. His statement was rhetoric. It was an ambitious foreign policy 
that had no impact in terms of foreign policy implementation. O’Neill’s statement on 5 
February targeted the domestic audience. The statement helped to diffuse tensions that emerged 
from the two allegations levelled against him. It also helped to restore his public image. 
Following his rhetoric statement on 5 February, members of the opposition who were critical 
of his leadership welcomed his stance on West Papua. Deputy Opposition Leader, Sam Basil, 
thanked the prime minister for taking the issue of West Papua on board (Blades, 2015b). 
Similarly, Governor Juffa, one of the outspoken politicians in the opposition bench and a 
staunch supporter of the free Papua movement, welcomed O’Neill’s stance on West Papua. 
Speaking to the local television network, EMTV on 7 February, Juffa said: 
 
It’s good to see the Prime Minister getting onboard with the West 
Papua issue. Now we have to take it further. We have to demand that 
the UN review its 1969 decision and give freedom to the people of West 
Papua. Nothing else, we demand freedom (Juffa, 2015). 
 
Not only were the opposition members convinced, but various NGO groups and 
prominent leaders were also persuaded. An outspoken advocate for West Papua People’s 
Consultative Committee and former Sandaun Governor, John Tekwie, thanked the prime 
minister and welcomed his position on West Papua. He asked the prime minister to take that 
position further into official government policy so that the Committee can work properly with 
the government to reach an ultimate conclusion (Ramoi, 2015). The prime minister used the 
West Papua case to his advantage; he diffused tensions that emerged from the allegations by 
announcing his policy on West Papua, much to the pleasure of the civil society. Speaking 
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publicly about the rights of West Papuans played well to the domestic audience. His statement 
on West Papua improved his political image as prime minister, which was tainted by allegations 
of corruption and misconduct. He won the parliamentary opposition over and gained the 
confidence of the civil society, human rights advocacy groups and the Melanesian society at 
large.  
 
The prime minister’s statement on 5 February was ambiguous and contradictory. It was 
ambiguous in that it was not known whether he supported political rights and the freedom of 
West Papuans, or the freedom from persecution and torture. He used the word ‘oppression’ 
(O'Neill, 2015a), which he associated with ‘brutality’ (O'Neill, 2015a) and human rights 
concerns, but he was still misread by many human rights activists, including the Indonesian 
Government. After the prime minister’s announcement in February 2015, the head of 
Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights, Hafid Abbas, said Indonesia would ask 
PNG for clarification on O’Neill’s comments (ABC News, 2015a). On 1 March 2015, O’Neill 
met the Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Retno Marsudi, in Port Moresby and reiterated 
that PNG supports Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua. He clarified PNG’s position, 
stating that the issues of human rights and sovereignty in West Papua were ‘not linked’ 
(O’Neill, cited in The Economist, 2015). O’Neill maintained that West Papua was an integral 
part of Indonesia and that PNG’s concerns were about the human rights abuses against the 
Melanesian population living in it, not their political freedom. This response essentially 
reflected two contradictory foreign policy positions on West Papua: on 5 February, the prime 
minister made a statement that encroached on the non-intervention policy and on 1 March, he 
said he respected Indonesia’s sovereignty over West Papua. Prime Minister O’Neill changed 
the tone of his language from interventionist to cooperative. During President Joko Widodo’s 
visit to Port Moresby on 11–12 May 2015, O’Neill said: 
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We [Papua New Guinea and Indonesia] will be sitting down and 
sharing our views and looking at how we might work together to 
improving the lives of Melanesian people in the Papuan provinces. We 
know that in our countries, and around the region, there are contesting 
views on issues concerning the Papua province that has an 820km land 
border with PNG, and the West Papua province further west on the 
New Guinea island … Deep down, everyone wanted the same 
outcomes—peace, calm, and understanding between PNG and the 
Papuan provinces. We share the same border, we share the same 
culture, so a strong relationship is a must … For some years now I have 
been engaging in dialogue with our friends in Indonesia on issues 
relating to our relationship with Melanesians in the Indonesia provinces 
of Papua and West Papua … We [Papua New Guinea] appreciate that 
there is a great deal of passion and emotion in these discussions … Our 
Government looks to work with the Indonesian Government, and use 
our special connection with the Melanesian people of Papua and West 
Papua to encourage peace and stability (O'Neill, 2015c). 
 
O’Neill pulled back on his earlier statement, which made news headlines in PNG and 
abroad three months before. He offered to use PNG’s Melanesian connection to cooperate and 
assist Indonesia to improve the lives of the Melanesian people in the Papuan provinces. Prime 
Minister O’Neill essentially changed the tone of language from interventionist to cooperative, 
which reflects the policy contradiction on West Papua. The keynote of the meeting between 
Prime Minister O’Neill and President Widodo was that O’Neill eased the doubts that emerged 
after his speech on 5 February. The statement pointed more to the social welfare of West 
Papuans than to their political emancipation and it strengthened O’Neill’s justification that 
PNG was concerned about human rights and not political rights.  
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The prime minister’s statement on 5 February also targeted the MSG member countries. 
As mentioned previously, the prime minister made his statement a day after ULMWP 
submitted its application for membership to the MSG. O’Neill’s statement indicated PNG’s 
acquiescence to ULMWP’s bid for membership to the sub-regional group. His statement was 
an appeal to other MSG members to be more decisive on the human rights abuses against West 
Papuans when considering ULMWP’s bid for membership to MSG. He knew that PNG cannot 
handle West Papua alone, as will be observed later in this chapter. O’Neill appealed to the 
MSG member countries using cultural identity as a legitimating course. He used the terms ‘our 
family’ and ‘our brothers and sisters’ when he spoke against human rights abuses in West 
Papua (O'Neill, 2015a). Expressions such as ‘our people’, ‘our family’ and ‘our brothers and 
sisters’ strongly emphasise the cultural identity and ethnic link between the Melanesian 
societies. This emphasis is significant among the MSG member countries. PNG has long been 
pressured by the Melanesian societies to take a decisive stance against the oppression in West 
Papua because of the Melanesian brother pressure (Nyamekye & Premdas, 1979a, p. 939), 
which capitalises on ethnic bond. The prime minister’s statement on 5 February strengthened 
the Melanesian brotherhood rationale and helped endorse ULMWP’s bid for membership in 
the MSG. 
 
On 26 June 2015, during the MSG Leaders’ Summit in Honiara, the MSG member 
countries admitted ULMWP as an observer member of MSG, in which it represented 
Melanesians living abroad, and they admitted Indonesia as an associate member of the group, 
‘representing the five Melanesian Provinces in Indonesia’ (ABC News, 2015b). The 
compromise was messy, but better than the alternatives of alienating Indonesia or forsaking 
West Papua aspirations. Despite being denied full membership, ULMWP Secretary General 
Octavius Mote regarded the observer status positively. He said, ‘we might not be a full member 
of the MSG, but a door has opened to us. We will sit across a table from Indonesia as equal’ 
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(Mote, cited in Fox, 2015). The MSG’s diplomatic recognition of the pro-independence group 
was historic. It was the first time that the Indonesian Government and a West Papua 
organisation would have a seat at the same table in a regional forum. PNG’s endorsement of 
ULMWP’s bid for membership in the MSG does not constitute a call for autonomy, but it gave 
ULMWP a voice to be heard at the sub-regional group. Moreover, the West Papua case showed 
that cultural identity was influential in foreign policy. 
 
The West Papua case is significant in terms of PNG’s foreign policy development. 
Prime Minister O’Neill pushed for an active regional diplomacy to manage the complex West 
Papua issue. It involved competing interests: the economic interests of MSG member countries 
and their relationship with Indonesia; political independence, freedom from persecution and 
the physical abuse of West Papuans; PNG’s commitment to the non-interference policy; the 
Melanesian brotherhood pressure; and Indonesia’s growing influence in the region. O’Neill 
knew that PNG could not handle the West Papua issue alone, so he advocated a more inclusive 
approach. Prime Minister O’Neill said the ‘Pacific cannot deal with West Papua alone’ (O'Neill, 
2015b). West Papua, he said, required a concerted effort from both the Melanesian societies 
and Indonesia. O’Neill wanted the Pacific Island countries to be more inclusive and to include 
Indonesia in the dialogue if they wanted to see improved social conditions for West Papua 
(Hayward-Jones, 2015b). PNG supported this political statement when it backed Indonesia’s 
bid to become an associate member of MSG (Callick, 2015). Concurrently, PNG pushed for 
ULMWP to be included as an observer member of MSG. PNG’s push for Indonesia to be 
included in discussions that involved West Papua was a significant move because it brought 
Indonesia into the conversation. Making diplomacy more inclusive in the region was 
considered a step forward in addressing West Papua human rights, a sensitive foreign policy 
issue that had troubled successive PNG governments and the Melanesian societies for a very 
long time. It demonstrated national maturity in foreign policy vis-a-vis human rights in West 
Papua. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
What does the case study of West Papua reveal about contemporary foreign policy in 
PNG? I reflect on this question by observing at the concept of national interest and the different 
aspects of foreign policy. I begin with national interest. National interest, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, is an intrinsic part of foreign policy, in that it forms the basis for state actions in the 
international arena. Simply put, national interest drives foreign policy. This prompts the 
question: what drove foreign policy in the West Papua case? As observed earlier in this chapter, 
PNG had its own issues with human rights. Therefore, the issue of human rights was not the 
primary driver of foreign policy in the West Papua case. Human rights became secondary to 
PNG’s leadership ambition in the region. However, the leadership ambition did not represent 
the interests of Papua New Guineans. It reflected the prime minister’s perception of PNG and 
his views about how PNG should behave in the region. Many Papua New Guineans, including 
the public, church groups, human rights activists and members of the government and 
parliamentary opposition did not see West Papua in the light of regional politics. Instead, they 
saw human rights as the primary concern and West Papuans as ‘our family, our brothers and 
sisters’ (O'Neill, 2015a). The prime minister’s statement on 5 February 2015, regarding the 
oppression and brutality inflicted on West Papuans, received wider approval from the domestic 
audience and the Melanesian societies at large. The issue of human rights in West Papua 
essentially played into PNG’s ambition to consolidate its leadership status in the region. 
Concurrently, cultural identity also played an influential role in PNG’s foreign policy on West 
Papua. The words ‘our family, our brothers and sisters’ highlighted the cultural identity among 
the Melanesian people, which appealed to the domestic audience as well as to Melanesian 
societies in the Pacific region. In the context of national interest, I argue that PNG’s foreign 
policy in West Papua was driven by competing interests such as culture, human rights, regional 
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politics and PNG’s leadership ambition in the region. Correspondingly, the competing interests 
have been reflected in an unstable foreign policy, which is covered next. 
 
The case of West Papua portrayed two aspects of foreign policy: unstable and strategic 
foreign policy. The unstable aspect of the policy is reflected by the prime minister’s 
contradictory statements. The policy is contradictory in that the government’s statement on 5 
February 2015 signalled a departure from the traditional non-intervention policy, much to the 
delight of human rights activists and the Melanesian society at large. However, PNG still 
respected Indonesia’s sovereignty over West Papua, as mentioned by the prime minister on 1 
March of the same year. Second, it is rhetoric because it demonstrated a disconnect between 
policy and practice. The government announced an ambitious foreign policy to address human 
rights in West Papua, but the policy lacked a detailed plan for implementation, which points to 
weak institutional support. That is, the formal institutions responsible for foreign policy did not 
support the government’s ambition to address human rights in West Papua at either the 
domestic or regional levels. It alluded to the prevalence of informal institutions in foreign 
policymaking, or foreign policy was conversely made outside the government’s formal 
institutions. Finally, the foreign policy on West Papua is ambiguous. This ambiguity manifests 
in two ways. First, it was unclear whether the prime minister supported political rights and 
freedom, or freedom from the Indonesian authorities’ persecution and torture of West Papuans. 
Populist support for West Papua in PNG and elsewhere in the Pacific largely leaned towards 
political freedom and freedom from oppression (e.g., cruelty, abuse and brutality), or both. The 
prime minister was concerned about oppression and human rights, which had connotations of 
social and political freedom. Therefore, Indonesian authorities urged him to clarify PNG’s 
position. Second, PNG pushed for human rights in West Papua because it felt that, as a regional 
leader, it had the moral obligation to speak about the oppression of Melanesians living in 
Indonesia. The government’s move to lead discussions on West Papua was justified along the 
lines of human rights abuses. Therefore, the moral justification was invoked. However, the 
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moral justification became secondary to the leadership rationale as a legitimating course. It 
reflected the ambiguity of foreign policy on West Papua. 
 
I now consider the strategic feature of foreign policy. This is significant in the analysis 
of PNG’s evolution and development of foreign policy. The West Papua case demonstrated 
one of the first instances of a substantive PNG foreign policy that was supported by resources 
and a degree of policy coherence. Supported by a period of strong economic growth, PNG 
expanded its nascent foreign policy tool—aid—to consolidate its position and pursue its 
interests in the region. The case of West Papua is an example. The government pursued its 
interest by regionalising the issue of human rights. PNG pursued an active regional diplomacy 
to manage a complex foreign policy issue that has troubled successive PNG governments for 
many years. This is unique to foreign policy and is significant in the evolution of foreign policy 
in PNG. It demonstrated maturity in foreign policymaking.  
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
In this concluding chapter, I return to the question that was posed in the introduction: 
what factors have been influential in shaping PNG’s foreign policy in the twenty-first century? 
Since the 1990s, PNG has experienced significant changes domestically, in its region and in its 
place in the global society. Despite these changes, very little scholarly attention has been 
devoted to understanding how PNG’s foreign policy has changed, or what factors are driving 
these changes. This chapter reflects on this research question. In doing so, it contributes to the 
scholarship on PNG’s foreign policy and its making in the twenty-first century. The study is 
important for scholarly and practical purposes, particularly for foreign policy practitioners. 
PNG’s future depends on how well policymakers understand and manage their connection to 
the rest of the region and the rest of the world. Understanding the factors that influence 
contemporary foreign policy is important, if policymakers are to have a sense of any future 
directions. The chapter is divided into three parts. The first sets the foundation for the period 
under review by examining the foreign policy environment from the period 1975–2003. The 
findings in this study are covered in the second part. It is focused on the period 2003–2015, 
where there are deliberate continuities, changes and challenges of foreign policy. In the final 
part, I reflect on PNG’s foreign policy. 
 
7.1 The Foreign Policy Environment, 1975–2015 
To understand key changes in the contemporary period, one must first have a sense of 
the foundation. Chapter 3 explored the nature of PNG’s postcolonial foreign policy. 
Independent PNG’s evolving foreign policy approach—reflected in the doctrines of 
universalism and then active and selective engagement—point to a tentative attempt to 
articulate an independent foreign policy. However, the period from 1975 to the early 1980s 
was characterised by competing dynamics. PNG’s capacity to implement an independent 
foreign policy was limited institutionally, as reflected in its small foreign ministry and 
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inexperienced political leadership (Boyce, 1978). PNG’s aspiration to conduct foreign policy 
that is independent from external influence has often been limited because PNG remained 
heavily dependent on Australia. This limitation was best manifested in the high levels of aid 
dependence on Australia, which indicated that PNG’s external relations with other countries in 
the region could not be thoroughly pursued. Its foreign policy often showed almost a default 
support for Australia’s foreign policy positions. 
 
In the mid-1980s, PNG began to reconsider its national interest by adopting the active 
and selective engagement approach to foreign policy. The policy approach succeeded in 
diversifying economic and aid relations. Over the period, different prime ministers and their 
foreign affairs ministers adopted different strategies under the rubric of active and selective 
engagement, but the foreign policy initiatives did not differ much in substance and objective 
from the immediate postcolonial period. Foreign policies were constrained by an unclear sense 
of the national interest and a lack of strategic policy direction. National interest, under the broad 
active and selective engagement approach was extensive and left to the government in power 
to decide. Changes began to occur by the 1990s and early 2000s. Changes in the international 
environment—especially at the end of the Cold War and with the increasing economic 
dynamism of Northeast and Southeast Asia—embodied new challenges and opportunities. As 
observed in Chapter 1, the prime minister who was under pressure from domestic and external 
forces moved unilaterally to give Taiwan diplomatic recognition in exchange for billions of 
dollars in aid, soft loans and investments. China and Australia denounced the move. 
Nonetheless, this period was quite turbulent for PNG in terms of foreign policy, as it responded 
to implications prompted by the end of superpower rivalry and an increasing multipolarity. It 
also responded to the enhanced influence of international and regional organisations, 
international law and the emphasis on economic issues in international affairs. The period 
coincided with the growing influence of China in the Pacific. The rise of China as an economic 
and military power created geopolitical opportunities for PNG and other Pacific Island 
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countries. PNG no longer needed to identify itself solely with regional hegemons like Australia 
and NZ, as it had more choice of which external power or powers it engaged with. The period 
was simultaneously marked by a growing populist resentment towards external influence, 
particularly the World Bank, IMF and their support for a privatisation policy that was discussed 
in Chapter 3. 
 
Since the 2000s, the foreign policy environment in which PNG finds itself has become 
more fluid. The Pacific region has observed the entry of more active external participants, 
which is reflected in the growing engagement of China and Indonesia. In the early 2000s, 
Australia has also improved its regional engagement, which is best reflected in its new 
interventionism. It considered the region a part of securitised borderlands that can be used as a 
buffer for protecting its security interests, which ultimately manifested in the establishment of 
the offshore detention centres in Manus and Nauru. Further, Australia decided to recast its aid 
programs in the region to include security and demanded good governance to secure its security 
interests, as can be exemplified in the RAMSI and the ECP. These changes signified that PNG 
had more options in terms of foreign policy. 
 
Internally, PNG was also changing. Its economic development, based on the LNG 
project, gave PNG a new sense of economic independence and confidence. The increasing self-
confidence is powerfully symbolised in PNG becoming an aid donor to Melanesian neighbours 
like the Solomon Islands and in its hosting of APEC in 2018. A new generation of leaders, 
supported by a few from the old group (like Somare), were becoming more nationalistic and 
assertive. Deference to Australia has often been replaced with disputes and frequent opposition. 
PNG’s domestic politics have also created pressures on foreign policy. NGOs, pressure groups 
and civil societies have increased their efforts to influence foreign policy, which is best 
demonstrated in the issue of West Papua. PNG has also developed a stronger sense of its place 
in the region and increasingly sees itself as an important regional power with a role to play in 
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shaping regional order. This is best reflected in its insistence on maintaining the regional 
architecture, following the exclusion of Australia and NZ in the Pacific Islands Development 
Forum (which is discussed in Chapter 6). In combination, these factors have interacted to 
unsettle the postcolonial status quo. However, does it result in the emergence of a more 
coherent foreign policy? This question is answered by examining the three case studies. 
 
7.2 Papua New Guinea’s Foreign Policy, 2003–2015 
The research illuminates important areas of continuity as well as significant changes 
that have occurred in regard to PNG’s foreign policy over the period 2003–2015. An important 
area of continuity has been the centrality of the PNG–Australia relationship, albeit a 
relationship whose tenor has changed over time and will continue to change. Despite tensions 
between the two countries, as exemplified in the Moti case, PNG’s bilateral relationship with 
Australia remains a fundamental element of its international relations. Australia continues to 
support PNG’s development through bilateral agreements. PNG reciprocates and supports 
Australia’s regional policies, which is best reflected in PNG’s renewed commitment to the 
Pacific Solution, in which it signed the Regional Resettlement Arrangement between Australia 
and Papua New Guinea in 2013. 
 
The relationship between PNG and Australia has historically been one of aid donor and 
aid recipient. Since independence, PNG has focused on reducing its dependence on Australia 
and this objective has been the hallmark of its foreign policy, as reflected in universalism and 
active and selective engagement. One of the defining elements of PNG’s foreign policy during 
the period under review has been the increasing enthusiasm for moving away from Australia’s 
influence. In the ECP case study, the prime minister showed an increased willingness to push 
back on Australia, but he failed. After a period of conflict and a court case, PNG embraced the 
successor to the ECP—the SGP—in 2009, despite its resemblance to the ECP. This prompted 
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a sort of reluctant return to a less intrusive program, which underlies the reality of PNG’s 
continued dependence. 
 
PNG has long aspired to move away from its dependence on Australia, but its ability to 
do so has arisen more as a result of the growing economy (resource-driven) and increasing 
investment from other countries (globalisation) than from any deliberate act of foreign policy. 
Measured against key foreign policy concepts that are introduced in Chapter 2, the study does 
not convey a strong sense of institutional consolidation and coherence in terms of PNG’s 
capacity to make and implement coherent foreign policy. The Moti case demonstrated that 
foreign policy was influenced by individuals in the bureaucracy and further indicated political 
interference in the policy process. The pervasive indigenous cultures and deep-rooted 
traditional values challenged formal government institutions, as observed in the Moti affair. 
The case of the ECP has highlighted a lack of foreign policy coordination. Overall, the period 
under review has not observed a strong sense of institutional development in foreign policy. 
To some extent, the weak institutional environment reveals more about the development of the 
state. After 42 years of independence, PNG is still struggling to manage the impact of its 
traditional cultures on the modern political and administrative institutions. While the 
institutional context of foreign policy in PNG remains weak and has arguably become 
significantly weaker—and more personalised in individual political leaders—over the years, 
other PNG institutions, notably the courts, have continued to operate according to formal rules 
and procedures. The courts have acted to stabilise foreign policy engagement, but this has been 
largely reactive, as reflected in the ECP case. 
 
The period 2003–2015 marked the beginning of a more contentious and emboldened 
(on PNG’s part) bilateral relationship with Australia. National pride and a sense of nationalism 
increasingly became important. The period displayed a growing resistance to Australia’s 
influence in PNG, reflected in the ECP and Moti cases. Frustration at Australia’s influence was 
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connected with PNG’s dependent culture. Dependence on Australia has often been an affront 
to national pride. PNG’s ambition to minimise its dependence on Australia did not meet the 
expectations of policymakers. PNG’s continued dependence on its former administrator has 
raised the ire of some in certain quarters in the country, particularly those sharing nationalist 
sentiments. Political elites often evoked sentiments of nationalism and deployed nationalist 
rhetoric—usually against a perceived Australian dominance—to justify PNG’s independence 
and national sovereignty. What is interesting about the use of nationalism is how it has not 
been translated into a coherent policy to downplay Australia’s influence. The cases of the ECP 
and Moti provided examples of how inflammatory rhetoric complicated bilateral relations with 
Australia, but they did not result in significant changes to key parts of bilateral relations such 
as aid dependency and commercial interests. The period under review has not seen the 
emergence of a more coherent foreign policy, or the successful pursuance of alternative foreign 
policy choices that can minimise PNG’s dependence on Australia, apart from the rhetorical 
look north policy and the elusive exit strategy. 
 
The look north policy created economic opportunities for PNG, particularly in the 
increased aid and investment from China (Crocombe, 2007; Wallis, 2017). However, the policy 
did not emerge because of an articulate or planned policy, as discussed in Chapter 3. PNG 
leaders have often declared support for the look north policy to reduce national dependence on 
traditional partners in Australia and other Western countries, but there is not much evidence of 
a coherent ability of the PNG’s system to articulate and implement the look north policy. It 
represented a tentative and incoherent foreign policy that was not supported by sustained 
diplomacy and strategic repositioning. PNG leaders often deployed it to entertain and incite 
populist nationalism because pushing back on Australia played well to the domestic audience. 
During the study period, the government also announced its exit strategy as an incentive to 
gradually phase out Australian aid. Ironically, much of this policy initiative would require 
continued Australian assistance and a long time to materialise. It signifies that Australia’s 
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subtle influence through its aid programs (e.g., financial aid, technical assistance and military 
cooperation) and its economic influence will remain indefinitely. As such, PNG’s ambition to 
move away from its dependent relationship remains a formidable challenge for policymakers 
in PNG. 
 
PNG also became increasingly confident in its relations with other Pacific Island 
countries. Backed by a relatively strong economy, PNG increased its aid diplomacy and 
consolidated its position as a regional leader. It developed a stronger sense of its place in the 
region and increasingly saw itself as an important regional power with a role to play in shaping 
regional order. In doing do, PNG departed from the rhetoric of ‘work the Pacific’ in the mid-
1990s (see Chapter 3) when it played a relatively passive role in regional politics. PNG’s 
confidence in the region is best reflected in West Papua. The West Papua issue is a sensitive 
policy issue that has been avoided for many years. Countries in the region, including Indonesia 
and Australia, are aware of the human rights abuses in West Papua, but have not given much 
attention to it because they find the discussions uncomfortable. For the first time in PNG’s 
political history post-independence, the government spoke directly about the rights of West 
Papuans concerning torture and politically motivated violence against them in a public forum. 
This was a significant departure from the non-interference policy in Indonesia. 
 
The case of West Papua is an outlier in PNG’s foreign policy development, in the sense 
that it demonstrated a concerted foreign policy. PNG pushed its interest by regionalising the 
issue. It deployed its nascent foreign policy tool of aid diplomacy, consolidated its position in 
the region, endorsed the inclusion of West Papua in the sub-regional group of MSG, supported 
Indonesia’s elevation to associate member of the sub-regional group and included Indonesia in 
the dialogue concerning human rights in West Papua. This is a significant development in the 
evolution of foreign policy in PNG, as it confirms a concerted foreign policy. It is one of the 
first instances of foreign policy that is supported by resourcing and a degree of policy coherence 
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in terms of active diplomacy. Foreign policy in PNG, as Wolfers and Dihm (2009) argued, has 
‘been a matter of government trying to take advantage of external opportunities or responding 
to external pressures’ (Wolfers & Dihm, 2009, p. 307). This suggested the reactive nature of 
PNG’s foreign policy. The West Papua case departed from the status quo in that it suggested a 
more strategic than reactive foreign policy. 
 
One of the defining characteristics of foreign policy in the study period has been the 
personalisation of foreign policy, a feature of foreign policymaking that was consistent with 
the previous period. The key political figure wielded influence over the policy process and 
political institutions. The prime minister particularly enjoyed a pre-eminent position in foreign 
policy decision-making in an otherwise pluralistic domestic environment. He excluded 
opposition, prevented civil society participation, circumvented the policy process and 
subsequently excluded senior public officials in the policy process, as reflected in the cases of 
the ECP and the Moti affair. This is largely because the prime minister had personal power in 
leadership. In PNG and elsewhere in Melanesian societies, personal power is deeply ingrained 
in culture. The ‘big man’ wielded influence over decision-making and politics in traditional 
Melanesian societies. The influence of the ‘big man’ continues to pervade the modern systems 
of government and politics. Political leaders use this power in different ways. In the context of 
foreign policy, for example, Prime Minister Somare used this power to easily manipulate 
foreign policy in the direction that corresponded to his personal biases and interest, which is 
reflected in the Moti case. The Moti case established that the prime minister wielded influence 
over the policy process. The case also revealed the tensions between the efforts to 
institutionalise foreign policy, which would consolidate and strengthen the power and position 
of formal institutions, and the personalisation of foreign policy, which undermined formal laws 
and the effectiveness of political institutions. The personalisation of foreign policy significantly 
undermined formal rules and power of the formal institutions. The prime minister ignored the 
collective bureaucratic position to respect the extradition and judicial process. In doing so, he 
209 
undermined certain prospects for strengthening the formal institutions and foreign policy. His 
supporters circumvented the formal processes and procedures and subsequently violated the 
PNG constitution and its by-laws, the Chicago Convention and extradition treaties. Conversely, 
Prime Minister O’Neill personally handled a sensitive issue that has for almost four decades 
troubled PNG and the rest of the Melanesian societies with diplomacy. Overall, the 
personalisation of foreign policy remains an important feature of foreign policymaking in PNG. 
 
7.3 Reflection on PNG’s Foreign Policy 
This study highlights the state’s limited capacity to identify and implement coherent 
policies in pursuit of a commonly shared national interest. This is partly because foreign policy 
has been conducted in a fragmented manner, as discussed in Chapter 3. The main reason for 
this is foreign policy consultation and coordination, which has been one of the formidable 
challenges in PNG’s political and bureaucratic landscape (Bogari, 2010; Wolfers & Dihm, 
2009). One of the contributing factors that challenges foreign policy coordination is the 
isolation of the foreign affairs ministry in the Central Agency Coordinating Committee 
(CACC). The CACC was established in early 2000 (NEC Decision No: 10/2000) and it 
included the foreign affairs ministry. However, the ministry’s inclusion appears to be on paper 
only. In practice, it has never been an active member. This concern was raised during the Heads 
of Mission Conference in 2014, when foreign affairs officials met to review PNG’s foreign 
policy in the twenty-first century (PNG Department of Foreign Affairs, 2014). The conference 
urged the government to give the DFA due recognition and to allow it to be an active member 
of the CACC. The proposal was made to ensure that, under the whole-of-government approach 
to doing government business, there is better coordination between domestic policies and 
foreign policy. The conference reiterated that policies and proposals initiated by the 
bureaucracy could be appropriately reconciled with foreign policy and that actions by other 
departments and agencies that have international relations implications can have the benefit of 
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proper advice from foreign affairs. This study affirmed the lack of foreign policy coordination, 
as discussed in the cases of the ECP and West Papua. Such recommendation from foreign 
policy practitioners should not be overlooked. It is not only fitting, but necessary—particularly 
at this time in history when the foreign policy environment has become more fluid. 
 
The case of West Papua established the importance of political stability in foreign 
policy. Political stability gave PNG’s political leadership more scope to pursue new foreign 
policy objectives. For example, the O’Neill government enjoyed a political environment that 
was relatively stable. O’Neill assumed office in August 2011, served two consecutive terms 
and is currently still serving. He completed the full five-year period of the parliamentary life 
as prime minister from 2012 to 2017. During his tenure in office, Prime Minister O’Neill 
strengthened PNG’s relations with the Pacific Island countries and pushed the West Papua case 
in the MSG. The stable political environment enhanced the confidence of key political leaders, 
not to mention the investor confidence in PNG. This is a new development in PNG’s political 
landscape. PNG governments do not normally serve their full term before they are voted out 
through votes of no-confidence. Indeed, every government since independence has been a 
coalition and no government has lasted a full parliamentary term (May, 2003b, p. 4). Political 
instability has posed significant challenges for policy continuity and policy implementation in 
PNG. The West Papua case demonstrated the importance of a stable political environment. The 
government pursued its regional policies with confidence, including preparing for the APEC 
meeting in November 2018. 
 
The conduct of foreign policy under Prime Minister O’Neill has departed from the 
personalised approach to foreign policy, which has been one of the hallmarks of foreign 
policymaking in PNG since independence. O’Neill was more receptive to public opinion and 
has shown diplomacy in handling PNG’s foreign policy. O’Neill’s approach to managing 
foreign policy is partly influenced by interest groups (people who joined together for a specific 
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purpose or to advance a cause they believe in) and the attentive public (people who have a 
serious interest in the events around the globe) who have been informed about either specific 
foreign policy issues or foreign affairs in general. The dissemination of foreign policy 
information and issues is largely attributed to the improved information and communication 
technology in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Before this period, the scarcity of 
foreign affairs information accessed by the PNG public has generally been limited. Many 
Papua New Guineans paid little, if any, attention to the day-to-day developments in world 
politics. As a result, political leaders like the prime minister had more freedom in foreign 
policymaking. However, the government has recently been increasingly responsive to public 
opinion, as demonstrated in the case of West Papua. The changing approach to foreign 
policymaking is likely to be strengthened by the departure of the old generation of political 
leaders who wielded influence over foreign policy. For example, Somare epitomised the ‘big 
man’ who wielded influence in government, politics and foreign policy, as is reflected in the 
ECP and Moti cases. By virtue of his charismatic personality, he instigated the huge political 
mobilisation effort to prepare PNG for independence (Momis, 2016). Highly respected 
throughout the Pacific Islands region, Sir Michael Somare was instrumental in ushering PNG 
to independence from Australia in 1975 and now serves as the country’s first prime minister. 
On 4 April 2017, the founding father of the nation and former prime minister, Sir Michael 
Somare, was given a standing ovation as he gave his farewell speech to Parliament. The day 
marked exactly 49 years since Sir Michael first entered the House of Assembly in the Territory 
of Papua and New Guinea as a politician (Blades, 2017; Mauludu, 2017). Somare’s departure 
from PNG’s political landscape marked the end of era in which he and others of his kind had 
more control over foreign policy. 
 
From 2013 to 2015, PNG experienced a comparatively robust economic growth that 
underpinned a strong government revenue growth. This performance was aided by high 
commodity prices for PNG exports, supportive macro-economic policy settings and 
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developments in the resources sector, the most notable of which being the construction of the 
PNG LNG project and the first gas exports in 2014 (Osborne, Harden & Hoy, 2017; World 
Bank, 2017a). The strong economy gave PNG a sense of independence and instilled confidence 
in the government, as confirmed by Prime Minister O’Neill (O'Neill, 2014a). Reinforced by a 
strong economy and self-confidence, PNG increased its presence in the region. Following years 
of relatively strong economic growth, it is now confronting a period of significantly weaker 
growth (Osborne et al., 2017). An important question is posed, given this shift in the 
environment: would PNG pursue its regional policies with the same vigour that it did in the 
period 2003–2015? This is a question with an answer that is yet to be seen. 
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